Archiv der Kategorie: Fonds-/Managerselektion

ESG transparency returns illustration by natishus from pixabay

ESG transparency returns: Researchpost 195

ESG transparency returns: Illustration by Natishus from Pixabay

12x new research on green hydrogen acceptance, climate data, transition funds, sustainability reporting problems, materiality assessment issues, ESG disclosure premium, ESG discount, ESG investment limits, diversity benefits, non-additional green bonds, private equity low risk anomaly (#shows number of SSRN full paper downloads as of Sept. 26th,2024)

Ecological and social research

Green hydrogen acceptance: Keep it local and safe: Which system of green hydrogen production in Germany is accepted by citizens? by Johannes Buchner, Klaus Menrad, and Thomas Decker as of Dec. 20th, 2024 (#5): “… our study aims to identify significant factors influencing the German population‘s acceptance of green hydrogen production within various acceptance groups with differing preferences for future green hydrogen production systems. … Based on our results, it is recommended that required renewable energy for green hydrogen production be produced as close to the green hydrogen plants as possible. It must be ensured and communicated to the public that the (planned) green hydrogen plants meet high safety standards and pose a very low risk of fire or explosion. The neighbouring population should also benefit through annual heating cost savings and financial participation …“ (abstract).

Climate data analysis: ClimRetrieve: A Benchmarking Dataset for Information Retrieval from Corporate Climate Disclosures by Tobias Schimanski, Jingwei Ni, Roberto Spacey, Nicola Ranger, and Markus Leippold as of July 19th, 2024 (#46): “…this work simulates the typical tasks of a sustainability analyst by examining 30 sustainability reports with 16 detailed climate-related questions. As a result, we obtain a dataset with over 8.5K unique question-source-answer pairs labeled by different levels of relevance. Furthermore, we develop a use case with the dataset to investigate the integration of expert knowledge into information retrieval with embeddings. Although we show that incorporating expert knowledge works, we also outline the critical limitations of embeddings in knowledge-intensive downstream domains like climate change communication“ (abstract).

ESG investment research (in: ESG transparency returns)

Transition funds: Olive Is the New Black: The Rise of Transition Funds by Rumi Mahmood, Xinxin Wang, and Shuang Guo from MSCI as of September 12th, 2024: “Transition-labeled funds have seen rapid growth in recent years, with over USD 50 billion across more than 100 funds globally. Although the majority of transition funds (>70%) are domiciled in Europe, their primary investments are in the U.S., with a skew toward specialty chemicals, semiconductors and electrical components. In 2023, most transition funds delivered positive returns, with almost half outperforming their benchmark or parent index”.

Green information quality? Mandatory Sustainability Reporting and Project Selection by Hui Chen and Fulvia Oldrini as of June 21st, 2024 (#52): “… we examine the implications of implementing a mandate for sustainability reporting in an environment where companies are already inclined to disclose such information voluntarily. We compare the effects of voluntary and mandatory disclosure regimes through a parsimonious model where a manager has to choose between a brown and green project. The two projects are mutually exclusive and generate different financial returns and environmental externalities. We show that a mandatory disclosure regime for sustainability information is more likely to encourage the manager to invest in the green project than a voluntary regime. … when we consider the costs associated with a mandate, mandatory disclosure improves investors’ welfare only when the quality of the sustainability information system is sufficiently high“ (p. 30/31).

Material or sustainable? A review of ex ante and ex post materiality measures, and consequences and determinants of material disclosures in sustainability reporting by Asif M Huq and Mahsa Mohammadrezaei as of June 26th, 2024 (#26): “The purpose of the review is to synthesize the research on materiality measures of sustainability reporting and highlight how preparers, users, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders assess or determine the materiality in sustainability reporting. The review further summarizes the findings on consequences and determinants of material disclosures in sustainability reporting. … We find that the ex post materiality measures are simplistic and unidirectional in nature and ex ante materiality measures lack external validity and are generally narrow in focus – for example, focused on single firms or industries. Another major limitation in the current literature is the absence of robust empirical investigation of double materiality in sustainability reporting and a vast majority of the measures are developed without stakeholder engagement. Lastly, we document that the findings on determinants of material disclosure are fragmented and inconclusive and along with the literature on consequences of material disclosure is rather un-explored“ (abstract). My comment: This is important for shareholder engagement. I often get feedback from the companies I want to invest in, that they conducted a materiality analysis and will only focus on what they determined to be material and therefore do not care much about (my) shareholder proposals if these do not focus on the “material” topics.

ESG transparency returns (1): The ESG Disclosure Premium by Yumeng Gao, Benjamin C. Herbert, and Lionel Melin as of Dec. 23rd, 2024 (#30): “This paper investigates how firms’ valuations are impacted by the disclosure of ESG metrics. It concludes that companies are granted a lower cost of equity capital from initiating disclosure on any of the eight key environmental and social topics investigated. Markets appear to reward the availability of environmental metrics more than social ones. Interestingly, the positive disclosure premium has strengthened over time in developed Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. It has broadly turned from negative to positive in developed North America and emerging markets after the 2015 Paris Agreement. The paper also details, sector by sector, the specific premium that disclosure on the various topics would warrant …“ (p. 23).

ESG transparency returns (2): From Mandate to Market across the Globe: The Impact of Mandatory ESG Disclosure on the Cost of Equity Capital by Tung Lam Dang, Duc Trung Do, Thang Ho, and Cameron Truong as of June 26th, 2024 (#233): “By utilizing staggered ESG disclosure regulations across 35 countries … we identify a causal relationship between ESG disclosure and the cost of equity. Our results indicate a substantial reduction in the cost of equity by an average of 50 basis points due to ESG disclosure mandates. … Firms with weaker pre-mandate information environments experience a larger drop in equity-financing cost in the post-adoption periods. Second, firms, particularly those with high ESG ratings, witness increased interest from institutional investors who prioritize ESG considerations” (p. 37).

ESG discount? Is it time to change the climate for ESG Investing? by Timothy A. Krause and Eric R. Robbins as of Sept. 19th, 2024 (#35): “There is a preponderance of evidence that ESG investing provides negative incremental returns to shareholders, which may be a result of the imprecise early measures used to estimate corporate ESG performance. An in-depth analysis of the recent empirical research and the current empirical study of both contemporaneous and long-term stock returns clearly shows the relationships among third-party ESG scores and stock returns are largely negative. Our results are confirmed by much of the recent research, although we use a robust statistical methodology to provide additional evidence that this is the case over both the short- and long-term” (abstract). My comment: I do not think that this research is objective regarding (previous) ESG evidence (I included many other studies in my blog posts which show other results than this one)

ESG investment limits: Sustainable Investing: Evidence From the Field by Alex Edmans, Tom Gosling, and Dirk Jenter as of Sept. 23rd, 2024 (#734): “We survey 509 equity portfolio managers from both traditional and sustainable funds … ES performance influences stock selection, engagement, and voting for over three quarters of investors, including nearly two thirds of traditional investors. Financial considerations are a primary reason, even among sustainable funds. Few are willing to sacrifice financial returns for ES performance, largely due to fiduciary duty concerns, and voting and engagement are mainly driven by financial considerations. A second reason is constraints. Fund mandates, firmwide policies, or client wishes caused 71% to make stock selection, voting, or engagement decisions that they would otherwise not have. Some of these actions had financial consequences, such as avoiding stocks that would improve returns or diversification; others had ES consequences, such as avoiding stocks whose ES performance they could have improved” (abstract). My comment: I am happy that I have very limited (only legal and regulatory and – rarely – client specific) constraints to invest and engage as sustainable as I can.

Impact and SDG investment research

Diversity benefits: Unveiling the Dual Impact of Diversity & Inclusion: Boosting Financial Outcomes Through Enhanced Environmental Performance by Eleonora Monaco, Luca Galati, Lorenzo Dal Maso, and Marco Maria Mattei as of Sept. 20th, 2024 (#7): “The analysis conducted over a large sample of globally listed companies from 2017 to 2022 highlights that fostering a holistic approach to D&I is not only associated with enhanced financial performance but also with a firm’s ability to manage environmental issues. This subsequently contributes to superior financial metrics, underscoring a significant mediation effect where 40% of the financial benefits from D&I is associated with enhanced environmental performance …“ (p. 24).

Non-Additional? Green Bonds: New Label, Same Projects by Pauline Lam and Jeffrey Wurgler as of Sept. 9th, 2024 (#8): “Green finance emphasizes “additionality,” meaning funded projects should offer distinct environmental benefits beyond standard practice. Analysis of U.S. corporate and municipal green bonds, however, indicates that the vast majority of green bond proceeds is used for refinancing ordinary debt, continuing ongoing projects, or initiating projects without green aspects that are novel for the issuer. Only 2% of corporate and municipal green bond proceeds initiate projects with clearly novel green features. Investors and market participants also do not distinguish among levels of additionality: Offering yields, announcement effects, green bond index inclusion, and green bond fund holdings are uncorrelated with additionality” (abstract). My comment: Additionality in the sense of this research is a very demanding requirement but Green Bonds should clearly be used to finance really green projects.

Other investment research (in: ESG transparency returns)

PE low risk anomaly: Benchmarking Private Equity Performance – When Fund-Level Cash Flows are Missing by Da Li and Timothy Riddiough as of Sept. 19th, 2024 (#24): “After pooling together risk-adjusted performance results for funds with and without detailed cash flow data, we find that Buyout funds outperform the S&P500, while Venture Capital and Real Estate funds underperform for most of the sample period. We further classify Venture Capital and Real Estate funds by their strategy types and vintage years, and find that there is a negative relationship between benchmarked returns and fund strategy riskiness” (p. 26). My comment: Most investors use funds of funds or gatekeepers to invest in alternatives. After accounting for the respective costs, even buyout funds may not be attractive anymore.

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Werbehinweis (in: ESG transparency returns)

Unterstützen Sie meinen Researchblog, indem Sie in den von mir beratenen globalen Smallcap-Investmentfonds (siehe FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T) investieren und/oder ihn empfehlen. Der Fonds konzentriert sich auf die UN-Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (aktuell durchschnittlich 93% SDG-vereinbare Umsätze der Portfoliounternehmen: Investment impact) und verwendet separate E-, S- und G-Best-in-Universe-Mindestratings sowie Aktionärsengagement (Investor impact) bei derzeit 29 von 30 Unternehmen (siehe auch My fund).

ESG dislosure benefits illustration by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay

ESG disclosure benefits: Researchpost 193

ESG disclosure benefits illustration from Pixabay by Gerd Altmann

14x new research on climate, water and ESG disclosure and litigation effects, World Bank greenwashing, pollution exports, green shows, ESG outperformance, emission credit risks, green bond and green fund benefits, low SDG alignments, financial LLMs, and degrowth theory problems by Heiko Bailer, Thorsten Hens, Stefan Ruenzi and many more (#shows number of SSRN full paper downloads as of Sept. 12th, 2024)

Ecological and social research

Green disclosure meta-study (ESG disclosure benefits 1): The Economic Consequences of Climate Risk Disclosures by Meena Subedi and Emily Zoet as of June 7th, 2024 (#56): “… this study provides stakeholders with a thorough analysis of the economic effects of climate risk disclosures, reveals emerging trends, and identifies future research opportunities in this area. … Prior studies find mixed results regarding the positive or negative effects of climate risk and suggest disclosure of climate action may mitigate the penalties associated with climate risk. … Additionally, we compare the theoretical frameworks used in prior studies. We identify the predominant theories and their distinct assumptions and focus, providing insight for future researchers to refer to in their climate disclosure studies” (p. 34).

Good water disclosure (ESG disclosure benefits 2): Self-regulation and self-presentation in sustainability reporting: Evidence from firms’ voluntary water disclosure by Siwen Liu and Hans van der Heijden as of June 6th, 2024 (#68): “This study focuses on water disclosure, a key dimension of sustainability reporting, which, despite the importance of water, has received relatively little theoretical and empirical attention. … we document supportive evidence for the positive relations between voluntary water disclosure and several self-regulation mechanisms such as policies and actions on water efficiency and emission reductions. … We find that firms with high water efficiency are more likely to disclose water information in the global water survey to proactively showcase their good water performance to key stakeholders …“ (abstract).

