Postgrowth: Researchpost 231

Postgrowth: 10x new research on fossil fuel finance, coal insurance, postgrowth literature, financial nature risks, social ratings, ESG herding, resilient ESG, ESG regulation, divestment and transition deficits (# shows the number full SSRN research paper downloads as of June 19th, 2025)

Social and ecological research

Browner banks: Fossil Fuel Finance report 2025 by the Banking on Climate Chaos as of June 2025: “The 65 biggest banks globally committed $869 B USD to companies conducting business in fossil fuels in 2024. The 65 biggest banks globally committed $429 B USD to companies expanding fossil fuel production and infrastructure in 2024. Over 2/3 of banks covered in this report (45 banks) increased their fossil fuel financing from 2023 to 2024. 48 of the 65 banks in this report increased fossil fuel expansion finance from 2023 to 2024” (p. 4). My comment: Good reason to use green banks

Coal impact: Insurers’ Carbon Underwriting Policies by Olimpia Carradori, Felix von Meyerinck, and Zacharias Sautner as of June 12^th, 2025 (#66): “We study … carbon under writing policies among the world’s largest insurers. …Implementation of coal policies is often incomplete, and some insurers expand coal coverage despite commitments. Using merged mine-insurance policy data, we show that insurers with coal policies reduce the number of insured mines by about 16%, insured coal volumes by 56%, and make continued coverage 13pp less likely. Affected mines reduce output, cut employment, and are abandoned more often in subsequent periods” (abstract). My comment: Insurance companies can have a huge ecological impact

Postgrowth concepts: Degrowth and postgrowth: A systematic literature review of growth-critical science by Arho Toikka, Toni Ruuska, Laua Wiman, and Pasi Heikkurinen as of April 3^rd, 2025 (#41): “… While previous reviews have examined studies of degrowth and postgrowth as forming a unified and unanimous field, this article challenges the assumption that these concepts form a shared scholarly or political agenda beyond being critical towards growth. By using topic modelling … the study finds the topics in the full text of 943 articles. … In the analysis, the articles draw on 20 topics, appearing in various combinations, allowing us to present the network of the growth-critical discussion as it spans across fields and disciplines.” (abstract). My comment: SDG (revenue) alignment – if used sensibly – can be a very powerful post-growth indicator which has not been discussed yet as far as I know

ESG investment research (in: Postgrowth)

Financial nature: Corporate Nature Risk Perceptions by Snorre Gjerde, Zacharias Sautner, Alexander F. Wagner, and Alexis Wegerich as of May 1^st, 2025 (#650): “We survey companies worldwide … Nearly half view nature risks as financially material. Nature restoration efforts are less wide spread than mitigation efforts. Among respondents who experienced investor engagement on nature, three-quarters see it as value-generating, often prompting strategic changes“ (abstract).

Social rating effect: ESG Ratings and Financial Reporting Quality: Why Social Performance Matters by Rimona Palas, Dalit Gafni, Dov Solomon, and Ido Baum as of June 12^th, 2025 (#9): “… no prior study has comprehensively examined how the individual ESG pillars relate to financial reporting quality (FRQ). Using a sample of U.S.-listed firms from 2012 to 2022, we analyze the separate effects of the environmental, social, and governance components on FRQ, measured by earnings persistence and the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows. We find a strong association between the social pillar and FRQ“ (abstract).

ESG herding: ESG Mania and Institutional Trading by Riza Demirer, Lavinia Rognone, and Huacheng Zhang as of as of June 3^rd, 2025 (#45): “Recent two decades have seen that institutional investors simultaneously crowd in (buy) the ESG stock market. … we find significant evidence that their ESG investments are driven by fad, reputation, fund flow, or informational exploitation …. Small, dedicated, and ill-performed institutions exhibit strong herding intensity; institutions that experienced outflows exhibit higher herding intensity and high herding institutions attract more flows. Herding institutions do not outperform and their trading does not significantly impact stock prices. We find weak evidence of ‘doing well by doing good’. Finally, a compressive regression analysis suggests that reputational concern and attracting fund flow are the dominant motivations“ (abstract). My comment: I wonder what happens if these investor finally discover SDG and impact investments

Resilient ESG: ESG Indices and Macroeconomic Factors: A European Panel Data Analysis by Eleonor Salzman as of June 13^th, 2025 (#8): “… this study examines macroeconomic variables‘ short- and long-term impacts on ESG-driven indices (MSCI ESG) in European economies. Conventional indices are included to enhance comparability and interpretability … Results show that macroeconomic factors significantly influence both indices, with ESG indices exhibiting greater resilience to economic shocks through smaller regression coefficients …” (abstract). My comment: ESG investments appear to be less rsikay than traditional investments

ESG rating regulation: The EU regulation on ESG Ratings: Fit for purpose? by Filippo Annunziata and Michele Siri as of Feb. 24^th, 2025 (#157): “The recent approval of the new Regulation on ESG ratings marks an important evolution in the complex and evolving landscape on ESG finance in the European Union. The new EU regulation can indeed be considered as a step towards detailed and quite precise rules to ensure more reliable ESG ratings in the path of EU policy agenda to achieve a more sustainable world. The paper offers a first analysis of the new provisions, pointing to its similarities, but also differences with the Credit ratings regulation and discusses its more relevant aspects” (abstract).

SDG and impact investment research

Sticky fossils: Divestment From Fossil Fuels: Evidence From Ownership Data by Benjamin Trouvé and Alain Naef as of Jan. 29^th, 2025 (#63): “… Our database contains 30 million investor positions in the 312 largest fossil fuel companies. We show that certain religious organizations, universities and public organizations divested from fossil fuel. Looking at all large investors … we find that commodity price returns are the major drivers of short-term divestment … Only very few investors adjust their fossil fuel holdings in the long term” (abstract). My comment: If pollution reduction is a goal, less regulation does not seem to be the answer

Transition deficits: Climate Risk Engagements by Francois Derrien, Alexandre Garel, Arthur Romec, and Feng Zhou as of Jan. 24^th, 2025 (#299): “We study climate-risk related engagements by one of the world’s largest investors. … We find that firms with greater carbon footprint and greater exposure to climate transition risk are more likely to be targeted. Following a climate risk engagement, targeted firms are more likely to commit to adopt a science-based climate target and to disclose climate-related information. Targeted firms also experience a reduction in their carbon emissions. However this reduction is limited to scope 1 and 2 emissions and its magnitude is inconsistent with net-zero targets” (abstract). My comment: I invest in and focus my engagement in the most-sustainable companies which seem to be more open to real sustainability improvements

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Werbung (in: Postgrowth)

Unterstützen Sie meinen Researchblog, indem Sie in den von mir beratenen globalen Small-/Mid-Cap-Investmentfonds (siehe FutureVest Equity Sustainable Development Goals R) investieren und/oder ihn empfehlen.

Der Fonds konzentriert sich auf die UN-Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung mit durchschnittlich einzigartig hohen 99% SDG-vereinbaren Umsätzen der Portfoliounternehmen und sehr hohen E-, S- und G-Best-in-Universe-Scores sowie einem besonders umfangreichen Aktionärsengagement (siehe auch My fund).