Flight from ESG disclosures (ESG disclosure benefits 3): Behind the Corporate Veil: How Business Groups Arbitrage ESG Disclosure Mandates by Stefano Cascino and Maria Correia as of Sept. 9th, 2024 (#32): “… we demonstrate that, while improving their own ESG performance at the headquarter-country level, business group parents actively shift irresponsible ESG activities down the corporate structure. Specifically, we document that subsidiaries of parents subject to disclosure mandates experience an increase in the occurrence and frequency of ESG incidents, particularly in countries where weaker institutions make stakeholder monitoring more challenging. Moreover, we find that, in response to the introduction of ESG disclosure mandates, parent companies streamline their group structures by tightening control over more integrated subsidiaries and divesting from those that are more peripheral“ (abstract).

ESG litigation opportunities: The Effect of Expected Shareholder Litigation on Corporate ESG Reporting: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment by Lijun (Gillian) Lei, Sydney Qing Shu, and Wayne Thomas as of June 19th, 2024 (#112): “… the Morrison ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court … creates a plausibly exogenous shock (i.e., reduction) to expected shareholder litigation costs for U.S.-cross-listed foreign firms … Our primary result is that after Morrison, U.S.-cross-listed foreign firms increase their use of optimistic words in ESG reports. … We also find a decline in the relative likelihood of issuing an ESG report after Morrison … we also show that U.S.-cross-listed foreign firms are less likely to purchase external assurance or adopt GRI guidelines in preparation of their ESG reports in the post-Morrison period. … Overall, the results are consistent with a reduction in expected shareholder litigation costs decreasing the quality of ESG reporting“ (p. 35/36).

Greenwashing World Bank? How Has the World Bank’s Climate Finance Changed After the Paris Agreement? by Ayse Kaya and Asli Leblebicioglu as of Sept. 5th, 2024 (#17): “Utilizing a novel dataset of more than 2700 projects spanning 2010-2021, this study investigates the shifts in the World Bank (WB)’s climate finance from pre- to post-Paris Agreement. … We show that although WB’s reported climate finance has quadrupled in this period, this increase primarily comes from “mixed projects” that combine mitigation or adaptation goals with other aims. For most projects, these other goals constitute projects’ larger share, and they also increasingly encompass general capacity strengthening as opposed to climate-adjacent aims. Conversely, projects solely dedicated to mitigation or adaptation have declined. … Overall, the spectacular quantitative increase in WB’s post-Paris climate finance may not be as qualitatively impressive“ (abstract). My comment: For my ESG ETF-Portfolios I will continue to use Multinational Development Bank Bonds instead of Government Bonds because I still think that the former have more positive potential impact than the latter

Pollution export: Exporting Carbon Emissions? Evidence from Space by Santanu Kundu and Stefan Ruenzi as of Sept. 5th, 2024 (#32): “Our study based on the cement and steel industry shows that the price increase of carbon in the EU ETS (Sö: Emission Trading System) after 2017 is associated with emissions leakage to facilities in locations outside the EU. Not surprisingly, emissions are mainly leaked to pollution havens. … We find that mainly constrained firms, firms headquartered in countries with more developed financial markets as well as firms headquartered in civil law countries engage in carbon leakage. At the same time, our effects are stronger for private than for listed firms at the extensive margin. Firms affected by the EU-ETS not only leak more production to facilities outside the EU, they are also more likely to acquire more new facilities outside the EU“ (p. 31/32).

Green show beats impact: Impact, Inspiration, or Image: On the Trade-Offs in Pro-Environmental Behaviors by Raisa Sherif and Sven Arne Simon as of Sept. 4th, 2024 (#96): “… We find that some individuals are willing to give up environmental impact for both social image concerns and role model aspirations, with the latter having a stronger effect. However, the crowding out is not perfect” (p. 25).

ESG and SDG investment research (in: ESG disclosure benefits)

ESG outperformance drivers: Charting New Frontiers: The S&P 500® ESG Index’s Outperformance of the S&P 500 by May Beyhan from S&P Dow Jones Indices as of Sept. 6th, 2024: “Since its inception more than five years ago, the S&P 500 ESG Index had a tracking error of 1.33% and outperformed the S&P 500 by 1.62% on an annualized excess total return basis. … The performance of the S&P 500 ESG Index was … driven by an array of factors, such as seeking the best ESG-scoring constituents with medium ESG momentum scores, and selecting constituents with high Human Capital Development and Talent Attraction & Retention scores, while also avoiding the worst ESG-scoring constituents with high ESG momentum scores” (p. 12). My comment: My experience with ESG portfolios has been positive, too, although I exclude the “magnificient 7”, see Glorreiche 7: Sind sie unsozial? – Responsible Investment Research Blog (prof-soehnholz.com)

Lower emissions and credit risks: Linking Climate Risk to Credit Risk: Evidence from Sectorial Analysis by Mohamad H. Shahrour, Mohamed Arouri, and Sandeep Rao as of April 24th, 2024 (#86): “Using yearly data on the S&P 500, we first document that an increase in firms’ commitment towards reducing environmental emissions is associated with a lower credit risk (measured by credit ratings, and alternatively, distance-to-default). … While the majority of sectors experience a negative relationship, we find a positive relationship in the Industrials sector. Furthermore, we examine the direction of causality between carbon emissions and credit risk. Our results establish that the direction of causality is from carbon emissions to credit risk“ (p. 16).

Green bond advantages: Green Bonds in Banking: Do They Improve Loan Portfolio Quality and Funding Costs? by Egidio Palmieri, Maurizio Polato, and Josanco Floreani  as of Sept. 9th, 2024 (#8): “… banks issuing green bonds with high environmental performance exhibit an improvement in loan portfolio quality … Furthermore, the interaction with the governance pillar indicates that banks issuing green bonds experience a reduction in the cost of funding … showing that strong governance significantly contributes to lower funding costs” (p. 6).

Lower sustainability risks: Climate Risk Exposure: A Comparative Analysis of Sustainable and Conventional Funds by Camille Baily  and Jean-Yves Gnabo as of Sept. 6th, 2024 (#12): “We … investigate climate risk exposure in the U.S. mutual fund industry … using a large dataset of 3,140 mutual funds from 2013 to 2021. Using a conditional Value-at-Risk approach—CoVaR, we measure individual fund exposure to climate risks. We find that, on average, fund VaR is affected by climate risks when we control for other risk factors, suggesting that climate risks are spreading to U.S. mutual funds. Yet, we show that sustainable funds, as identified by the Morningstar metric, are significantly less exposed to climate risks than their conventional peers, even when we control for other fund characteristics“ (abstract). “Our results indicate that climate risk exposure is almost 50% lower for an average sustainable fund, compared to its conventional counterpart” (p. 31). My comment: In my most recent report for the fund which I advise  I showed that “a traditional global small-cap ETF has a Weighted Average Carbon (Scope 1 + 2) Intensity of 313 instead of 32 for the fund” (see Monatsreport).

25% SDG-Alignment? PAB & CTB: Sustainability 2.0 by Heiko Bailer as of Sept. 6th, 2024 (#27) “This paper investigates the MSCI World and Europe Paris-Aligned Benchmarks (PAB) and Climate Transition Benchmarks (CTB), focusing on refining these indices by incorporating additional sustainable constraints and tilting them towards better alignment with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). … For instance, the sustainable revenue component of the indices was increased from a baseline of 13- 15% to 25%, while the temperature targets were reduced from approximately 2°C to 1.7°C. These enhancements were achieved with minimal negative impact on financial performance, and in some cases, such as the Europe CTB, even resulted in performance gains. … Further adjustments involved tilting the indices towards higher SDGs, which provided additional alignment with UN sustainability goals without negative performance trade-offs. The analysis revealed a substantial difference in SDG scores between the World and Europe indices, with Europe’s SDG alignment being more than double that of the World indices“ (p.11/12). My comment: In my most recent fund report I write: “The net SDG revenue alignment reported by the data provider for the fund is very high at 93%. … By way of comparison, a traditional global small-cap ETF has an SDG revenue alignment of 5 %” (see Monatsreport).

Other investment research (in: ESG disclosure benefits)

Financial LLM deficits: How good are LLMs in risk profiling? by Thorsten Hens and Trine Nordlie as of Aug. 25th, 2024 (#113): “This study asked “How do ChatGPT and Bard categorize investor risk profiles compared to financial advisors?” For half of the clients the study revealed no statistically significant differences in the risk scores assigned by ChatGPT and Bard compared to those assigned by bankers. Moreover, on average, the differences had minor economic relevance. However … their reasoning … many times missed the specific characteristics of the clients“ (p. 9).

Degrowth deficits: Reviewing studies of degrowth: Are claims matched by data, methods and policy analysis? by Ivan Savin and Jeroen van den Bergh as of August 2024: “In the last decade many publications have appeared on degrowth as a strategy to confront environmental and social problems. … Based on a sample of 561 studies we conclude that: (1) content covers 11 main topics; (2) the large majority (almost 90%) of studies are opinions rather than analysis; (3) few studies use quantitative or qualitative data, and even fewer ones use formal modelling; (4) the first and second type tend to include small samples or focus on non-representative cases; (5) most studies offer ad hoc and subjective policy advice, lacking policy evaluation and integration with insights from the literature on environmental/climate policies; (6) of the few studies on public support, a majority concludes that degrowth strategies and policies are socially-politically infeasible; (7) various studies represent a “reverse causality” confusion, i.e. use the term degrowth not for a deliberate strategy but to denote economic decline (in GDP terms) resulting from exogenous factors or public policies; (8) few studies adopt a system-wide perspective – instead most focus on small, local cases without a clear implication for the economy as a whole“ (abstract).

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Werbehinweis

Unterstützen Sie meinen Researchblog, indem Sie in den von mir beratenen globalen Smallcap-Investmentfonds (siehe FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T) investieren und/oder ihn empfehlen. Der Fonds konzentriert sich auf die UN-Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (aktuell durchschnittlich 93% SDG-vereinbare Umsätze der Portfoliounternehmen: Investment impact) und verwendet separate E-, S- und G-Best-in-Universe-Mindestratings sowie Aktionärsengagement (Investor impact) bei derzeit 29 von 30 Unternehmen (siehe auch My fund).

Impactfunds illustration by Dmitriy from Pixabay

Impactfunds: Researchpost 183

Impactfunds illustration by Dmitriy from Pixabay

Impactfunds: 4x new research on right-wing policies, gender pay gap, AI and nature-reporting and channels of impactfunds (#shows SSRN full document downloads as of July 4th, 2024)

Unhappy rightists: Support for a right-wing populist party and subjective well-being: Experimental and survey evidence from Germany by Maja Adena and Steffen Huck as of June 26th, 2024: “… we establish a causal link revealing that individuals who are new or marginal supporters of the AfD exhibit deterioration in well-being … In addition, we establish a strong correlation between negative perceptions of personal and financial well-being and support for the German right-wing populist party AfD” (“Conclusion”).

Gender pay issues: One Cohort at a Time: A New Perspective on the Declining Gender Pay Gap by Jaime Arellano-Bover, Nicola Bianchi, Salvatore Lattanzio, and Matteo Paradisi as of May 2nd, 2024 (#263): “…we show that the entirety of the decline in the gender pay gap can be attributed to newer cohorts who entered the labor market with smaller gender differentials and to older cohorts who exited the labor market with larger differentials. … The data confirm that it was a significant decline in opportunities for younger men, rather than substantial gains for younger women, that drove the convergence in labor-market outcomes that occurred in the 1970s through the mid-1990s. After this point, the remaining gender gap at labor-market entry reflected mostly gender differences in educational choices, rather than differences in initial job allocations. Therefore, further increases in the number of older workers has continued to create bottlenecks to the careers of all younger workers, but not differentially between men and women” (p. 26/27).