Zum Vergleich: Ein traditioneller globaler Small-Cap-ETF hat eine SDG-Umsatzvereinbarkeit von etwa 5 %, ein diversifizierter Gesundheits-ETF 13 %, Artikel 9 Fonds circa 20%, liquide Impactfonds und ein ETF für erneuerbare Energien ungefähr 40 % (vgl. Maximale Portfolio-Nachhaltigkeit: Was geht?).

Insgesamt hat der von mir beratene Fonds seit der Auflage im August 2021 eine ähnliche Performance wie traditionelle globale Small- und Mid-Cap-Fonds (vgl. z.B. Fonds-Portfolio: Mein Fonds | CAPinside).

Ein Fondsinvestment war also bisher ein „Free Lunch“ in Bezug auf Nachhaltigkeit: Ein besonders konsequent nachhaltiges Portfolio mit marktüblichen Renditen und (eher niedrigeren) Risiken. Vergangene Performance ist allerdings kein guter Indikator für künftige Performance.

Finfluence: Researchpost 230

Finfluence: 5x new research on flexible sustainability beliefs, sectoral ESG, brown Tech companies, fund outperformance myths, and positive finfluence

Flexible beliefs: Stewardship Theatre and Political Catering with Congress by Massimo Massa and Lei Zhang as of June 3^rd, 2025: “We study how political pressure influences asset managers to adapt to the changing political landscape in the US Congress. … We find strong evidence that the proxy voting behavior of large asset management companies on environmental and social proposals aligns closely with the prevailing political preferences in Congress and changes accordingly as political dominance shifts” (abstract). My comment: That seem to be more or less the same companies which claimed ESG DNA a few months ago. I did not know that DNA depends on political factors.

Sectoral ESG: Sectoral and Financial Drivers of ESG Adoption: Evidence from Multi-Model Panel Data Analysis by A. Seddik Meziani as of June 4^th, 2025: “ESG engagement refers to the integration of environmental, social, and governance factors into corporate strategy. … Results show that Free Cash Flow Margin and Return on Assets (ROA) are positively associated with ESG engagement, while leverage and asset turnover have a negative impact. … Sector affiliation plays a crucial role, with Energy firms performing better in ESG, while Technology and Financial firms lag in social and governance aspects” (abstract).

Brown Tech: Greening digital companies: monitoring emissions and climate commitments 2025 by the International Telecommunication Union and World Benchmarking Alliance as of June 5^th, 2025: “The rapid growth of AI is expected to shape energy demand and emission trajectories …According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), global data centres consumed 415 TWh of electricity in 2024 (1.5 per cent of global 9 Greening Digital Companies report 2025 use) and are projected to more than double consumption by 2030. Digital companies assessed in this report that are heavily investing in AI saw their operational emissions in 2023 rise to 150 per cent of their 2020 levels. … Scope 3 emissions make up 84 per cent of total emissions for companies with full disclosures (more than five times higher than the combined total of Scope 1 and 2 emissions) but are not universally reported: 106 companies disclosed all relevant GHG Protocol categories of Scope 3 emission in 2023 (Soehnholz: Out of 200) … Some 82 companies have set absolute Scope 3 reduction targets … However, many of these targets are either limited in scope or based on intensity metrics, which track emissions per unit of revenue or product, rather than total reductions” (p. 9 and 10). My comment: “The Top Stocks Widely Owned by ESG Funds” (from Morningstar by Frances AufderHeide from Nov. 18th, 2024) …are Microsoft, NVIDIA, Apple, Amazon and Alphabet. Also see social deficits of such companies here: Glorreiche 7: Sind sie unsozial?

Fund outperformance? Chasing Shadows: Predicting outperformers in private assets by Lloyd Han, Sean Klein, German Ramirez and Rebecca Yuan as of June 10^th, 2025: “Investors face key practical challenges when selecting private asset managers. In-flight performance metrics for a fund are unreliable and mean-revert over the life of the fund. … As a result, while final measures of performance show persistence of private equity and private debt funds within the same manager, investors cannot outperform a simple equal-weighted allocation to funds by picking managers based on contemporaneous measures of fund performance. For venture capital funds, we find some evidence that historical performance may help investors generate incremental returns” (p.13/14). My comment: When investing in private markets, expect average market performance and only rely on returns after all fees and after all implementation (including opportunity) costs and not top quartile performance.

Positive finfluence? Understanding finfluencers: Roles and strategic partnerships in retail investor engagement by Marius Mölders, Lennart Bock, Eloy Barrantes, and Henning Zülch as of June 2025: “Financial influencers, or ‘finfluencers’, are emerging players in the financial community … The online survey responses of a representative sample of German-speaking finfluencers reveal that, despite apparent contradictions in their financial motives, finfluencers see themselves as advocates of financial education. While serving for financial services marketing, finfluencers also can be integrated into strategic partnerships, including retail investor relations and financial literacy initiatives. Despite controversies, we conceptualize finfluencers as agents of change promoting financial literacy, empowerment, and inclusion while also normalising financial conversations in everyday life” (abstract, finfluencer selection based on finanzblognews.de, finanzblogroll.net, geldz.de (p.9)). My comment: Hopefully, the “advice” of these finfluencers is in line with current financial research. I hope that many of them read my blogposts 🙂

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Werbung (in: Finfluence)

ESG-Exit: Researchpost 229

ESG-Exit: 12x new research on carbon pricing, brown loans, brown default risk, climate M&A challenges, greenwashing, stranded real estate, impact investing potential, worker-CEO pay gap, carbon border taxes and volatility as a risk measure (#shows SSRN full paper downloads as of June 5^th, 2025)

ESG investment research

Carbon value: Do Carbon Pricing Policies Harm Firm Performance? Worldwide Evidence by Tinghua Duan, Frank Weikai Li, and Hong Zhang as of May 27^th, 2025 (#63): “Carbon pricing initiatives are effective in reducing GHG emissions … By examining their worldwide, staggered enactment across different jurisdictions, we find no evidence that these policies reduce the aggregate profitability, investments, or employment of publicly listed firms in the adopting jurisdictions. Instead, carbon pricing policies redistribute profits and investments from firms with high emission intensity to those with low emission intensity. Moreover, high-emission intensity (low-emission-intensity) firms receive lower (higher) market values after the enactment of carbon pricing policies, driven by both a reduction in expected future cash flows and an increase in the discount rate. The lower profitability of high emission intensity firms relative to lower emission intensity firms is driven by both a decrease in sales growth and an increase in operating costs. Cross-country analyses show that the effect is more pronounced for firms headquartered in countries that rely more on fossil fuel energy, and the effect does not vary with countries’ exposure to physical climate risks” (abstract).

Brown loan advantages: The green banking gap: how bankability, business models, and regulations challenge banks’ decarbonisation by Nicolás Aguila, Paula Haufe, Riccardo Baioni, Jan Fichtner, Janina Urban, Simon Schairer, and Joscha Wullweber as of May 7^th, 2025 (#131): “Banks have been slow to increase green lending while they continue to finance high GHG-emitting activities, a phenomenon we call the “green banking gap”. Based on interviews … we argue that explanations for the green banking gap can be grouped into three broad categories: bankability, business model, and regulation. First, there are not many green firms and projects that meet banks’ desired risk/return profile, while high-GHG-emitting activities remain bankable. Second, there are constraints to decarbonise banks’ portfolios arising from the significant change in their business model in recent decades, making (green) corporate, and particularly project, lending relatively less important. Even when they lend, the characteristics of the lending process imply a bias towards high-GHG-emitting over green activities as balance sheets are locked in old loans and banks prioritise long-term relationships with their clients. Finally, there are constraints on green lending and incentives to high-GHG-emitting lending arising from financial (liquidity and capital requirements) and sustainability regulations and overall policy uncertainty over the future decarbonisation path of the economy” (abstract). My comment: I do not invest in bank stocks or bank loans, if I can avoid it

Brown default risks: Climate stress test for the German banking sector: Impact of the green transition on corporate loan portfolios by Christian Gross, Laura-Chloé Kuntz, Simon Niederauer, Lena Strobel, and Joachim Zwanzger from the Deutsche Bundesbank as of May 19^th, 2025 (#35): “We develop a novel stress testing framework to quantify the risks to the German banking sector from the green transition. … We find that potential losses over the near term from a green transition are non-negligible, highlighting that banks’ loan portfolios are vulnerable to climate policy. Our estimates show that there are large differences across sectors and firms depending on their characteristics, most notably their carbon footprint, highlighting the importance of concentration risk in bank portfolios” (abstract) … “For a scenario that envisages an orderly transition to net zero emissions by 2050 (NGFS scenario), our results show an average increase of up to 40% in the probabilities of default for non-financial corporations after three years. In an alternative scenario assuming an abrupt increase in the carbon price to €200 (STS scenario), the probabilities of default rise to a similar extent. In the micro approach, there is an aggregate increase in probabilities of default of up to 30% in the short term … Whilst significantly stronger increases in PDs emerge for emissions-intensive firms, credit risk is not as high for firms with low emissions” … (p.38).

Climate M&A challenges: Climate change exposure and M&A: Global evidence by Yongyi Xue, Shehub Bin Hasan and Muhammad Kabir as of May 30^th,2025 (#8): “We find that firms facing higher CCE (Soe: climate change exposure) exhibit a reduced propensity to engage in M&A, and experience a decrease in deal numbers and value. … Our results indicate that the cost of financing and cash holdings explain this negative relationship. The effect is more concentrated among US acquirers and developed economies. We also find that firms proactively engage in sustainable practices to mitigate such adverse impacts of CCE. Finally, firms with higher climate change exposure also take more time to complete a deal, earn insignificant announcement returns, and exhibit poor operating performance” (abstract).

Growing greenwashing: Greenwashing Games: Playing the ESG Mandates by Amjad Ali, Jairaj Gupta, and Emad Elkhashen as of May 6^th, 2025 (#61): “… Analysing 3,642 non-financial listed firms across 41 countries (2003–2022) …, we find an 8% overall increase in greenwashing following the adoption of ESG disclosure mandates. … However, this aggregate trend masks differing firm behaviours: pre-mandate greenwashers reduce greenwashing by 26.9%, while pre-mandate non greenwashers increase it by 14.3% …” (abstract).

ESG-Exit: Post-Brexit ESG Penalty Arbitrage by Narmin and Imtiaz Sifat as of June4th, 2025 (#13): “Brexit offers a natural experiment for observing how multinational enterprises (MNEs) recalibrate sustainability strategy … We show that, after 2017, EU MNEs became 28% more likely to book ESG violations in their UK subsidiaries, while environmental fines in those units rose by a factor of four; tax, antitrust, and other non-ESG infractions display no parallel shift … insider-trading patterns suggest managers privately capitalized on the newly opened enforcement gap” (abstract). My comment: In my opinion, negative external effects require a strict regulation.

ESG-Exit (2)? Does ESG Information Deliver Investment Value? A High-Dimensional Portfolio Perspective by Giovanni Bruno, Felix Goltz, and Antoine Naly from Scientific Beta as of June 3^rd, 2025 (#48): “… we build on a high dimensional information set of more than 200 ESG characteristics and employ a host of robust portfolio construction methods … Our results show that ESG information is not redundant, increasing the portfolio Sharpe Ratio by up to 25 percent in-sample, compared with using financial information alone. However, out-of-sample benefits are insignificant as estimation errors offset any information advantage. We also show that optimal use of ESG information does not necessarily imply positive sustainability, as portfolios contain both green tilts to factors like human rights and brown tilts to factors like sin stocks. Furthermore, using ESG metrics provides no measurable risk reduction compared with using financial characteristics alone“ (abstract). My comment: With similar risks and returns I certainly prefer a good-ESG to a bad-ESG portfolio. Also, I assume that a test of often-used traditional (non-ESG) information shows comparable results.

Stranded real estate: Pricing or panicking? Commercial real estate markets and climate change by Kai Foerster, Ellen Ryan, Benedikt Scheid from the European Central Bank as of May 23^rd, 2025 (#13): “This paper provides the first study of climate risk pricing in euro area commercial real estate markets. … We find evidence of investors applying a penalty to buildings exposed to physical risk and that this penalty has increased significantly over the 2007-2023 period we study … towards the end of our sample the market response to transition risk appears to be playing out via market liquidity. This indicates that older buildings- which are more exposed to transition risks- may already be at risk of becoming “stranded assets”” (abstract).

SDG and impact investment research (in: ESG-Exit)

Impact investment potential: Mind the Gap: Why European retail investors don’t get what they want by Nicola Stefan Koch, Ana Rivera Moreno, and David Cooke from the Sustainable Finance Observatory as of May 2025: “Key regulatory reforms (SFDR, MiFID II, IDD) required integrating sustainability preferences into financial advice and product governance. To assess their effectiveness, the Sustainable Finance Observatory conducted one of Europe’s largest research programmes (2017–2024), analysing investor demand, product supply, and advisory practices across 14 Member States. Key Findings: … 74% of EU retail investors have sustainability-related objectives (i.e. value alignment and/or impact), yet in key markets only 19% hold sustainable financial products … Key barriers preventing retail investors from walking their talk include limited expertise, high information costs, and a lack of trust in the credibility of sustainable financial products. … In 57% of advice meetings (2022–2024), sustainability preferences were not automatically assessed. In 54% of German cases, advisors altered client preferences while in 53% of French cases, unsubstantiated impact claims were made. Advisor knowledge has improved overall but remains weak on investor impact across Member States. … 51% of EU retail investors want to generate real-world impact with their savings, but impact products make up only 0.7–1.3% of the market in key countries such as Germany and Austria. A majority of impact-oriented investors are willing to pay for real-world impact but mistakenly believe that low-carbon funds directly reduce emissions, making them vulnerable to misleading claims and potential exploitation. 27% of 450 Art. 8 and 9 funds reviewed in 2023 made explicit environmental impact claims — none substantiated, while 76% of investors expected real impact from such claims. … The definitions of “sustainability preferences” or “sustainable investments” exclude impact-generating investments, misaligning with 51% of investor objectives. MiFID II and SFDR lack definitions for sustainability-related objectives, leading to inconsistent classification and advice. Oversight and enforcement remain inadequate across the EU, allowing persistent compliance failures and greenwashing risks” (p. 3/4). My comment see Maximale Portfolio-Nachhaltigkeit: Was geht?