Disclosure-deficits: Using AI to Assess the Decision-Usefulness of Corporates’ Nature-related Disclosures by Chiara Colesanti Senni, Saeid Ashraf Vaghefi, Tushar Manekar, Tobias Schimanski, and Markus Leippold as of June 10th, 2024 (#158): “Nature-related disclosures by companies are insufficient. As long as they remain voluntary, this situation is unlikely to improve, even under well-intentioned initiatives like the Task Force on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD). … our sentiment analysis reveals that corporate disclosures predominantly report positive C2N (Sö: company-to-nature) impact. … we find that current CSR disclosures, although aligned with the TNFD, are not sufficiently decision-useful for stakeholders and lack legal enforceability” (abstract). My comment: That is why I try to engage companies to improve disclosures, see Shareholder engagement: 21 science based theses and an action plan – (prof-soehnholz.com). For the German version see “Nachhaltigkeitsinvestmentpolitik” at www.futurevest.fund

Impactfunds: The Impact of Sustainable Investment Funds – Impact Channels, Status Quo of Literature, and Practical Applications by Marco Wilkens, Stefan Jacob, Martin Rohleder, and Jonas Zink as of June 28th, 2024 (#1223): “… investment funds can, in principle, achieve impact through three impact channels which we systematize in an impact framework: engagement, portfolio allocation, and further effects. In a next step, the article provides an overview of the current status quo of research on impact investment. … Empirically, there are at least initial indications that an impact has already been achieved via engagement and portfolio allocation. However, there are also legitimate concerns that neither of the two impact channels will have the desired positive and material impact. There is therefore a growing need of information in this area, which could be met, for example, via impact grids for sustainable investment funds” (p. 23). My comment: Good research summary, ideas and concept. For my impactfund approach see My fund – Responsible Investment Research Blog (prof-soehnholz.com)

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Werbehinweis (in: Impactfunds)

Unterstützen Sie meinen Researchblog, indem Sie in meinen globalen Smallcap-Investmentfonds (SFDR Art. 9) investieren und/oder ihn empfehlen. Der Fonds konzentriert sich auf die Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDG: Investment impact) und verwendet separate E-, S- und G-Best-in-Universe-Mindestratings sowie ein breites Aktionärsengagement (Investor impact) bei derzeit 29 von 30 Unternehmen:  My fund – Responsible Investment Research Blog (prof-soehnholz.com).

Zur jetzt wieder guten Performance siehe zum Beispiel Fonds-Portfolio: Mein Fonds | CAPinside

Impactfonds: Bild von Mastertux von Pixabay

Impactfonds im Nachhaltigkeitsvergleich

Impactfonds: Foto von Mastertux von Pixabay

Es ist schwierig, passende nachhaltige Fonds zu finden

Nachhaltige Investments sind kein No-Brainer. Ein Problem dabei: Nachhaltige Investments können sehr unterschiedlich definiert werden. Ich verweise meist auf das von mir mit entwickelte Policies for Responsible Invesment Scoring Concept der DVFA (DVFA PRISC, vgl. Kapitel 7.3 in Das Soehnholz ESG und SDG Portfoliobuch). Damit können Anleger, Berater und Anbieter ihre individuelle Nachhaltigkeitspolitik festlegen. Das ist einfach. Schwierig wird es, wenn die dazu passenden Investmentfonds gefunden werden sollen. In diesem Beitrag zeige ich, wie man das machen kann und welche Fonds besonders gut zu meinen Nachhaltigkeitsanforderungen passen.

Wenig überraschend ist, dass der von mir beratene Fonds dabei am besten abschneidet. Neu für mich war aber, wie stark die Unterschiede zu anderen Smallcap-Fonds sind, die den Fondsnamen nach mit meinem Fonds vergleichbar sein sollten. Das gilt auch für die Performance.

Was ist ein liquider Impactfonds?

Laut Bundesinitiative Impact Investing ist wirkungsorientiertes Investieren ein Investmentansatz, der neben einer finanziellen Rendite auch eine messbare ökologische und/oder soziale Wirkung erzielen soll.

Ich beschränke mich in dieser Analyse auf liquide Investments. Das heißt, dass ich nur Fonds vergleiche, die in börsennotierte Wertpapiere investieren. Damit werden Fonds ausgeklammert, die Empfängern direkt zusätzliches Eigen- oder Fremdkapital bringen können. Das reduziert den potenziellen Impact von Fonds.

Allerdings ist mir die jederzeitige Änderungsmöglichkeit von Investments sehr wichtig. Das zeigt sich daran, dass ich bisher schon 60 Aktien aus meinem im August 2021 gestarteten und aus 30 Aktien bestehenden Fonds verkauft habe (vgl. Divestments: 49 bei 30 Aktien meines Artikel 9 Fonds und das Engagementreporting auf FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals). Verkaufsgründe waren überwiegend meine zunehmend höheren Nachhaltigkeitsansprüche und (relativ) verschlechterte Nachhaltigkeit der Aktien im Portfolio. Mit illiquiden Investments ist man meistens mehrere Jahre an diese gebunden. Das bedeutet, dass man ein relativ hohes Nachhaltigkeitsrisiko eingeht (vgl. Free Lunch: Diversifikation nein, Nachhaltigkeit ja?).

Man kann zwei Arten von Impactinvestments unterscheiden, nämliche solche mit Fokus auf den Impact der Anlagen selbst und andere, die den Impact von Anlegern Berücksichtigen (vgl. Impactleitfaden der DVFA DVFA-Fachausschuss Impact veröffentlicht Leitfaden Impact Investing und ähnlich Eurosif und Forum nachhaltige Geldanlagen, Marktbericht 2024 S. 13). Im ersten Fall sind das zum Beispiel Aktien und Anleihen von Herstellern erneuerbarer Energien. Im zweiten Fall ist das die positive Einflussnahme von Anlegern über Stimmrechtsausübungen und andere Formen von Engagement, um Investmentziele nachhaltiger zu machen.

109 diversifizierte Impactfonds?

In Deutschland werden aktuell ungefähr neuntausend Investmentfonds mit insgesamt 34.500 Anteilsklassen öffentlich angeboten (vgl. Fonds-Suche | DAS INVESTMENT Fonds Explorer). Ungefähr 4% davon bzw. 350 sind Fonds nach dem strengsten Nachhaltigkeitsartikel 9 der Offenlegungsverordnung.

Man könnte annehmen, dass nur Artikel 9 Fonds auch Impactfonds sein können. Das Forum nachhaltige Geldanlagen kommt aber zu anderen Ergebnissen. Danach fallen „fast 60 Prozent der Artikel-6-Mandate bzw. Spezialfonds … in die Kategorie „Impact-Aligned“ (FNG Marktbericht 2024, S. 20). Das erscheint mir sehr viel.

Für meine eigene Analyse habe ich mir die verfügbaren Fonds auf www.morningstar.de angesehen und nach Stichworten im Fondsnamen gesucht. Ich interessiere mich dabei vor allem für Fonds mit Impact und Sustainable Development Goals im Namen. Bei den sogenannten aktiven Fonds finde ich nur 582 von 62325, also 0,9% aller potenziellen Anteilsklassen mit „Impact“ im Namen. Hinzu kommen 0,4% mit „Sustainable Development Goals“ bzw. „SDG“ im Namen. Insgesamt finde ich sich so 84 unterschiedliche Impactfonds.

Ohne Transitions-, reine Engagement- und wenig diversifizierte Fonds

Dabei habe ich Fonds ausgeklammert, die Transitionen von schlechteren zu besseren Nachhaltigkeiten anstreben. Das wären zum Beispiel Paris-Aligned Benchmark (PAB) Fonds. Diese investieren in Aktien und Anleihen von Organisationen, die sich auf einem CO2-Reduktionspfad befinden. Darunter sind oft Unternehmen mit aktuell noch hohen Emissionen und wenig nachhaltigen Produktangeboten. Solche Fonds sind nach meiner Auffassung keine konsequenten SDG-vereinbaren Fonds, zu denen ich nur Fonds mit Wertpapieren zähle, die in Bezug auf ihre Produkte und Services bereits möglichst nachhaltig sind.

Man könnte auch noch die 134 Anteilklassen mit „Engagement“ im Namen nutzen. Darauf verzichte ich aber ebenfalls (wenn nicht SDG oder Impact zusätzlich im Namen enthalten sind), denn für mich sollten die Emittenten der Wertpapiere im Fonds vor allem mit den SDG vereinbare Produkte und Services anbieten. Wenn dann noch Shareholder Engagement dazu kommt, ist das gut. Aber nur Engagement ohne SDG-Vereinbarkeit reicht mir für meinen Impactansatz nicht aus.

Ich interessiere mich vor allem für potenzielle Wettbewerber für den von mir beraten branchen- und länderdiversifizierten Aktienfonds. Deshalb betrachte ich hier keine länderspezifischen oder branchen- bzw. themenspezifischen Fonds, auch nicht solche für erneuerbare Energien oder Mikrofinanz. Ich klammere auch Anleihefonds mit Fokus auf grüne, soziale und andere nachhaltige Anleihen aus, sofern sie nicht SDG oder Impact im Namen nutzen.

Dafür füge ich Fonds hinzu, die dem Global Challenges Index bzw. dem nx25 Index folgen. Der Grund dafür ist, dass mein Fonds manchmal mit diesen Fonds verglichen wird.

Bei den ETFs finde ich nur einen Impact-ETF mit Umweltfokus sowie nur zwei SDG-diversifizierte-ETFs, die ich beide in der Detailanalyse berücksichtige.  

Insgesamt erhalte ich so 109 „Impactfonds“. 34 davon sind Anleihefonds, 7 sind Mischfonds und 3 sind Protected- bzw. Garantie- oder Hedgefonds. Damit bleiben 65 Aktienfonds übrig. 37 sind globale Aktienfonds, die grundsätzlich alle Unternehmensgrößen abdecken (Allcaps),12 sind überwiegend auf mittelgroße Unternehmen (Midcap) fokussierte globale Aktienfonds und 5 sind regional fokussierte Fonds. Bis auf zwei regionale Fonds enthalten diese nur relativ wenige Smallcaps, die in meinem Fonds vorherrschend sind. Damit bleiben 11 überregionale Smallcapfonds für den Detailvergleich übrig.

Detailvergleich von 11 globalen sogenannten Impactfonds mit Smallcapfokus

Idealerweise wird ein Nachhaltigkeitsvergleich der von mir selektieren Fonds mit kostenlos verfügbaren und damit extern einfach nachprüfbaren Daten durchgeführt. Die mir bekannten derartigen Datenbanken sind jedoch wenig transparent, nutzen nur Best-in-Class ESG Ratings und/oder enthalten nur einen Teil der mich interessierenden Fonds und Nachhaltgigkeitsdaten.

Deshalb habe ich die Fonds mit der kostenpflichtigen Datenbank von Clarity.ai analysiert. Diese hat den Vorteil, dass sie – mit Ausnahme eines neuen ETFs – für alle 11 Fonds detaillierte SDG- und ESG-Analysen ermöglicht. Dabei werden möglichst alle Aktien einzeln analysiert und dann auf Portfolioebene aggregiert.

Bei der Interpretation der Ergebnisse ist zu berücksichtigen, dass solche Nachhaltigkeitsanalysen je nach Datenanbieter und Stichtag (hier: Mitte Juni 2024) unterschiedliche Ergebnisse ergeben können. Zu beachten ist auch, dass die Ratings oft annähernd normalverteilt sind, d.h. die Streuung in der Mitte ziemlich hoch ist und Ausreißer selten sind. Das bedeutet, dass ein durchschnittliches ESG-Rating von 55 gegenüber 50 einen erheblichen Unterschied bedeuten kann.

Nur 1 diversifizierter konsequenter Smallcap-Impactfonds?

Ich analysiere sogenannte unerwünschte Aktivitäten, ESG-Ratings und SDG-Vereinbarkeiten. ESG-Ratings fassen dabei ESG-Risiken inklusive Kontroversen zusammen, ohne finanzielle Aspekte zu berücksichtigen. Dabei nutze ich ein Best-in-Universe Rating. Das bedeutet, dass Umwelt-, Sozial- und Unternehmensführungsrisiken aller über fünfundzwanzigtausend gerateten Unternehmen miteinander verglichen werden und nicht brancheninterne (Best-in-Class) Ratings genutzt werden. ESG-Risiken haben eine mögliche Bandbreite von 0 bis 100 und SDG-Vereinbarkeit wird über SDG-vereinbare Umsätze gemessen, von denen vorher unvereinbare Umsätze abgezogen werden (Netto-Umsatz-Ansatz).

Die hier analysierten 11 Fonds investieren insgesamt in über 200 Unternehmen mit einigen von 37 von mir unerwünschten und vermiedenen Aktivitäten. Das sind vor allem in Unternehmen, die Tierversuche durchführen. Dutzende weitere Unternehmen haben Abhängigkeiten von fossilen Brennstoffen oder Waffen.

Die SDG-(Netto-)Umsatzvereinbarkeit ist mir besonders wichtig. Am besten schneidet dabei der von mir beraten Fonds Futurevest Equities SDG R mit 88% ab. Drei weitere Fonds liegen um die 80%. Damit sind für mich nur diese 4 Smallcap-SDG Fonds konsequente Impactfonds. Zwei davon setzen vor allem auf erneuerbare Energien, einer auf Gesundheit und nur der von mir beratene Fonds auf beide und weitere Segmente.