Positive inequality? Learning About Income Inequality: Long-Run Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosures by Alok Kumar, Van Anh Tran, and Chendi Zhang as of April 23^rd, 2025 (#70): “We find that although first-time high (Sö: CEO-worker) pay ratio disclosures generate negative announcement returns …, returns exhibit a reversal within three months and become positive. This reversal is stronger for firms with high inequality averse institutional shareholders. High pay ratio firms also have stronger operating performance, consistent with the view that high pay ratios reflect managerial talent …. institutional investors progressively increase their holdings and overweigh high pay-ratio firms …” (abstract). My comment: One of my top 5 shareholder engagement topics is pay ratio disclosure (Shareholder engagement: 21 science based theses and an action plan). My motive has not been better performance but – in my opinion- potentially problematic effects of ESG bonifications on pay ratios.

Other investment research

Carbon barriers: The Global Effects of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms by Kimberly Clausing, Allan Hsiao, Jonathan Colmer, and Catherine Wolfram as of April 28^th, 2025: “We study carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) policies, as currently being implemented by the EU and UK. … Our data cover the most emissions-intensive and heavily traded sectors targeted in the first phase of EU and UK implementation. We find that CBAMs can effectively boost competitiveness, curb leakage, and encourage regulation, while also avoiding disproportionate impacts on lower-income countries” (abstract).

Vola-deficits? Volatility: A Dead Ringer for Downside Risk by Javier Estrada as of June 4^th,2025 (#18): “Volatility is as widely used as is widely criticized as a risk metric. This short article argues that despite its many shortcomings volatility is pervasive for two mutually‐reinforcing reasons: First, it is very well known; and second, it is a very good proxy for the downside risk that investors really dislike. The evidence discussed here shows that a ranking of assets by volatility is very highly correlated with rankings made by different metrics that directly assess downside risk”. My comment: Interesting result but not surprising, see the respective research by Martin Ehling and Frank Schumacher

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Werbung (in: ESG-Exit)

Brown bank securities: Researchpost 228

Brown bank securities: 7x new research on deadly climate change, green political power, brown bank securities, ESG rating diversion, ESG factor performance and equity drawdowns (# shows SSRN full paper downloads as of May 29^th, 2025)

Deadly climate change: Anthropogenic climate change contributes to wildfire particulate matter and related mortality in the United States by Beverly E. Law, John T. Abatzoglou, Christopher R. Schwalm, David Byrne, Neal Fann, and Nicholas J. Nassikas as of May 2^nd, 2025: “Climate change has increased forest fire extent in temperate and boreal North America. … Climate change contributed to approximately 15,000 wildfire particulate matter deaths over 15 years … and a cumulative economic burden of $160 billion. … We suggest that absent abrupt changes in climate trajectories, land management, and population, the indirect impacts of climate change on human-health through wildfire smoke will escalate“ (abstract).

Green political power: Does Institutional Climate Adaptation Pressure Affect Corporate Mitigation Efforts? by Raffaele Conti, Aleksandra Kacperczyk, and Marcin Kacperczyk as of May 23^rd, 2025 (#39): “Using the staggered adoption of Climate Change Adaptation Plans (CCAPs) across U.S. states, we … find that that firms headquartered in CCAP-adopting states significantly reduce emissions, especially those from company-controlled sources, and become more innovative, even though CCAPs are neither mandatory nor aimed at firm-level mitigation. These innovation effects extend beyond traditional environmental domains, suggesting that adaptation policies trigger broader organizational shifts toward higher efficiency and productivity rather than environmental responses alone. Correspondingly, firms reduce expenditures on new capital and employment while maintaining profitability margins. Finally, these effects are more pronounced among firms covered by analysts …“ (abstract).

Brown bank securities (1): Carbon Transition Risk and Corporate Loan Securitization by Isabella Mueller, Huyen Nguyen, and Trang Nguyen as of March 5^th, 2025 (#261): “Our main result illustrates that when carbon transition risk is high, banks are significantly more likely to securitize a loan if the borrower is a high carbon emitter. In contrast, when transition risk is lower, banks adapt quickly and cut back on the securitization of brown loans. We also show that securitization allows banks to offer lower interest rates for loans given to high carbon emitters but there is no evidence that securitization enables banks to fund more green loans nor did we find brown loan securitization leads to changes in borrowers’ environmental performance. … we highlight that banks without preferences for green lending, US banks, large banks, banks with lower levels of deposits, and banks with lower capital ratios are more likely to manage carbon transition risk by securitization“ (p. 41). My comment: A serious transition needs to make sure that financial service companies are aligned with this goal

Brown bank securities (2): Do Bank Green Bonds Deliver? Evidence from Global Lending and Borrower Emissions by Jianlei Han, Tingjun Liu, and Qing (Clara) Zhou as of May 22^nd, 2025 (#19): “Using data from 767 banks across 2007–2022, we find that green bond issuance is associated with increased lending to firms with high carbon emissions and low realized environmental performance, despite these borrowers having high external environmental ratings. … Although borrowers’ average environmental scores improve post-issuance, the dispersion of scores across banks’ portfolios widens, suggesting that banks strategically allocate funds to enhance reported—but not actual—environmental performance. Real environmental outcomes worsen, with higher CO ₂ emissions and more environmental incidents. These effects are more pronounced in countries with stronger regulatory oversight and among banks with higher institutional ownership …” (abstract). My comment: Green bonds must be screened carefully and measurement has to focus on real outcomes

ESG rating divergence: ESG Rating Competition and Rating Quality by Cai Chen, Svenja Dube and Shiran Froymovich as of May 23^rd, 2025 (#57): “We exploit the entry of Sustainalytics as a new ESG rating agency in 2010. … First, we find that higher competition decreases incumbents’ ESG rating disagreements of the same scope. The negative relation between competition and ESG rating disagreement persists for same-scope rating metrics not covered by Sustainalytics, suggesting that neither learning nor herding drive the results. … Second, we find that incumbents’ ratings of ESG concerns are more strongly associated with future negative ESG news for firms additionally covered by Sustainalytics. This finding is consistent with competition improving ratings’ ability to predict future negative ESG incidents. Third, we find that incumbents evaluate more difficult-to measure outcome metrics for firms covered by Sustainalytics, consistent with competition inducing more effort”. My detailed comment see Neues Research: Positiver ESG-Ratingwettbewerb | CAPinside

ESG factor performance: Empirical Analysis: How ESG Investing has Impacted Asset Pricing in the Equity Market by Tareq Hossain as of May 22^nd, 2025 (#20): “This study conducts an extensive empirical investigation into the influence of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) factors on asset pricing for firms listed in the European STOXX 600 index over the period from 2003 to 2023. … The findings reveal a counterintuitive pattern: firms with higher ESG scores tend to underperform in terms of portfolio returns. However, companies with moderate levels of ESG integration demonstrate superior returns relative to both high and low ESG counterparts … Further analysis … reveals that firms with stronger Environmental and Social scores exhibit lower levels of systematic risk … we extend the traditional Fama-French five-factor asset pricing model by incorporating an ESG factor as a potential sixth explanatory variable. Our empirical results indicate that the inclusion of this ESG factor significantly improves the model’s explanatory power, with the social component emerging as the most influential driver of excess returns among all ESG dimensions” (abstract). My comment: I do not believe in factor investments but (ESG) factor analysis is important.

Drawdown issues: Drawdowns and Recoveries – Base Rates for Bottoms and Bounces by Michael J. Mauboussin and Dan Callahan from Morgan Stanley Investment Management as of May 21^st, 2025: “The median drawdown for the 6,500 stocks in our sample from 1985-2024 was 85 percent and took 2.5 years from peak to trough. More than one-half of all stocks never recover to their prior highs. Relative to smaller drawdowns, larger drawdowns, on average, take longer to occur, recover to the previous peak less often, and yet can provide attractive returns off the lows. Recoveries from drawdowns of all sizes have significant skewness, which means some stocks do extremely well relative to the pack. As a result, average returns from rebounds are higher than median returns. … Mutual fund results follow a similar pattern. While the absolute levels of drawdowns were less than those of individual stocks, the average drawdown for the top 20 funds for the 25 years through 2024 was 60 percent. These funds subsequently produced substantial excess returns “ (p. 19). My comment: I use “max. drawdown” as the most important economic risk measure for my stock seletion. Without good forecasts it seems to be prudent not to invest in stocks which have had large dradowns.

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Werbung (in: Brown bank securities)

SDG-Kennzahlen: Nur eine gut?

SDG-Kennzahlen: Hier werden Nachhaltigkeits-Rangfolgen von Wertpapier-Indizes mit sechs Nachhaltigkeitskennzahlen gebildet, davon fünf SDG-Kennzahlen. Die Rangfolgen unterscheiden sich teilweise stark. Eine SDG-Kennzahl wird als besonders attraktiv eingeschätzt.

SDG-Forschungsdefizit als Anlass für diese Analyse

Bei der Suche nach den nachhaltigsten Investments kommt es entscheidend auf die genutzten Metriken an. Solche Kenzahlen kann man für die Selektion von Aktien, Anleihen oder Fonds aber auch andere Zwecke wie die Gestaltung von Vergütungssystemen von Unternehmen nutzen.

ESG-Ratings sind am verbreitetsten aber werden seit Jahren und oft zu Recht kritisiert. Ähnliches gilt für regulatorische Kennzahlen wie EU-Taxonomie-konforme Umsätze oder Fondskategorisierungen auf Basis der Offenlegungsverordnung (SFDR Art. 6, 8 oder 9). Aber es gibt auch andere Kennzahlen.

Diesen Beitrag basiert vor allem auf Veröffentlichungen und Diskussionen innerhalb der Nachhaltigkeitskommission der Deutschen Vereinigung für Finanzanalyse und Asset Management (DVFA), deren Mitglied ich bin. Unsere Kommission hat schon Einiges zu dem Thema publiziert, zum Beispiel Leitfaden Impact Investing, 18 Dimensionen nachhaltiger Anlagepolitik, und Befragung zu Impact-Ratings.

Hier stehen sogenannte Impact-Kennzahlen im Vordergrund. Obwohl es schon seit einigen Jahren diverse Impact-Ratings gibt, sind Vergleiche solcher Ratings selten. Eine gute derartige Analyse findet man hier: ““In Partnership for the Goals”? The (Dis)Agreement of Sdg Ratings” von Tobias Bauckloh, Juris Dobrick, André Höck, Sebastian Utz, und Marcus Wagner.

SDG ist das internationale Kürzel für Nachhaltige Entwicklungsziele der Vereinten Nationen. In der Zusammenfassung der Studie wird „ein beträchtliches Maß an Uneinigkeit, das bei großen Unternehmen sowie bei Unternehmen aus dem Gesundheitswesen und dem Grundstoffsektor besonders hoch ist“ festgestellt.

Diese Studie fokussiert auf aggregierte SDG-Scores unterschiedlicher Anbieter. Was weiterhin fehlt ist ein Vergleich der unterschiedlichen Elemente solcher „Impact“- Scores wie SDG-Umsätze, SDG-Operations etc..

Hier vergleiche ich unterschiedlichen SDG-Scoring-Elemente des von mir genutzten Datenanbieters Clarity.ai für ausgewählte börsennotierte Wertpapiere.

Gute Erfahrungen mit SDG-Kennzahlen

Seit 2015 suche ich nach den nachhaltigsten ETFs. Mit meiner ersten ETF-Selektion auf Basis von ESG-Kriterien war ich nicht völlig zufrieden. Die besten ESG-ETFs enthielten aus meiner Sicht zu viele Aktien und Anleihen von Unternehmen, deren Produkte und Dienstleistungen ich nicht für besonders nachhaltig halte.

Die Suche nach den besten Einzelaktien nach ESG-Kriterien brachte ein etwas besseres aber immer noch unbefriedigendes Ergebnis in Bezug auf deren Produktanagebote und Services. Erst mit der zusätzlichen Anforderung einer hohen SDG-Vereinbarkeit erhielt ich eine Lite von Unternehmen, die auch nach meiner persönlichen Einschätzung nach nachhaltig waren.

Weil keiner der von mir genutzten Datenanbieter adäquate Kennzahlen dazu anbot, musste ich anfangs eigene branchenbasierten SDG-Vereinbarkeitsschätzung nutzen. Die von meinem Datenanbieter später angebotenen SDG-Scores habe ich nicht genutzt, weil sie mir zu viele Überschneidungen mit den bereits von mir verwendeten ESG-Scores enthielten und für mich nur schwer nachvollziehbar waren. Erst als mein Datenanbieter SDG-Umsatzvereinbarkeiten angebot, habe ich diese zusätzlich zu ESG-Scores verwendet.

Inzwischen bieten Nachhaltigkeitsdatenanbieter oft mehrere Impactmetriken an.

SDG-Kennzahlen-Analyse eines Anbieters

Das gilt auch für meinen Datenanbieter. Ich kaufe aber nicht alle Daten und nutze auch nicht alle Metriken, auf die ich Zugriff habe, für meine Aktienselektion. Regulatorische Daten wie EU-Taxonomiequoten, Principal Adverse Indicators (PAI) und SFDR-Kennzahlen werden überwacht und berichtet, aber für Wertpapierselektionen gibt es meines Erachtens bessere Daten.

Für Selektionen nutze ich vor allem sogenannte Exposure-Daten, ESG-Scores, die Kontroversen umfassen und SDG-Umsätze. Fürs Reporting nutze ich bei Kundeninteresse zusätzliche Daten wie CO2-bezogene Informationen.

Solche Daten habe ich auch für einige eigene Veröffentlichungen genutzt, zuletzt für den Beitrag Maximale Portfolio-Nachhaltigkeit: Was geht?. Die aus meiner Sicht wichtigste Nachhaltigkeitsmetrik ist demnach aktivitätsbasierter SDG-Netto-Umsatz. Dabei bin ich allerdings nur auf Brutto- und Netto- und Entity- und aktivitätsbasierte Umsätze eingegangen, aber nicht auf alternative SDG-Metriken.

So stellt mein Anbieter auch Daten zu SDG-Vereinbarkeiten von Operations und Produkten und Dienstleistungen zur Verfügung sowie zu United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) und OECD-Verstößen sowie aggregierte SDG-Scores, die alle diese Kennzahlen umfassen. Diese Kennzahlen vergleiche ich im Folgenden für ausgewählte Indizes bzw. ETFs.

SDG-Daten-Analyse ergibt stark unterschiedliche Nachhaltigkeitsrangfolgen

Die von mir beurteilten ETFs bzw. die Ihnen zugrunde liegenden Indizes umfassen vor allem die Marktsegmente Globale Aktien, nämlich All-Caps, Mid-Caps, Small-Caps, SDG-Aktien, SRI (Socially Responsible Investments), CTB (Climate Transition Benchmark), und PAB (Paris Aligned Benchmark). Hinzu kommen globale ETFs für Gesundheitsaktien, erneuerbare Energie-Aktien und Green Bonds, weil das Segmente mit den höchsten Impactquoten sein dürften.