Zwei weitere Fonds haben etwas über 50% SDG-Umsätze. Für mich überraschend ist, dass für 6 Fonds unter 50% netto SDG-Umsätze ausgewiesen wird. Ein Fonds mit „SDG-Engagement“ im Namen schneidet mit 7% am schlechtesten ab. Das Fondsmanagement will mit seinem Engagement dabei offensichtlich relativ wenig nachhaltige Investments nachhaltiger machen.

Impactfonds mit ESG-Risiken

In Bezug auf die ESG-Risiken ergeben sich ebenfalls erhebliche Unterschiede: Auch hier schneidet der von mir beratene Fonds mit einem durchschnittlichen ESG- Rating von 66 am besten ab. Bei Governance gibt es mit 71 einen noch besseren Fonds im Vergleich zu den 70 des Futurevest Fonds. Mit 62 bei Sozialrisiken und 68 von 100 Punkten bei Umweltrisiken scheidet der Futurevest-Fonds aber am besten ab.

Drei Fonds liegen bei den aggregierten ESG-Ratings aber auch bei Umwelt- und Sozialem unter 50 und haben damit überdurchschnittliche Risiken. Alle anderen Fonds liegen zwischen 53 und 60 bei den aggregierten Ratings. Beim Governancerating geht die Bandbreite nur von 52 bis 71, bei Umwelt von 40 bis 68 und bei Sozialem von 36 bis 63. Dabei liegen 9 Fonds bei den Sozialratings unter 50.

Auch bei den Emissionen gibt es starke Unterschiede. So reichen die umsatzgewichteten Scope 1 und Scope 2 Emissionen von 41 bis 1503 Tonnen mit fünf Fonds über 100 Tonnen. Mit 54 Tonnen hat der Futurevest-Fonds die drittniedrigsten Emissionen. Die Scope 3 Emissionen reichen von 88 bis 3.650 (Futurevest: 665) und scheinen damit kaum vergleichbar zu sein. Fonds, die bei ihren Investments auf Scope 3 Reporting drängen, wie ich das machen, werden bei solchen Vergleichen tendenziell benachteiligt.

Engagementdaten der Fonds werden in der Clarity.ai Datenbank nicht aufgeführt. Hierzu wäre eine relativ aufwändige separate Analyse nötig (Infos zu Futurevest siehe „Engagementreporting“ auf FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals).

Strengster Fonds mit guter Performance

In Bezug auf Ausschlüsse, SDG-Umsätze und ESG-Ratings ist nach diesen Daten der von mir beratenen Fonds der mit Abstand am konsequentesten nachhaltige. Das ist auch nachvollziehbar, denn ich nutze fast nur Nachhaltigkeitskriterien für die Aktienselektion.

Aber natürlich ist auch Performance wichtig. In Bezug auf traditionelle Smallcapfonds erreicht der von mir beratene Fonds seit der Auflage marktübliche Renditen und Risiken. Für die Analyse der selektieren Smallcap-Nachhaltigkeitsfonds nutze ich, sofern vorhanden, die thesaurierenden nicht-währungsgesicherten Retailanteilsklassen. Bezüglich der Renditen von Anfang 2022 bis Mitte Juni 2024 (der Futurevest-Fonds ist erst im August 2021 gestartet) liegt mein Fonds aktuell an der zweitbesten Position, direkt nach dem aus meiner Sicht wenig nachhaltigen SDG Engagementfonds. Im aktuellen Jahr liegt er sogar an erster Stelle. Und die Volatilität von etwa 13% ist auch relativ niedrig. Die Bandbreite der Performance recht dabei von +11% bis -59%.

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Disclaimer

Dieser Beitrag ist von der Soehnholz ESG GmbH erstellt worden. Die Erstellerin übernimmt keine Gewähr für die Richtigkeit, Vollständigkeit und/oder Aktualität der zur Verfügung gestellten Inhalte. Die Informationen unterliegen deutschem Recht und richten sich ausschließlich an Investoren, die ihren Wohnsitz in Deutschland haben. Sie sind keine Finanzanalyse und nicht als Verkaufsangebot oder Aufforderung zur Abgabe eines Kauf- oder Zeichnungsangebots für Anteile der/s in dieser Unterlage dargestellten Aktie/Fonds zu verstehen und ersetzen nicht eine anleger- und anlagegerechte Beratung.

Die in diesem Artikel enthaltenen Informationen dienen ausschließlich zu Bildungs- und Informationszwecken. Sie sind weder als Aufforderung noch als Anreiz zum Kauf oder Verkauf eines Wertpapiers oder Finanzinstruments zu verstehen. Die in diesem Artikel enthaltenen Informationen sollten nicht als alleinige Quelle für Anlageentscheidungen verwendet werden.

Anlageentscheidungen sollten nur auf der Grundlage der aktuellen gesetzlichen Verkaufsunterlagen (Wesentliche Anlegerinformationen, Verkaufsprospekt und – sofern verfügbar – Jahres- und Halbjahresbericht) getroffen werden, die auch die allein maßgeblichen Anlagebedingungen enthalten.

Die Verkaufsunterlagen des Fonds werden bei der Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft (Monega Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH), der Verwahrstelle (Kreissparkasse Köln) und den Vertriebspartnern zur kostenlosen Ausgabe bereitgehalten. Die Verkaufsunterlagen sind zudem im Internet unter www.monega.de erhältlich. Die in dieser Unterlage zur Verfügung gestellten Inhalte dienen lediglich der allgemeinen Information und stellen keine Beratung oder sonstige Empfehlung dar. Die Kapitalanlage ist stets mit Risiken verbunden und kann zum Verlust des eingesetzten Kapitals führen. Vor einer etwaigen Anlageentscheidung sollten Sie eingehend prüfen, ob die Anlage für Ihre individuelle Situation und Ihre persönlichen Ziele geeignet ist.

Diese Unterlage enthält ggf. Informationen, die aus öffentlichen Quellen stammen, die die Erstellerin für verlässlich hält. Die dargestellten Inhalte, insbesondere die Darstellung von Strategien sowie deren Chancen und Risiken, können sich im Zeitverlauf ändern. Einschätzungen und Bewertungen reflektieren die Meinung der Erstellerin zum Zeitpunkt der Erstellung und können sich jederzeit ändern. Es ist nicht beabsichtigt, diese Unterlage laufend oder überhaupt zu aktualisieren. Sie stellt nur eine unverbindliche Momentaufnahme dar. Die Unterlage ist ausschließlich zur Information und zum persönlichen Gebrauch bestimmt. Jegliche nicht autorisierte Vervielfältigung und Weiterverbreitung ist untersagt.

ESG deficits: Desert illustration by Nushrolloh Huda from Pixabay

ESG deficits: Researchpost 174

ESG deficits: Illustration by Nushrulloh Huda from Pixabay

ESG deficits: 8x new research on plastic pollution, electric cars, climate prognostics, purpose, ESG deficits, climate costs, financial education, fund management (#shows SSRN full paper downloads as of May 2nd, 2024)

Ecological and social research

Plastic pollution: Global producer responsibility for plastic pollution by Win Cowger and many more as of April 24, 2024: “We used data from a 5-year (2018–2022) worldwide (84 countries) program to identify brands found on plastic items in the environment through 1576 audit events. We found that 50% of items were unbranded, calling for mandated producer reporting. The top five brands globally were The Coca-Cola Company (11%), PepsiCo (5%), Nestlé (3%), Danone (3%), and Altria (2%), accounting for 24% of the total branded count, and 56 companies accounted for more than 50%. … Phasing out single-use and short-lived plastic products by the largest polluters would greatly reduce global plastic pollution“ (abstract).

Solar car power: Solar Photovoltaics and Battery Electric Vehicles by Johannes Rode as of March 8th, 2024 (#105): “With a large enough PV (Sö: photovoltaic) system, it is financially attractive to charge a BEV (Sö: battery electric vehicle) with self-produced electricity from PV on sunny days. We indeed find that PV adoption spurs the co-adoption of BEV. … According to our baseline specification, PV adoption was responsible for a third of the BEV share in Germany in 2022. This finding only holds true for household PV systems and does not for industrial PV systems. … we can only confirm a causal effect from PV diffusion on the BEV share for PV systems that are large enough to generate enough electricity for normal household consumption and for charging a BEV. … we do not find evidence for reverse effects from adopting a BEV on PV adoption“ (p. 13/14).

Climate prognostic criticism: Klimawandel: Zur Unterscheidung von Fakten, Analysen und Prognosen in Umweltpolitik und Rechtsprechung von Werner Gleißner vom Februar 2024: „Im Ergebnis ist festzuhalten, dass bei wissenschaftlichen und natürlich auch politischen Diskussionen über den Klimawandel und die erforderlichen Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zwischen Aussagen unterschiedlicher Evidenz deutlicher unterschieden werden sollte. Dies sollte auch in der Medienberichterstattung, bei Gesetzesinitiativen und der Rechtsprechung beherzigt werden. Wie im Beitrag erläutert, sollte zwischen Fakten, Analysen und Prognosen aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen Evidenz klar abgegrenzt werden. Es sollte insbesondere auch klar ausgedrückt werden, dass es für Prognosen über die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels für in 100 Jahren lebende Menschen kein wissenschaftlich gesichertes Fundament gibt“ (S. 436).

Purpose explained: The Role of Corporate Purpose in Corporate Governance: A Framework for Boards of Directors and Senior Managers by Jordi Canals as of March 9th, 2024 (#54): “… I review the notion of purpose in contemporary management theory and corporate governance …. Corporate purpose has the potential to be an engine for organizational change, improve corporate governance and help reconnect companies with relevant stakeholders and society. Recent empirical studies show a positive relationship between corporate purpose and financial performance. … This paper … is based on some longitudinal real cases of firms that have been using corporate purpose in their governance and management. This paper presents a framework for boards of directors and senior managers for adopting corporate purpose effectively “ (abstract).

ESG investment research (in: ESG deficits)

ESG deficits? Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Transparency and Investment Efficiency by Yifei Lu as of April 25th, 2024 (#39): “Exploiting the staggered coverage of Refinitiv Asset4 ESG ratings as an exogenous shock that increases ESG transparency, I uncover a reduction in investment-q sensitivity, indicating lower investment efficiency after coverage initiation. … I show that greater ESG transparency crowds out fundamental information from the stock price, making it less useful to guide investment decisions. … I find that pressure on ESG performance increases and that firms increase ESG investments but reduce regular investments. … firms with poorer initial ESG performance experience larger reductions in investment efficiency. Overall, I document that more ESG transparency hurts real efficiency by restraining managerial learning and driving firms’ objectives away from maximizing shareholder value“ (abstract). My comment: Firms should consider external effects very seriously and I . more or less successfully – use only responsible investment criteria for ETF and stock selection, see e.g. Regeländerungen: Nachhaltig aktiv oder passiv? – Responsible Investment Research Blog (prof-soehnholz.com)

Low climate-pressure? Climate-triggered institutional price pressure: Does it affect firms’ cost of equity? by George Skiadopoulos and Cheng Xue as of April 26th, 2024 (#30): “We find that institutional portfolio rebalancing triggered by firms’ climate change exposures, affects S&P 500 firms‘ cost of equity during 2005-2021 via the incurred climate change price pressure (CCPP). We estimate stock-level CCPP from physical and transition exposures in a demand-based asset pricing setting. … The average CCPP is sizable up to -8%. A one-standard-deviation decrease of CCPP increases firms‘ cost of equity by up to 6% of its average value, the effect being greater (smaller) from CCPP originating from opportunity and physical (regulatory) exposures. Banks and insurance companies contribute primarily to CCPP by on average underweighting stocks with high climate change exposures. Despite facing a higher cost of equity from more negative CCPP, firms do not reduce future climate change exposures and carbon emissions, except over periods of heightened media attention to climate change“ (abstract).