Wie schon in meinen vorherigen Analysen zeigt sich, dass sich die Best-in-Class ESG-Scores dieser aggregierten Index-ETFs nur wenig voneinander unterscheiden, denn sie variieren nur zwischen 69 (Clean Energy) und 74 (Grüne Anleihen). Die Skala geht von 0 bis 100 und hohe Scores bedeuten geringere ESG-Risiken und damit mehr Nachhaltigkeit.

Bei den aggregierten SDG-Scores (letzte Spalte) sind die Unterschiede viel größer. Sie reichen von 16 (Small-Caps) bis 71 (Clean Energy). Das bedeutet, dass der nach ESG-Scores am wenigsten nachhaltige Clean-Energy ETF der nach SDG-Scores nachhaltigste ETF in diesem Vergleich ist.

Bei der SDG-Operations-Vereinbarkeit wird für den ESG-Score-Besten (Green Bonds ETF) mit 2 der mit Abstand schlechteste Score ausgewiesen. Hier liegt der Gesundheits-ETF mit 50 vorne. Die Unterscheide zwischen ESG- und SDG-Operations-Scores sind besonders interessant, weil die einzelnen Kriterien, die für SDG-Operations-Score-Berechnungen genutzt werden, sich relativ stark mit denen der ESG-Scores überschneiden.

Bei den UNGC- und OECD-Verstößen geht die Bandbreite von relativ schlechten 16% für SRI-Aktien bis zu 0% für Small-Caps, Mid-Caps, Green Bonds und Erneuerbare Energie ETFs. Auch das ist zumindest für Small- und Mid-Caps überraschend und könnte an einer geringeren Datenverfügbarkeit liegen.

Bei den SDG-vereinbaren Produkten und Dienstleistungen steht der Clean Energy ETF mit 81 an der Spitze und der All County Aktienindex liegt mit 10 noch unter den Small- und Mid-Cap ETFs. Damit weicht die Reihenfolge geringfügig von der Rangfolge der SDG Netto-Umsätze ab, bei der ebenfalls Clean Energy mit 68 oben steht aber Small-Caps mit 5 am Ende nach Mid-Caps mit 6 und All Country mit 11.

Fazit: Ich habe klare SDG-Kennzahlen-Präferenzen

Hier werden Nachhaltigkeitsrangfolgen für ausgewählte Indizes bzw. ETFs anhand diverser Nachhaltigkeitskennzahlen eines Datenanbieters gebildet. Bei Diskussionen nachhaltiger Investments geht es oft um ESG-Scores. ESG-Scores können sich erheblich zwischen Anbietern unterscheiden. Das gilt aber auch für andere Nachhaltigkeits-Kennzahlen wie aggregierte SDG-Scores. Hier stehen diverse SDG-(Unter-)Scores im Vordergrund.

Der hier genutzte Anbieter bildet aggregierte SDG-Scores aus SDG-Umsätzen, SDG-Operations-Scores, Kennzahlen für die SDG-Vereinbarkeit von Produkten und Dienstleistungen und UNGC und OECD-Verletzungen.

Die gleichzeitige Nutzung von ESG- und aggregierten SDG-Scores erscheint konzeptionell kritisch: SDG-kritische Operations und -Umsätze sowie Produkte und Services werden typischerweise ebenso auch von ESG-Scores umfasst wie schwerwiegende Kontroversen.

Die SDG-Umsätze leiten sich konzeptionell aus SDG-vereinbaren Produkten und Services ab. Wie der Rangfolgevergleich zeigt, scheint die separate Erfassung von SDG Produkt- und Services-Scores deshalb kaum Zusatznutzen zu bringen. Der Vorteil von SDG-Umsätzen: Durch die Analyse von veröffentlichen Segmentumsätzen von Unternehmen sind SDG-Umsätze typischerweise auch für Laien einfach nachvollziehbar, wenn die segmentspezifischen Klassifizierungsregeln des Nachhaltigkeitsdatenanbieters bekannt sind. Das ist für die anderen hier genannten Kennzahlen nicht der Fall.

Ich bleibe deshalb bis auf Weiteres bei dem Fokus ESG-Scores und vor allem (aktivitätsbasierten) SDG-Nettoumsätzen für meine Wertpapierselektionen.

Exkurs: SDG-Kennzahlen für Politiker?

Traditionelle Aktienindizes (All-Cap, Mid-Cap und Small-Cap) weisen nur etwa 10% SDG-vereinbare Umsätze aus. Und selbst die angeblich nachhaltigsten diversifizierten SRI/CTB/PAB-Indizes haben nur eine SDG-Umsatz-Vereinbarkeit von 14 bis 22%. Das bedeutet, dass etwa 80 bis 90% aller Umsätze von Unternehmen bestenfalls SDG-neutral sind. Unspezifisches Wirtschaftswachstum, welches von sehr vielen Politikern bzw. Regierungen angestrebt wird, ist also nicht unbedingt positiv. Die relativ einfache und transparenten Kennzahl SDG-vereinbare Umsätze könnte deshalb auch eine gute Basis für politische Entscheidungen sein.

Nature risks: Researchpost 227

Nature risks: 11x new research on green volatility, climate alliances, brown asset managers, green accounts, omnibus, nature risks, green turbulence, exclusions, stakeholders, medtech, venture risks (# shows SSRN full paper downloads as of May 22nd, 2025)

Ecological and social research

Green volatility: Renewable Asset Price Volatility and Its Implications for Decarbonization by Harrison Hong, Jeffrey Kubik, and Edward Shore as of May 10^th, 2025 (#488): “We show that the price volatility of renewable assets is significantly higher than that of brown assets. …This estimate is related to higher electricity price volatility and more volatile firm revenues, and is consistent with industry concerns about a host of uncertainties regarding renewables intermittency and policy implementation. … higher green asset volatility is at least as important a determinant of decarbonization as the relative mean productivity of green versus brown capital” (p. 38).

Climate show? An Empirical Examination of Business Climate Alliances: Effective and/or Harmful? by Matteo Gasparini and Peter Tufano as of May 14^th, 2025 (#76): “… We study eleven major alliance mostly focused on financial services firms and 424 major publicly traded financial institutions … Financial service firms that join climate alliances show increased adoption of climate-aligned management practices; greater adoption of emissions targets; reductions of own-emissions; mixed evidence of increased funding for green projects; and greater pro-climate lobbying. We find no evidence of traditional antitrust violations in the form of pricing power or market concentration; no reduction in funding to oil and gas companies; and no lower risk-adjusted shareholder returns than non-alliance members …“ (abstract). My comment: No reduction in fossil company funding and no clear evidence of increased green project funding is very disappointing.

ESG Asset Managers? Point of No Returns 2025 – A responsible investment benchmark of 76 of the world’s largest asset managers by Share Action as of May 21^st, 2025: “This report … provides overall rankings and highlights trends in performance since our first Point of No Returns report, published in 2020. It also includes examples of leading practice. … We found that: Industry progress has stalled: there are some leaders but the largest US managers are lagging behind. … Asset managers continue to invest in industries that are extremely harmful to people and planet … Asset managers still haven’t addressed their biodiversity blind spot … Asset managers frequently only consider environmental and social issues in a minority of funds…. The asset management sector does not appear to want to fix itself …”( p. 4-6). My comment: Many of the lower-ranked asset managers in this report used to talk about their ESG DNA. Asset management DNA seems to be rather volatile.

Green accounts: Greening the retail banking industry: Evidence from German bank account consumers by Sophie Maria Anneke Klein and Friedemann Polzin as of May 21^st, 2025: “This study investigates the reasoning behind adopting sustainable bank accounts … of 1501 consumers in Germany. The most important determinant for adopting these accounts was sustainable finance self-efficacy – in other words, the perceived impact that the consumer can make by using the product. Other significant determinants include the consumers‘ willingness to pay a premium for the sustainability characteristic. Sustainable values, trust in bank in provider, and financial literacy are less relevant drivers of adoption. The study identified five distinct consumer clusters with different levels of adoption to generate more targeted industry and policy responses due to limited uptake”(abstract).

Defect omnibus: EU omnibus package on sustainability – something we don’t want to ride (yet)? by Josef Baumüller as of May 1^st, 2025 (#580): “In February 2025, the European Commission proposed its “first omnibus package on sustainability”, aiming at simplification and deregulation of the current sustainability (reporting) regime in the EU. One important measure addresses the scope of companies falling under the CSRD, which should be considerably reduced by introducing a new threshold of 1,000 employees. … this paper analyzes a sample of approx. 32,000 Austrian companies … the reduction of companies subject to the CSRD reporting requirements might be considerable – and for a SME-dominated country like Austria arguably even more severe than expected by the European Commission. Also, different sectors are effected in a way that is not consistent with a sector’s sustainability impacts or other considerations … “ (abstract).

ESG investment research (in: Nature risks)

Nature risks: Nature and Climate Risk in Asset Prices by Chiara Colesanti Senni, Skand Goel, and Markus Leippold as of May 14^th, 2025 (#269): “… Our model guides an empirical analysis that compares sensitivities of stock returns to news about biodiversity and climate, which we call nature and climate beta …. Our model predicts that with better information, firms’ nature and climate betas should more accurately reflect their fundamental risk exposures. …. We find that climate betas increasingly reflect corporate climate impact, with higher-impact firms showing greater sensitivity. … However, nature betas for companies more dependent on nature decrease relative to less dependent companies, suggesting inconsistencies in the financial market’s perception and pricing of nature-specific news and risks“ (abstract).

Sustainable cash flows: Does Environmental and Social Performance Pay Off amid Market Turbulence? A Risk Premia Analysis by Giovanni Cardillo, Cristian Foroni, and Murad Harasheh as of May 16^th, 2025 (#11): “… We focus on non-financial firms in Europe and the United Kingdom from 2017 to 2022. … our findings reveal that sustainability alone does not directly lower the equity risk premia, especially during widespread economic stress. … Nonetheless, our evidence documents that investors are more likely to price more tangible initiatives tackling climate-related risks, demanding lower risk premiums for firms enacting such policies. Finally, our estimates point out that … more sustainable firms display lower market crash risk and higher coverage ratios, suggesting that more sustainable firms are less likely to be zombie firms during adverse states of the economy”.

SDG and impact investment research

Effective exclusions? Investor Alignment in Divestment Decisions and Firm Behavior: Evidence from Publicly Disclosed Exclusion Lists by Nicolas Rudolf and Huajuan Yuan as of May 19^th, 2025 (#15): “We study the consequences of portfolio exclusion announcements by Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) … Market participants respond negatively to the exclusion disclosures with an average abnormal return of -0.5% over a three-day window surrounding the announcement. Using a novel dataset of exclusion decisions by 86 major institutional investors, we document substantial institutional alignment in exclusion decisions. Firms excluded by NBIM face five times more institutional investor exclusions than other excluded firms in our dataset. … Exclusions with broader institutional alignment, particularly among asset owners, are associated with significant improvements in firms‘ environmental and social performance. However, when exclusions occur without broader institutional alignment, firms experience deteriorating environmental and social performance“ (abstract). My comment: If exclusions can improve ES-performance, they should be used more often especially by very large institutional investors.

Shareholders first? Can a Shareholder Focus Create Value for all Stakeholders? By John Ampong and Matthew Souther as of May 16^th, 2025 (#61): “We develop a novel machine-learning technique analyzing earnings call transcripts to measure whether a manager’s focus is on shareholders or stakeholders. We find that managers focusing on shareholders generate significantly higher stock returns in subsequent periods. However, these higher returns do not come to the detriment of other stakeholders; we find that shareholder-focused firms experience far fewer adverse environmental and social (ES) incidents in subsequent periods. Further, following the COVID-19 pandemic drawing attention to ES issues, shareholder-focused firms experience the strongest declines in subsequent ES incidents” (abstract).

Other investment research (in: Nature risks)

Medtech AI: Artificial Intelligence Stakes a Claim on Medtech by Christian Johnson, Jennifer McCaney, Mahruq Siddiqui, Gunnar Trommer, Erik Adams, Meghna Eichelberger, and Peter Lawyer from the Boston Consulting Group as of May 2025: “The period from 2015 through Q3 2024 saw growth of more than 35X in AI/ML-enabled devices, with 1,016 products authorized by the FDA to date. Radiology remains the leading application … Software-as-a-medical-device (SaMD) sets the standard, accounting for 71% of all AI/ML authorizations. Coding hotspots in the US are responsible for about half of AI/ML authorizations, with Israel, France, China, South Korea, and Japan adding another 27%. … Two-thirds of AI/ML products were sponsored by private companies at the time of authorization. Half of AI/ML authorized devices came from VC backed companies, which have cumulatively invested $14 billion in AI/ML-enabled devices since 2010” (p. 4). My comment: My fund invests heavily in Medtech

Venture ban? Should Governments Restrict Foreign Investments in Startups? By Fiona Paine, Richard R. Townsend, and Ting Xu as of May 2025: “The global shift toward restricting foreign investments in startups represents a significant recalibration of the traditional relationship between innovation policy and national security considerations. … while these restrictions may yield important security benefits by limiting knowledge spillovers to strategic competitors, they also impose substantial costs on domestic innovation ecosystems through reduced capital availability, disrupted syndication networks, and potentially diminished innovation. The empirical evidence indicates that foreign venture capital investments–particularly those from corporate investors–do facilitate measurable knowledge transfers across borders. … At the same time, the implementation of policies like FIRRMA (Soe: USA 2018) has led to significant decreases in overall startup funding in affected industries, extending well beyond the direct loss of foreign capital. … Alternatives such as mitigation measures, domestic funding subsidies, and coordinated approaches to limiting knowledge flows through other channels all merit further research and analysis …“ (p. 21/22).

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Werbung (in: Nature risks)

Zum Vergleich: Ein traditioneller globaler Small-Cap-ETF hat eine SDG-Umsatzvereinbarkeit von 5 %, ein diversifizierter Gesundheits-ETF 13 %, Artikel 9 Fonds 21%, liquide Impactfonds 39% und ein ETF für erneuerbare Energien 42 % (vgl. Hohe SDG Umsätze? Nur wenige Investmentfonds!).