Other investment research (in: ESG deficits)

Financial knowhow? Financial Literacy and Financial Education: An Overview by Tim Kaiser and Annamaria Lusardi as of April 25th, 2024 (69): “This article provides a concise narrative overview of the rapidly growing empirical literature on financial literacy and financial education“ (abstract). My comment: I try to contribute to financial literacy and education with this free to use blog

Fund signals? When do Investors Care About Fund Performance? by Samia Badidi, Martijn Boons, and Rafael Zambrana as of April 11th, 2024 (#28): “We find that weekly flows strongly respond to daily performance, especially on days with unusually low market returns (bad days).. … we find that flows significantly respond to both poor and good performance on bad days. … we find that outperformance on bad days is persistent and contributes significantly to unconditional fund outperformance. In fact, we find that managers with the skill to outperform on the 5% of worst market return days in the previous year generate about as much unconditional future outperformance (relative to other active US equity mutual funds) as managers with the skill to outperform on the remaining 95% of days. Because we find little overlap between these two sets of managers, we conclude that outperformance on bad days requires specific bad day skill that is distinct from the one-dimensional notion of general skill often entertained in the literature. Indeed, we find no evidence to suggest that that there are many generally skilled fund managers that outperform on bad and other days alike. Finally, we find no evidence that fund managers learn from poor past performance on bad days“ (p. 36/37).

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Advert for German investors

Sponsor my research by investing in and/or recommending my global small cap mutual fund (SFDR Art. 9). The fund focuses on the Sustainable Development Goals and uses separate E, S and G best-in-universe minimum ratings and broad shareholder engagement with currently 29 of 30 companies: FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T or My fund (prof-soehnholz.com).

Climate Shaming: Illustration from Nina Garman from Pixabay

Climate shaming: Researchpost 171

Ilustration from Pixabay by Nina Garman

Climate shaming: 11x new research on green technology, sustainable fund labels, sustainable advice, carbon premium, brown profits, green bonds, green growth, green shareholder engagement, climate shaming, optimizations and investment timing (# shows number of SSRN full paper downloads as of April 11th, 2024)

Ecological and social research

Green technology benefits: Economic Impact of Natural Disasters Under the New Normal of Climate Change: The Role of Green Technologies by Nikos Fatouros as of March 18th, 2024 (#9):” In our model of the world economy, raising temperatures are expected to negatively affect consumption as well as increase debt. The most frequently proposed possible solution to climate change, is the de-carbonization of production, by using more “green” technologies. Under “green” technology adaptation, countries would be projected to achieve higher levels of consumption and welfare. This positive effect of more environmentally friendly means of production, tends to be stronger for more developed countries. However, under the assumption of greater technological progress of the “green” sector, our results show that even developing countries would be projected to follow the same path of higher and more sustainable levels of consumption and welfare” (p. 10).

ESG investment research (in: Climate Shaming)

Attractive labels: In labels we trust? The influence of sustainability labels in mutual fund flows by Sofia Brito-Ramos, Maria Céu Cortze Nipe, Svetoslav Covachev, and Florinda Silva as of April 2nd, 2024 (#29): “In Europe, investors can resort to different types of sustainable labels such as GNPO-sponsored labels and ESG ratings from commercial data vendors that assess funds’ sustainability risks. In addition, funds can communicate their sustainability features by including ESG-related designations in the name or self-classifying themselves as article 8 or 9 of the SFDR. … Drawing on a dataset of equity funds sold in Europe … Our initial results document investors‘ preferences for sustainability labels, with GNPO labels (Sö: Government and non-profit organizations) standing out as salient signals. … we find that GNPO labels have an effect on fund flows … Furthermore, this impact is stronger for funds holding other sustainability signals, such as Morningstar top globes, the LCD (Sö: Low Carbon Designation) and an ESG name, suggesting a complementary effect of labels … our results show that the effect of funds being awarded a GNPO label is stronger for the institutional invest segment. The findings show that GNPO labels and SFDR classification are influential for investors’ decisions (p. 23/24). My comment: Maybe I should consider paying for labels for my Article 9 fund. A more detailed comment can be found here Nachhaltigkeitssiegel beim Verkauf von Investmentfonds | CAPinside

(Un-)Sustainable advice? Investing Responsibly: What Drives Preferences for Sustainability and Do Investors Receive Appropriate Investments? by Chris Brooks and Louis Williams as of April 8th, 2024 (#21): „ While investors with stronger desires for sustainability do hold more highly ESG-rated funds on average, the relationship is weaker than might have been expected. Perhaps surprisingly, a majority of clients for whom responsible investing is very important hold some unrated funds, while those for whom it is unimportant nonetheless hold the highly ESG-rated funds in their portfolios. We therefore conclude that more focus on sustainability preferences is required to ensure that retail investors get the portfolios they want” (abstract). My comment: Advisor should develop detailed sustainability policies at least for larger investors, see e.g. DVFA_PRISC_Policy_for_Responsible_Investment_Scoring.pdf (English version available upon demand)

No carbon premium: Carbon Returns Across the Globe by Shaojun Zhang as of April 5th, 2024 (#272): ” Emissions are a weighted sum of firm sales scaled by emission factors and grow almost linearly with firm sales. However, emission data are released at significant lags relative to accounting variables, including sales. After accounting for the data release lag, more carbon-intensive firms underperform relative to less carbon-intensive ones in the U.S. in recent years. International evidence on carbon or green premium is largely absent. The carbon premium documented in previous studies stems from forward-looking bias instead of a true risk premium in ex-ante expected returns” (p. 23).

Profitable brown greening? Paying or Being Paid to be Green? by Rupali Vashisht, Hector Calvo-Pardo, and Jose Olmo as of March 31st, 2024 (#70): “… firms in the S&P 500 index are divided into brown (heavily polluting) and green (less polluting) sectors. In clear contrast with the literature, (i) brown firms pay to be green (i.e.better financial performance translates into higher environmental scores) but green firms appear not to. In addition, (ii) neither brown nor green firms with higher environmental scores perform better financially” (abstract). My comment: If brown and green firms perform the same, why not invest only in green firms?

Resilient green bonds: “My Name Is Bond. Green Bond.” Informational Efficiency of Climate Finance Markets by Marc Gronwald and Sania Wadud as of April 4th, 2024 (#15): “… the degree of informational inefficiency of the green bond market is generally found to be very similar to that of benchmark bond markets such as treasury bond markets. … the degree of inefficiency of the green bond market during the Covid outbreak in 2020 and the inflation shock in 2022/2023 is lower than that of the treasury bond market“ (abstract).

Green growth: Investing in the green economy 2023 – Entering the next phase of growth by Lily Dai, Lee Clements, Edmund Bourne, and Jaakko Kooroshy from FTSE Russell as of Sep. 19th, 2023: “After a downturn in 2022 … Green revenues for listed companies are on track to exceed US$5 trillion by 2025 — doubling in size since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in 2015 — with market capitalisation of the green economy approaching 10% of the equity market. However, to shift the global economy onto a 1.5°C trajectory, green growth would have to further substantially accelerate with green market capitalisation approximating 20% of global equity markets by 2030” (p. 3).

Impact investment research (in: Climate Shaming)

Short-term impact: The Value Impact of Climate and Non-climate Environmental Shareholder Proposals by Henk Berkman, Jonathan Jona, Joshua Lodge, and Joshua Shemesh as of April 3rd, 2024 (#19): “In this paper, we investigate the value impact of environmental shareholder proposals (ESPs) for a large sample of Russell 3000 firms from 2006 to 2021 … We find that both withdrawn and non-withdrawn climate ESPs have positive CARs (Sö: Cumulative abnormal returns), indicating that management screens value-enhancing climate proposals and rejects value-destroying climate proposals. For non-climate ESPs we find insignificant CARs, suggesting that management does not have an ability to screen non-climate proposals. However, we find that close-call non-climate ESPs that are passed have negative abnormal returns, implying that for non-climate ESPs the original decision by managers not to agree with the activists is supported by the share market” (p. 26).

Climate shaming: Fighting Climate Change Through Shaming by Sharon Yadin as of April 4th, 2024 (#13): “This Book contends that regulators can and should shame companies into climate-responsible behavior by publicizing information on corporate contribution to climate change. Drawing on theories of regulatory shaming and environmental disclosure, the book introduces a “regulatory climate shaming” framework, which utilizes corporate reputational sensitivities and the willingness of stakeholders to hold firms accountable for their actions in the climate crisis context. The book explores the developing landscape of climate shaming practices employed by governmental regulators in various jurisdictions via rankings, ratings, labeling, company reporting, lists, online databases, and other forms of information-sharing regarding corporate climate performance and compliance” (abstract). My comment: Responsilbe Naming and Climate Shaming are adequate investor impact tools in my opinion (my “climate shaming” activities see Engagement report” here FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T)

Other investment research

(Pseudo-)Optimization? Markowitz Portfolio Construction at Seventy by Stephen Boyd, Kasper Johansson, Ronald Kahn, Philipp Schiele, and Thomas Schmelzer as of Feb. 13th, 2024 (#50): “More than seventy years ago Harry Markowitz formulated portfolio construction as an optimization problem that trades off expected return and risk, defined as the standard deviation of the portfolio returns. Since then the method has been extended to include many practical constraints and objective terms, such as transaction cost or leverage limits. Despite several criticisms of Markowitz’s method, for example its sensitivity to poor forecasts of the return statistics, it has become the dominant quantitative method for portfolio construction in practice. In this article we describe an extension of Markowitz’s method that addresses many practical effects and gracefully handles the uncertainty inherent in return statistics forecasting” (abstract). My comment:  Extensions of Markowitz methods create complexity but still contain many assumptions/forecasts and are far from solving all potential problems. I prefer very simple optimization and forecast-free approaches, see Das-Soehnholz-ESG-und-SDG-Portfoliobuch.pdf (soehnholzesg.com)

Bad timing? Another Look at Timing the Equity Premiums by Wei Dai and Audrey Dong from Dimensional Fund Advisors as of Nov. 2nd, 2023 (#1642): “We examine strategies that time the market, size, value, and profitability premiums in the US, developed ex US, and emerging markets …. Out of the 720 timing strategies we simulated, the vast majority underperformed relative to staying invested in the long side of the premiums. While 30 strategies delivered promising outperformance at first glance, further analysis shows that their outperformance is very sensitive to specific time periods and parameters for strategy construction”(abstract).

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Sponsor my research by investing in and/or recommending my global small cap mutual fund (SFDR Art. 9). The fund focuses on the Sustainable Development Goals and uses separate E, S and G best-in-universe minimum ratings and broad shareholder engagement with currently 27 of 30 companies: FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T or My fund (prof-soehnholz.com).

ESG rumor illustration from yaobim from Pixaby

ESG rumors: Researchpost #169

ESG rumors: 8x new research on carbon offsets, green innovation, sustainable fund outperformance, ESG rumors and their effects on equities and bonds, ESG factors, safe bonds and private equity (# shows SSRN full paper downloads as of March 27th, 2024)

Ecological and social research

Problematic Offsets: Carbon Offsets: Decarbonization or Transition-Washing? by Sehoon Kim, Tao Li, and Yanbin Wu as of March 23rd, 2024 (#104): “Carbon offsets allow firms to claim reductions in carbon emissions by purchasing and retiring carbon credits sold by projects or entities that achieve those reductions. … While large firms with net-zero commitments are more likely to use offsets, we find evidence that offsets are often used strategically by firms that are already positioned close to achieving these targets or in industries where it is easier to boost their ESG rankings relative to their peers. When faced by an exogenous shock to their incentives to boost rankings, firms with low emissions in industries with narrow cross-peer emission gaps become more likely to use offsets whereas heavy-emission firms in large-gap industries do not. Moreover, firms that strategically increase the use of offsets do so by retiring credits from low-quality offset projects, which command lower prices and therefore provide a cost-effective way of transition-washing. Overall, our evidence does not support the purported idea that carbon offsets can be effective at facilitating net-zero transitions by heavy-emission firms. … we do not find evidence that these firms would use such “good” offsets in large-enough quantities to meaningfully reduce their net emissions“ (p. 29/30). My comment: I do not consider/use offsets for my investments.

ESG investment research (ESG rumors)

Green innovation variations: Doing Good by Being Smart: Green Innovation and Firms’ Financial and Environmental Performance by Qiang Cheng, An-Ping Lin, and Mengjie Yang as of March 22nd, 2024 (#25): “We find that firms with more valuable pollution prevention patents have better future financial and environmental performance, whereas the value of firms’ pollution control patents is not associated with their future financial or environmental performance. We further document that pollution prevention innovation improves financial performance through its positive effects on sales growth and cost efficiency …“ (p. 29/30).

2023 ESG outperformance: Sustainable Reality – Sustainable Funds Show Continued Outperformance and Positive Flows in 2023 Despite a Slower Second Half by Morgan Stanley Institute for Sustainable Investing as of Feb. 29th, 2024: “Sustainable funds outperformed their traditional peers in 2023 with a median return of 12.6% compared to traditional funds’ 8.6%, according to Morningstar data. … Sustainable fund assets under management (AUM) globally grew to $3.4 trillion, up 15% from 2022 and reaching 7.2% of total AUM. Inflows to sustainable funds remained positive overall at $136 billion, 4.7% of the prior year-end AUM. … Equity funds with a global, Europe or APAC investment focus skew primarily to Industrials and Health Care, while funds investing in the Americas are more overweight Technology. Greater exposure to Technology stocks helped sustainable equity funds investing in the Americas in 2023, but this was not the only factor influencing sustainable funds’ outperformance” (p. 1). … “If a hypothetical fund achieved the median return for each of the past five years, a sustainable fund would be up +35% compared with a traditional fund’s +25%” (p. 6). … “Europe-domiciled Sustainable Funds Outperformed Traditional Funds, With Article 8 and Article 9 Funds in a Similar Range” (p. 18). My comment: I have a similar experience, see 2023: Passive Allokation und ESG gut, SDG nicht gut – Responsible Investment Research Blog (prof-soehnholz.com)

ESG rumors (1): Attention-Grabbing ESG: Do Investors Extract Value-relevant ESG Information from Social Media? by Yoshitaka Tanaka and Shunsuke Managi as of March 23rd, 2024 (#9): “Initially, we find that unconditional excess stock returns exhibit a positive correlation with positive and attention-grabbing ESG events and a negative correlation with negative ESG events. Our findings also indicate that events with low financial materiality, despite their high social prominence, do not have a lasting effect on stock returns. … we find that the greater is the information asymmetry regarding ESG information, the greater is the stock return response. On the other hand, when we control for firm attributes, we find no correlation between materiality and stock returns. The regression results suggest that the response of stock returns to ESG events may be attributed to market inefficiencies arising from information asymmetries rather than fundamental factors“ (p. 20). My comment: I ,like that my ESG ratings provider incorporates ESG controversies in its frequently updated ESG ratings

ESG rumors (2): From News to Numbers: Quantifying the Impact of ESG Controversies on Corporate Bond Spreads by Doina C. Chichernea, J. Christopher Hughen, and Alex Petkevich as of March 23rd, 2024 (#7): “… we document that bondholders demand a higher credit spread for bonds issued by firms with higher ESG controversies. The adverse effect of ESG controversies on bond pricing is long-lived and is primarily observed in bond issues with higher credit risk and more pronounced information asymmetry. We also document that current ESG controversies significantly predict an increase in the firm’s future asymmetric information and default risk …” (abstract).

No ESG factor? Are ESG Factors Truly Unique? by Svetoslav Covachev, Jocelyn Martel, and Sofia Brito-Ramos as of March 21st, 2024 (#71): “This paper studies the relationships between carbon and ESG risk factors and commonly accepted equity risk factors. … the carbon and ESG risk factors can be replicated as linear combinations of risk factors that are based on stock characteristics that are not directly related to environmental and ESG policies. We note that the main inputs for building the carbon and ESG factors are ESG ratings, which have a documented link with firm size. Bigger firms tend to have greater resources for gathering and disclosing ESG information. We also examine the risk exposures of popular ESG indexes, which provide a convenient means to invest in ESG-focused companies. Our findings indicate that the indexes examined are all exposed to the market and size factors, but they are also well-explained by the long leg of the ESG factor” (p. 15). My comment: Sustainable investments should not be expected to have higher returns but rather lower (ESG and thus overall) risks than comparable other investments.

Other investment research (ESG rumors)

Flights to bonds: Global or Regional Safe Assets: Evidence from Bond Substitution Patterns by Tsvetelina Nenova as of March 25th, 2024 (#5): “This paper provides novel empirical evidence on portfolio rebalancing in international bond markets through the prism of investors’ demand for bonds. … Safe assets such as US Treasuries or German Bunds face especially inelastic demand from investment funds compared to riskier bonds. But spillovers from these safe assets to global bond markets are strikingly different. Funds substitute US Treasuries with global bonds, including risky corporate and emerging market bonds, whereas German Bunds are primarily substitutable within a narrow set of euro area safe government bonds. Substitutability deteriorates in times of stress, impairing the transmission of monetary policy“ (abstract).

Private equity dissected: The economics of private equity: A critical review by Alexander Ljungqvist as of Feb. 15th, 2024: “… I have aimed to critically synthesize the main insights of more than 90 academic studies of private equity … to draw the following conclusions. Private equity funds have, on average, historically outperformed public-market indices after fees, but maybe not when adjusted for risk, leverage, and illiquidity. … Private equity funds generate returns for their investors through a combination of the value they add to their portfolio companies and their ability to target companies whose performance is about to take off anyway.  Whether private equity creates social value for the economy at large is an open question. … Private equity is a demanding asset class in which more sophisticated investors can expect to earn better returns than less sophisticated investors. There is scope for ample misalignment of interests between fund managers and investors. Private equity is an innovative asset class, creating new practices and solutions at a fast pace. Recent examples include subscription lines, GP-led secondaries, and NAV financing“ (p. 42/43).

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Advert for German investors:

Sponsor my research by investing in and/or recommending my global small cap mutual fund (SFDR Art. 9). The fund focuses on the Sustainable Development Goals and uses separate E, S and G best-in-universe minimum ratings and broad shareholder engagement with currently 28 of 30 companies: FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T or My fund (prof-soehnholz.com).

Biodiversity Diversgence illustration with seed toto by Claudenil Moraes from Pixaby

Biodiversity diversion: Researchpost #165

Biodiversity diversion: 14x new research on donations, brown indices, ESG ETFs, ESG investing fees, greenwashing, labeled bonds, climate engagement, framing, female finance, and risk measurement (“’#” shows full paper SSRN downloads as of Feb. 29th, 2024).

Social and ecological research

Facebook donations: Does Online Fundraising Increase Charitable Giving? A Nationwide Field Experiment on Facebook by Maja Adena and Anselm Hager as of Feb. 27th, 2024 (#4): “Using the Facebook advertising tool, we implemented a natural field experiment across Germany, randomly assigning almost 8,000 postal codes to Save the Children fundraising videos or to a pure control. … We found that (i) video fundraising increased donation revenue and frequency to Save the Children during the campaign and in the subsequent five weeks; (ii) the campaign was profitable for the fundraiser; and (iii) the effects were similar independent of video content and impression assignment strategy. However, we also found some crowding out of donations to other similar charities or projects.” (abstract).

Biodiversity diversion (1)? The 30 by 30 biodiversity commitment and financial disclosure: Metrics matter by Daniele Silvestro, Stefano Goria, Ben Groom, Thomas Sterner, and Alexandre Antonelli as of Nov. 23rd, 2023 (#93): “The recent adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework commits nearly 200 nations to protect 30% of their land by 2030 – a substantial increase from the current global average of c. 17%. … the easiest approach to reach compliance would be to protect the cheapest areas. … Here we explore biological and financial consequences of area protection … We find substantial differences in performance, with the cheapest solution always being the worst for biodiversity. Corporate disclosure provides a powerful mechanism for supporting conservation but is often dependent on simplistic and underperforming metrics. We show that conservation solutions optimized through artificial intelligence are likely to outperform commonly used biodiversity metrics“ (abstract).

ESG investment research (in: „Biodiversity diversion“)

Biodiversity diversion (2): A Bibliometric and Systemic Literature Review of Biodiversity Finance by Mark C. Hutchinson and Brian Lucey as of Feb. 19th, 2024 (#140): “This study presents a short bibliometric analysis of biodiversity finance …. Six focal areas emerge, with Conservation, Conservation Finance, and Ecosystem Finance prominent. Thematic emphasis revolves around biodiversity challenges and the inefficiency of financial mechanisms in addressing them. Our analysis reveals an exploitable gap in the lack of finance-led solutions” (abstract).

Brown stock indices: International trade in brown shares and economic development by Harald Benink, Harry Huizinga, Louis Raes, and Lishu Zhang as of Feb. 22nd, 2024 (#9): “Using global stock ownership data, we find a robust negative relation between the tendency by investors to hold brown assets and economic development as measured by log GDP per capita. … First, at the country level, economic development is likely to lead to a greening of the national stock portfolio. Second, cross-sectionally, richer countries will tend to hold greener portfolios. … Finally, we find that investors in richer countries have a lower propensity to divest from browner firms that are included in the MSCI World index, which does not consider firms’ carbon intensities” (p. 31/32). My comment: Most (institutional) investors use benchmarks. Green benchmarks should be used more often to foster transition (regarding benchmark selection compare Globale Small-Caps: Faire Benchmark für meinen Artikel 9 Fonds? (prof-soehnholz.com).

ESG ETF dispersion: From ESG Confusion to Return Dispersion: Fund Selection Risk is a Material Issue for ESG Investors by Giovanni Bruno and Felix Goltz from Scientific Beta as of Feb. 22nd, 2024: “… we construct a dataset of Sustainable ETFs – passive ETFs that have explicit ESG objectives. … Overall, our results indicate that ESG investors face a large fund selection risk. Over the full sample dispersion is 6.5% (4.9%) in terms of annualised CAPM Alpha (Industry Adjusted Returns), and it can reach 22.5% (25.3%) over single calendar years. We also show that past performance and tracking error do not contain useful information on future performance. … dispersion in performance allows ETF providers to always present investors some strategy that has recently outperformed“ (p. 31). My comment: It would be nice to have more details in the research article regarding conceptual differences e.g. between ESG Leader, Transition and SRI indics/ETFs, see e.g. Verantwortungsvolle Investments im Vergleich: SRI ETFs sind besser als ESG ETFs (prof-soehnholz.com) from 2018

Good ESG ETFs: Unraveling the Potential: A Comprehensive Analysis of ESG ETFs in Diversified Portfolios across European and U.S. Markets by Andrea Martínez-Salgueiro as of Feb. 15th, 2024 (#10): “… results indicate substantial benefits of ESG ETFs in Europe and notable hedge, diversification, and safe-haven potential in the U.S. Simulated data further demonstrate ESG portfolios‘ outperformance, especially in Europe, highlighting the risk-return tradeoff” (abstract).

Responsible fees: Responsible Investment Funds Build Consistent Market Presence by Jordan Doyle as of Feb. 21st, 2024: “… during the study period from 31 December 2012 to 31 December 2022. Total net assets for “responsible investments” as defined by Lipper increased by a factor of 2.7×, from $2,215.6 billion in 2012 to $5,974.6 billion in 2022. The market share of responsible investment funds remained relatively constant during the same period, increasing from 14.2% in 2012 to 15.4% in 2022. … Retail ownership dominates institutional ownership of responsible investment funds globally. In the United States, however, institutional assets surpassed retail assets in 2018, indicating a relative shift in demand preferences. … they both invest more assets into negative screening funds than any other type of responsible investment strategy …fund fees of responsible investing funds are largely in line with those of non-responsible investment fund fees in the United States. In Europe, however, responsible investment fund fees tend to be lower than non-responsible investment fund fees“ ( p. 3).

Unsustainable institutions? Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation: voluntary signaling or mandatory disclosure? by Lara Spaans, Jeroen Derwall, Joop Huij, and Kees Koedijk as of Feb. 19th, 2024 (#38): “… we point out that (i) the SFDR similarly to voluntary disclosure enables funds to signal their sustainability commitments to the market, while (ii) like mandatory disclosure, requires these funds to be transparent about the sustainability outcomes of their underlying portfolio … we show that investors indeed respond to the Article signals, but that this effect is driven by retail investors. … we see that mutual funds that take on an Article 8(/9) label after the SFDR announcement improve their sustainability outcomes compared to Article 6 funds. Specifically, we note that retail funds behave in accordance with their signal, while for institutional funds we do not find that Article 8(/9) funds behave differently from Article 6 funds. We disregard the hypothesis that these institutional funds partake in ‘window-dressing’, instead we find evidence that mandatory disclosure induces European institutional funds to significantly improve their sustainability outcomes compared to untreated, US-domiciled institutional funds“ (p. 32). My comment: For my Article 9 (global smallcap fund) see www.futurevest.fund and My fund (prof-soehnholz.com).

Less greenwashing: Do US Active Mutual Funds Make Good of Their ESG Promises? Evidence from Portfolio Holdings by Massimo Guidolin and Monia Magnani as of Feb. 23rd, 2024 (#22): “… our findings indicate a distinct shift towards greater sustainability within the mutual equity fund industry. Notably, this trend is not exclusive to self-labelled ESG funds; all types of funds have enhanced their ESG ratings and reduced their investments in sin stocks. The number of self-labelled ESG funds has continued to rise in recent years, and importantly, most of these ESG funds, on average, appear to genuinely adhere to their claims of prioritizing sustainable investing. Consequently, they demonstrate significantly higher actual ESG scores in their portfolio holdings. Moreover, we are witnessing a noticeable reduction in sin stocks within their portfolios“ (p. 34).

SDG- aligned and impact investment research

Sustainable returns: Labeled Bonds: Quarterly Market Overview Q4 2023 by Jakub Malich and Anett Husi from MSCI Research as of Feb. 21st, 2024:  Green, social, sustainability and sustainability-linked “Labeled-bond issuance reached a similar level in 2023 as in 2022, which was notably below the peak issuance of 2021. … The market continued to grow both in size and diversity, as hundreds of new and recurring corporate and government-related issuers brought labeled bonds to the market. … Most newly issued and outstanding labeled bonds were investment-grade and issued by ESG leaders … the performance of labeled bonds, despite their distinctions from conventional bonds, was primarily driven by key fixed-income risk and return drivers, such as interest-rate sensitivity, currency fluctuations and credit risk“ (p. 18). … “Corporate issuers led issuance in the fourth quarter, with USD 75 billion worth of labeled bonds (63% of the total), while supranational, sovereign and agency (SSA) entities issued USD 44 billion (37%). This continues a shift in the labeled-bond market, with corporate issuers taking a more central role” (p. 4).

Index impact: The Impact of Climate Engagement: A Field Experiment by Florian Heeb and  Julian F. Kölbel as of Feb. 6th, 2024 (#361): “A randomly chosen group of 300 out of 1227 international companies received a letter from an index provider, encouraging the company to commit to setting a science-based climate target to remain included in its climate transition benchmark indices. After one year, we observed a significant effect: 21.0% of treated companies have committed, vs. 15.7% in the control group. This suggests that engagement by financial institutions can affect corporate policies when a feasible request is combined with a credible threat of exit” (abstract). My comment: It would be interesting to know the assets of the funds threatening to divest (index funds are often large). Hopefully, this type of shareholder engagement also works for active (and small) asset managers. Further shareholder engagement research see e.g. Shareholder engagement: 21 science based theses and an action plan – (prof-soehnholz.com)

ESG nudging: Optimistic framing increases responsible investment of investment professionals by Dan Daugaard, Danielle Kent, Maroš Servátka, and Lyla Zhang as of Jan. 1zh, 2024 (#33): “… we report insights from an incentivized online experiment with investment professionals … The analyzed sample consists of individuals who stated their intention to increase their investment in ESG within the next 10 years … We demonstrate that framing divestment decisions in a more optimistic orientation, with an emphasis on the transitory nature of costs and the permanency of future benefits, significantly increases responsible investment by 3.6%. With total professionally managed assets valued at USD $98.4 trillion globally, a comparable effect size would represent a USD $3.6 trillion shift in asset allocations” (p. 12).

Other investment research (in: „Biodiversity diversion“)

Gender differences: The Gender Investment Gap: Reasons and Consequences by Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi and Leah Zimmerer as of Jan. 27th, 2024 (#31): „ Women, compared to men, report larger financial constraints, higher risk aversion, perceived stress in financial matters, and lower trust in financial institutions. As a result, women save and invest less consistently than men. Conditional on investing, women use fewer financial products, particularly in equity investments. We find a significant gender gap in stock market participation, with 17.6% of women and 32.3% of men investing. The motives and barriers influencing stock market participation also diverge, with men leaning towards short-term gains and the thrill of investing, while women commonly cite unfamiliarity with stocks and fear of potential losses as primary reasons for non-participation” (abstract).

New performance indicator: Maximum Cumulative Underperformance: A New Metric for Active Performance Management by Kevin Khang and Marvin Ertl from The Vanguard Group as of Jan. 18th, 2024 (#29): “… we define maximum cumulative underperformance (MaxCU)—the maximum underperformance of an active fund relative to the benchmark … The greater the benchmark return environment and the longer the investment horizon, the greater MaxCU investors should expect … Ex-ante, our framework can be used to articulate the investor’s tolerance for underperformance relative to the benchmark and inform the final active allocation decision at the outset. Ex-post, our framework can be used to set the base rate for terminating a manager who has suffered a sizeable underperformance“ (p. 19/20). My comment: Useful concept, but benchmark selection is very important for this approach. For the latter problem see e.g. Globale Small-Caps: Faire Benchmark für meinen Artikel 9 Fonds? (prof-soehnholz.com)

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Advert for German investors:

Sponsor my research by investing in and/or recommending my global small cap mutual fund (SFDR Art. 9). The fund focuses on the Sustainable Development Goals and uses separate E, S and G best-in-universe minimum ratings and broad shareholder engagement with currently 26 of 30 companies: FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T or My fund (prof-soehnholz.com).

Small-Caps Illustration durch Benchmark meines Fonds mit einer Peergroup

Globale Small-Caps: Faire Benchmark für meinen Artikel 9 Fonds?

Small-Caps: Ich möchte möglichst nachhaltig und transparent, d.h. regelbasiert investieren. Die nachhaltigsten regelbasierten ETFs- bzw. Publikumsfonds erreichen aber nur ungefähr die Hälfte der Nachhaltigkeit meiner nachhaltigsten Aktienportfolios (Details dazu vgl. Nachhaltigkeitsinvestmentpolitik auf www.futurevest.fund). Interessenten sind neben der absoluten auch an der relativen Performance dieser Portfolios interessiert. Dafür ist eine faire Benchmark nötig. Es ist schwer, eine solche zu finden.

Keine diversifizierte SDG-Benchmark?

Meine Regeln beinhalten vor allem Länder- und Aktivitätsausschlüsse, ESG-Anforderungen und solche an Vereinbarkeit mit den Nachhaltigen Entwicklungszielen der Vereinten Nationen (SDG). Außerdem versuche ich, ein breites und tiefes Shareholder Engagement umzusetzen.

Die Aktien für meinen Fonds werden Bottom-Up selektiert. Es gibt also keine Allokationsvorgaben z.B. für Länder oder Branchen oder Unternehmensgrößen. Bisher hatten die USA einen Anteil von etwa 40 bis 60 Prozent, danach folgt Australien mit ca. 10% sowie diverse europäische Länder.

Bei den Branchen lag das Gewicht je nach Definition bei 30 bis 60 Prozent Gesundheit und bis zu 40% Industrie.

Ein ESG- plus SDG-Index bzw. eine derartige Fonds-Vergleichsgruppe (Peergroup) wären als Benchmark geeignet. Fonds mit Fokus auf Cleantech oder erneuerbarer Energieproduktion (SDG 7) performen ganz anders als Fonds mit Gesundheitsfokus (SDG 3). Deshalb ist eine SDG-diversifizierte Benchmark nötig. Ich kenne aber keine solche Benchmark bzw. Peergroup, deren Daten öffentlich zugänglich sind und die somit allen Interessenten für Vergleiche zur Verfügung stehen.

Allenfalls der Global Challenges Index der Börse Hannover (GCX) könnte als Benchmark dienen. Allerdings beinhaltet er vor allem ökologisch ausgerichtete Aktien und kaum welche mit Sozialfokus. Außerdem ist er Europalastig und beinhaltet überwiegend höher kapitalisierte Unternehmen als mein Fonds. Ein Vergleich der Positionen von GCX und meinem Fonds ergibt nur sehr wenige Gemeinsamkeiten. Deshalb ist die Korrelation zu meinem Fonds mit ca. 0,6 (seit Fondsauflage im August 2021) auch relativ gering.

Small-Caps Benchmark adäquat?

Eine hohe SDG-Vereinbarkeit ist für branchenfokussierte Unternehmen einfacher erreichbar als für diversifizierte. In den letzten Jahren haben zudem immer mehr Small- und Mid-Cap-Unternehmen aussagekräftige ESG-Daten veröffentlicht. Deshalb gibt es zunehmend mehr SDG-kompatible Unternehmen mit guten ESG-Ratings. Aus diesen Gründen sind überwiegend kleine und wenige Großunternehmen in meinem Portfolio vertreten.

Die durchschnittliche Kapitalisierung der Unternehmen im Portfolio ist von anfangs ca. 15 Milliarden auf inzwischen unter 5 Milliarden gesunken. Je nach Zeitpunkt bzw. Definition war der Fonds also zu Beginn eher ein Mid-Cap- und ist jetzt eher ein Small-Cap-Fonds. Ich erwarte aus den oben genannten Gründen, dass der Fonds auch künftig Small-Cap-fokussiert bleibt.

Korrelationen seit Fondsauflage zeigen knapp 0,6 mit globalen Mid-Caps und etwas über 0,6 mit globalen Small-Caps. Einen kombinierten Small/Mid-Cap-Index bzw. ETF, der für Vergleiche genutzt werden kann, habe ich nicht gefunden. Datenanbieter wie Morningstar oder CAPInside stellen aber Fondspeergroups aus Small- und Mid-Cap-Fonds zusammen. Diese scheinen mir für Performancevergleiche meines Fonds für die Vergangenheit am ehesten geeignet. Bei der CAPInside Peergroup liegt die Korrelation seit Fondsauflage bei 0,7. Dabei ist allerdings zu beachten, dass solche Vergleichsgruppen aufgrund der relativ hohen Kosten aktiver Fonds typischerweise geringere Renditen erreichen als direkte Wertpapierindizes bzw. kostengünstige ETFs.

Der Vorteil einer Small- bzw. Small/Mid-Cap-Benchmark ist, dass mein Fonds mit sehr viel mehr anderen Fonds verglichen werden kann als mit der GCX-Benchmark. Außerdem sind viel mehr Anleger gewohnt, mit traditionellen (Small/Midcap) als mit nachhaltigen (GCX) Benchmarks zu arbeiten. Für künftige Vergleiche wäre eine reine Smallcap-Peergroup adäquater. Eine solche frei zugängliche Vergleichsgruppe gibt es jedoch weder bei Morningstar noch bei CAPInside.

Keine eigene Impact-Peergoup

Ich habe auch versucht, eine eigene Peergroup mit vergleichbaren Fonds zu erstellen. Ich habe aber keine Fonds gefunden, die konsequente ESG- und breite SDG-Kriterien nutzen und global vor allem in Small-Caps investieren. Es gibt zwar SDG- bzw. Impactfonds, aber die sind oft auf nachhaltige Energien fokussiert und/oder nur auf eine Region. Wenn es sich um globale Fonds handelt, enthalten sie typischerweise sehr viele (Technologie-) Mega-Caps, die meiner Meinung nach weder nach ESG- noch nach SDG-Kriterien nachhaltig genug sind (vgl. Glorreiche 7: Sind sie unsozial? – Responsible Investment Research Blog (prof-soehnholz.com)).

Am ehesten können deshalb die Fonds genutzt werden, die dem Global Challenges Index folgen. Wie erwartet, haben diese erheblich geringere USA- und Sozialallokationen und aktuell eine etwa doppelt so hohe durchschnittliche Marktkapitalisierung wie mein Fonds.

Problematische Faktoranalysen

Ich könnte auch auf Faktoranalysen verweisen, um die Fondsperformance zu erklären. Für meinen Fonds ist aber aufgrund seiner Konzeption, außer in Bezug auf SDG, ESG und Small- und Mid-Caps, keine klare und dauerhafte Faktorabhängigkeit zu erwarten. Und die mir bekannten öffentlichen und damit einfach von Interessenten nachprüfbaren Faktoranalysen nutzen keine SDG- bzw. ESG-Faktoren.

Bei Morningstar wird für meinen Fonds z.B. eine unpassende „Aktien global All-Cap“ Benchmark genutzt und eine Flex-Cap- (inkl. Mega- und Large-Caps) anstatt einer Small/Mid-Cap-Peergruppe, die es ebenfalls gibt. Bei der Morningstar-Portfolioanalyse ist der Small-/Mid-Cap-Fokus dagegen deutlich erkennbar.

Der Fonds hat nach Morningstar-Klassifikation keinen klaren Value- oder Growth-Fokus und nur geringe Momentum-Komponenten. Für Interessenten problematisch ist, dass die Ergebnisse solcher Faktoranalysen stark von den jeweiligen Faktordefinitionen abhängen können (vgl. z.B. Kessler, Stephan and Scherer, Bernd and Harries, Jan Philipp, Value by Design? (November 14, 2019). The Journal of Portfolio Management Quantitative Special Issue, 46 (2) 25-43, 2020, DOI: https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2019.1.122, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3593557).

Fazit: Die für meinen Fonds am besten geeignete Benchmark über die bisherige Laufzeit ist eine Vergleichsgruppe aus globalen Small- und Mid-Cap-Fonds. Im Vergleich zu einer solchen Fondsgruppe von CAPInside hat mein Fonds eine ähnliche Performance seit Auflage und vor allem seit Mitte 2023 und seit Auflage eine Korrelation von ca. 0,7. Das ist nachvollziehbar, denn seit der letzten jährlichen regelbasierten Portfolioumstellung zu Mitte/Ende 2023 besteht der Fonds aus noch mehr Small- und Mid-Caps als vorher. Für künftige Analysen ist dagegen eine reine Small-Cap-Benchmark adäquater.

Besonders nachhaltige marktübliche Performance

Natürlich wäre es aus meiner Sicht gut, eine Outperformance gegenüber solchen Benchmark zu erreichen. Weil für meinen Fonds neben den oben genannten Branchen auch – relativ schlecht performende – nachhaltige Energien, Infrastruktur und Immobilien eine wichtige Rolle spielen, war das in den letzten Jahren aber schwierig. Die Rendite meines Fonds ist deshalb aus meiner Sicht OK. Mit ungefähr 13% Volatilität sind die Schwankungen zudem relativ gering (Interessenten können die Performance z.B. hier prüfen: Fonds-Portfolio: Mein Fonds | CAPInside).

Nachdem Small-Caps lange Zeit relativ schlecht rentiert haben, erwarten einige Marktbeobachter, dass sich die Renditen bald verbessern könnten. Weil ich prognosefrei arbeite, kann ich das nur hoffen. Zumindest gelten Small-Caps als Aktien, die grundsätzlich schnell und stark steigen können. Im Dezember 2023 hat mein Fonds mit den +9% gezeigt, dass das durchaus vorkommen kann.

Mein erklärtes Ziel, mittelfristig eine marktübliche Performance mit besonders nachhaltigen Investments zu erzielen, habe ich bisher erreicht. Anders ausgedrückt: Wenn man weltweit in Small-Caps investieren möchte, kann man das mit meinem Fonds besonders nachhaltig machen und sollte dabei keine Performancenachteile haben.

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Werbung (Small Caps):

Der von mir beratene Fonds (SFDR Art. 9) ist auf soziale SDGs fokussiert. Ich nutze separate E-, S- und G-Best-in-Universe-Mindestratings sowie ein breites Aktionärsengagement bei aktuell 26 von 30 Unternehmen: FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T oder Divestments: 49 bei 30 Aktien meines Artikel 9 Fonds

Disclaimer

Diese Unterlage ist von der Soehnholz ESG GmbH erstellt worden. Die Erstellerin übernimmt keine Gewähr für die Richtigkeit, Vollständigkeit und/oder Aktualität der zur Verfügung gestellten Inhalte. Die Informationen unterliegen deutschem Recht und richten sich ausschließlich an Investoren, die ihren Wohnsitz in Deutschland haben. Sie sind nicht als Verkaufsangebot oder Aufforderung zur Abgabe eines Kauf- oder Zeichnungsangebots für Anteile des in dieser Unterlage dargestellten Fonds zu verstehen und ersetzen nicht eine anleger- und anlagegerechte Beratung. Anlageentscheidungen sollten nur auf der Grundlage der aktuellen gesetzlichen Verkaufsunterlagen (Wesentliche Anlegerinformationen, Verkaufsprospekt und – sofern verfügbar – Jahres- und Halbjahresbericht) getroffen werden, die auch die allein maßgeblichen Anlagebedingungen enthalten. Die Verkaufsunterlagen werden bei der Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft (Monega Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH), der Verwahrstelle (Kreissparkasse Köln) und den Vertriebspartnern zur kostenlosen Ausgabe bereitgehalten. Die Verkaufsunterlagen sind zudem im Internet unter www.monega.de erhältlich. Die in dieser Unterlage zur Verfügung gestellten Inhalte dienen lediglich der allgemeinen Information und stellen keine Beratung oder sonstige Empfehlung dar. Die Kapitalanlage ist stets mit Risiken verbunden und kann zum Verlust des eingesetzten Kapitals führen. Vor einer etwaigen Anlageentscheidung sollten Sie eingehend prüfen, ob die Anlage für Ihre individuelle Situation und Ihre persönlichen Ziele geeignet ist. Diese Unterlage enthält ggf. Informationen, die aus öffentlichen Quellen stammen, die die Erstellerin für verlässlich hält. Die dargestellten Inhalte, insbesondere die Darstellung von Strategien sowie deren Chancen und Risiken, können sich im Zeitverlauf ändern. Einschätzungen und Bewertungen reflektieren die Meinung der Erstellerin zum Zeitpunkt der Erstellung und können sich jederzeit ändern. Es ist nicht beabsichtigt, diese Unterlage laufend oder überhaupt zu aktualisieren. Sie stellt nur eine unverbindliche Momentaufnahme dar. Die Unterlage ist ausschließlich zur Information und zum persönlichen Gebrauch bestimmt. Jegliche nicht autorisierte Vervielfältigung und Weiterverbreitung ist untersagt.

2023: Bild von Gerd Altmann von Pixabay

2023: Passive Allokation und ESG gut, SDG nicht gut

2023: Vereinfacht zusammengefasst haben meine Portfolioregeln in 2023 diese Wirkung gehabt: Passive Allokation und ESG gut, SDG schlecht und Trendfolge sehr schlecht…. Im Jahr 2022 hatten dagegen besonders meine Trendfolge und SDG-Portfolios gut rentiert (vgl. SDG und Trendfolge: Relativ gut in 2022).

Passives Allokations-Weltmarktportfolio 2023 mit guter Rendite

Das nicht-nachhaltige Alternatives ETF-Portfolio hat in 2023 mit 7,2% rentiert, also deutlich schlechter als Aktien insgesamt mit ca. 17%. Das regelbasierte „most passive“ Multi-Asset Weltmarkt ETF-Portfolio hat mit +9,9% trotz seines hohen Anteils an Alternatives dagegen relativ gut abgeschnitten, denn die Performance ist sogar etwas besser als die flexibler aktiver Mischfonds (+8,2%).

Das  Alternatives-ETF Portfolio (Start 2016) wird künftig nicht mehr aktiv angeboten (vgl. Alternatives: Thematic replace alternative investments (prof-soehnholz.com)). Damit ist künftig das Weltmarkt ETF-Portfolio (Start 2016) das einzige verbleibende traditionelle Portfolio im Angebot.

ESG ETF-Portfolios OK

Eine vergleichbare Performance gilt für das ebenfalls breit diversifizierte ESG ETF-Portfolio mit +9%. Das ESG ETF-Portfolio ex Bonds lag dagegen mit +12,8% aufgrund des hohen Alternatives- und geringen Tech-Anteils erheblich hinter traditionellen Aktien-ETFs. Die Rendite ist aber ganz ähnlich wie die +12,1% traditioneller aktiv gemanagter globaler Aktienfonds. Das ESG ETF-Portfolio ex Bonds Income verzeichnete ein geringeres Plus von +9,1%. Das ist etwas schlechter als die +9,8% traditioneller Dividendenfonds.

Mit +0,8% schnitt das ESG ETF-Portfolio Bonds (EUR) ähnlich wie die +1,5% für vergleichbare traditionelle Anleihe-ETFs ab. Aktive Fonds haben jedoch +4,6% erreicht. Anders als in 2022, hat meine Trendfolge mit -1,8% für das ESG ETF-Portfolio ex Bonds Trend aber nicht gut funktioniert.

SDG ETF-Portfolio: 2023 naja

Das aus thematischen Aktien-ETFs bestehende SDG ETF-Portfolio lag mit +2,6% stark hinter traditionellen Aktienanlagen zurück und das SDG ETF-Trendfolgeportfolio zeigt mit -10% eine sehr schlechte Performance. Für thematische Investments mit ökologischem Fokus lief es allerdings in 2023 generell nicht so gut.

Um das Portfolioangebot zu straffen, werden künftig nur noch 4 ESG ETF-Portfolios aktiv angeboten: Multi-Asset (Start 2016), Aktien, renditeorientierte Anleihen und sicherheitsorientierte Anleihen (alle Start 2019). Hinzu kommen, wie gehabt, die beiden SDG ETF-Portfolios (Start 2019 und 2020).

Direkte pure ESG-Aktienportfolios OK

Das aus 30 Aktien bestehende Global Equities ESG Portfolio hat +14,6% gemacht und liegt damit besser als traditionelle aktive Fonds (+12,1%) aber hinter traditionellen Aktien-ETFs, was vor allem an den im Portfolio nicht vorhandenen Mega-Techs lag. Das nur aus 5 Titeln bestehende Global Equities ESG Portfolio S war mit +8,9% etwas schlechter, liegt aber seit dem Start in 2017 immer noch vor dem 30-Aktien Portfolio.

Das Infrastructure ESG Portfolio hat -5,1% verloren und liegt damit erheblich hinter den +0,8% traditioneller Infrastrukturfonds und den +9,2% eines traditionellen Infrastruktur-ETFs. Das Real Estate ESG Portfolio hat +7,2% gewonnen, während traditionelle globale Immobilienaktien-ETFs +6,9% und aktiv gemanagte Fonds +7,9% gewonnen haben. Das Deutsche Aktien ESG Portfolio hat +6,7% zugelegt. Das wiederum liegt erheblich hinter aktiv gemanagten traditionellen Fonds mit +15,1% und nennenswert hinter vergleichbaren ETFs mit +16,2%.

Direkte ESG plus SDG-Aktienportfolios: Nicht so gut

Das auf soziale Midcaps fokussierte Global Equities ESG SDG hat mit -0,7% im Vergleich zu allgemeinen Aktienfonds sehr schlecht abgeschnitten. Das ist vor allem auf den hohen Gesundheitsanteil zurückzuführen. Das Global Equities ESG SDG Trend Portfolio hat mit -8,4% – wie die anderen Trendfolgeportfolios – besonders schlecht abgeschnitten. Das Global Equities ESG SDG Social Portfolio hat dagegen mit +10,4% im Vergleich zum Beispiel zu Gesundheits-ETFs bzw. aktiven Fonds (-0,6 bzw. -1,0%) dagegen ziemlich gut abgeschnitten.

Aufgrund mangelnder Nachfrage werden die direkten ESG-Aktienportfolios für globale Aktien, deutsche Aktien, Infrastrukturaktien und Immobilienaktien (alle Start 2016 und 2017) künftig nicht mehr aktiv angeboten, sondern nur noch die ESG + SDG-Aktienportfolios (Start 2017 und 2022).

Fondsperformance: Nicht so gut

Mein FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R Fonds (Start 2021) zeigt nach einem im Vergleich zu anderen Portfolios sehr guten Jahr 2022 (-8,1%) in 2023 mit +0,5% eine starke Underperformance gegenüber traditionellen Aktienmärkten. Das liegt vor allem an der Branchenzusammensetzung des Portfolios mit Fokus auf Gesundheit und an den relativ hohen nachhaltigen Infrastruktur- und Immobilienanteilen (weitere Informationen wie z.B. auch den aktuellen detaillierten Engagementreport siehe FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R – DE000A2P37T6 – A2P37T). Hinzu kommt, dass die sogenannten Glorreichen 7 bewusst in keinem meiner direkten Portfolios enthalten sind (vgl. Glorreiche 7: Sind sie unsozial? – Responsible Investment Research Blog (prof-soehnholz.com)). Dafür sind das letzte Quartal 2023 mit +9,4% und vor allem der Dezember mit +9,0% besonders gut gelaufen.

Anmerkungen: Die Performancedetails siehe www.soehnholzesg.com und zu allen Regeln und Portfolios siehe Das Soehnholz ESG und SDG Portfoliobuch. Benchmarkdaten: Eigene Berechnungen u.a. auf Basis von www.morningstar.de