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 40: Helmtechnik aus Schweden

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 40: MIPS

Das SDG-Investmentbeispiel 40 aus dem von mir beratenen Fonds (vgl. My fund) ist die Mips AB aus Schweden. Auf der Internetseite steht: „Mips ist ein Unternehmen, das sich auf helmbasierte Sicherheit spezialisiert hat und in diesem Bereich weltweit führend ist. Mips vertreibt seine Produkte an Helmhersteller. … Das Mips®-Sicherheitssystem wurde entwickelt, um Helme gegen Rotationsbewegungen zu schützen. … Diese Rotationsbewegung führt zu einer Scherung und Dehnung des Hirngewebes, die sich auf das Gehirn auswirkt und das Risiko von Hirnverletzungen durch den Aufprall erhöht“ (übersetzt mit der kosenlosen Version von Deepl.com).

Mips fokussiert auf Sporthelme. Der Umsatz entfällt zu etwas über 50% auf die USA, zu einem Drittel auf Europa und der Rest auf Asien und Australien. Mips entwickelt in Schweden und produziert in China.

SDG-Vereinbarkeit, ESG-Risiken und Shareholder Engagement (in: SDG-Investmentbeispiel 40)

Auch Mips erfüllt meinen wichtigsten Nachhaltigkeitsanspruch, nämlich Produkte oder Services anzubieten, die möglichst kompatibel mit den Nachhaltigen Entwicklungszielen der Vereinten Nationen (SDG) sind (Fonds (vgl. Maximale Portfolio-Nachhaltigkeit: Was geht?). Clarity.ai weist einen SDG-vereinbaren Umsatzanteil von 96 Prozent aus. Dabei werden offenbar die ca. 4% Umsatz mit Sicherheitshelmen nicht als SDG-konform angesehen.

Zum Vergleich: Der Amundi MSCI World Health Care ETF erreicht brutto nur 16% und netto 12% SDG-Umsatzvereinbarkeit, nachdem SDG-schädliche Umsätze abgezogen wurden. Und der von mir beratene Fonds hat aktuell insgesamt 99% netto-SDG-Umsatzvereinbarkeit.

Negative SDG-Aspekte bzw. unerwünschte Aktivitäten oder nennenswerte Kontroversen sind mir von Mips nicht bekannt.

Die Best-in-Universe E, S und G Scores von Mips sind mit 90, 71 und 87 sehr gut: Mein bereits hoher Portfoliodurchschnitt liegt aktuell bei 72, 70 und 79. Der aggregierte ESG-Score von Mips liegt mit 82 erheblich über den schon sehr guten 73 des FutureVest Fonds.

Investment- und Engagementstart bei Mips war Ende April 2025.

Mips berichtet bereits umfassende GHG Scope 3 Emissionen, die Pay Ratio zwischen CEO und durchschnittlichem Mitarbeiter und vorbildlich auch die Entwicklung der Nachhaltigkeitsbewertungen von Lieferanten. Für den letzten Punkt nutze ich Mips jetzt als eines meiner Best Practice Beispiele (vgl. Supplier engagement – Opinion post #211).

Deshalb habe ich Mips nur noch Vorschläge zu Mitarbeiter- und Kundennachhaltigkeitsbefragungen gemacht (vgl. 241203_Nachhaltigkeitsinvestmentpolitik_der_Soehnholz_Asset_Management_GmbH.pdf). Bisher hat Mips noch nicht auf meine Vorschläge reagiert.

Nachhaltigkeitsfazit

Die Unternehmen in meinem Portfolio gehören sowohl in Bezug auf Ausschlüsse als auch ESG- und SDG-Kriterien bereits zu den besten weltweit. Alternative Investments schneiden nach diesen Kriterien etwas schlechter ab und es ist nicht abschätzbar, ob deren Engagementreaktion schneller als die von Mips wäre. Deshalb verkaufe ich allein wegen einer möglicherweise unbefriedigenden Reaktion auf meine Engagements keine Aktien.

Divestments erfolgen in der Regel nur dann, wenn meine Mindestanforderungen an Ausschlüsse, ESG-Risiken bzw. SDG-Umsätze nicht mehr erfüllt werden.

Dabei bin ich davon überzeugt, dass Investments und Divestments durchaus reale Auswirkungen auf Unternehmen haben können, vor allem, wenn transparent über diese berichtet wird, so wie ich das hier mache (vgl. Wirkungen der nachhaltigen Kapitalanlage von Rolf Häßler von NKI Research vom März 2025. Zum Thema Divestments siehe Impact divestment: Illiquidity hurts und zum Thema „Additionalität“ von börsennotierten Investments siehe Who Clears the Market When Passive Investors Trade? von Marco Sammon und John J. Shim vom 15.April 2024).

Sehr gute Portfoliodiversifikation (in: SDG-Investmentbeispiel 40)

Nach dem Verkauf der Aktien von Biotage ist Mips neben dem Krebsspezialisten Elekta (vgl. SDG-Investmentbeispiel 9: Krebsbekämpfung aus Schweden) eines von zwei Unternehmen aus Schweden im Portfolio. Kein anderes meiner Portfoliounternehmen ist im selben Markt wie Mips aktiv.

Mit einer Marktkapitalisierung von unter einer Milliarde Euro gehört Mips zu den kleinsten Unternehmen im Portfolio.

Seit dem Investmentstart hat der Aktienkurs von Mips um über 20% zugelegt.

Weitere Informationen zum Fonds

Insgesamt hat der von mir beratene Fonds seit der Auflage im August 2021 eine ähnliche Performance wie durchschnittliche globale Small- und Midcapfonds (vgl. z.B. Fonds-Portfolio: Mein Fonds | CAPinside).

Ein Fondsinvestment war also bisher ein „Free Lunch“ in Bezug auf Nachhaltigkeit: Man erhält ein besonders konsequent nachhaltiges Portfolio mit fondstypischen Renditen und Risiken (vgl. Free Lunch: Diversifikation nein, Nachhaltigkeit ja?).

Weitere Informationen siehe z.B.

Globale Small-Caps: Faire Benchmark für meinen Artikel 9 Fonds? (2-2024)

Nachhaltiges Investmentbeispiel 1: Gesundheitspersonalservices (5-2024)

SDG-Investment 2: Handschuhe aus Australien (6-2024)

Impactbeispiel 3: Wassermessgeräte (6-2024)

Impactbeispiel 4: Schwedische Labortechnik (6-2024)

Impactfonds im Nachhaltigkeitsvergleich (6-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 5: US-Arzneimittelvertrieb (7-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 6: Hörimplantate aus Australien (8-2024)

3 Jahre nachhaltigster diversifizierter Fonds? (8-2024)

My shareholder engagement: Failures, successes and adaption (8-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 7: Chinesische Taxis? (9-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 8: Baskische Schienenfahrzeuge (9-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 9: Krebsbekämpfung aus Schweden (9-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 10: US-Krebsvorsorge und -Diagnose (9-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 11: Solartechnik aus den USA (9-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 12: Schweizer Apotheken (9-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 13: Fokus Grüner Star (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 14: US-Dentalvertrieb (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 15: Smart Grids aus der Schweiz) (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 16: Schweizer Orthopädie (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 17: Mettler Toledo (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 18: Nachhaltige Busse (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 19: Deutsche Gesundheits-Software (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 20: Deutsche Onshore-Windenergie (10-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 21: Medizingeräte aus Japan (11-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 22: US-Gesundheitsservices (11-2014)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 23 Pro Medicus (11-2014)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 24: Australischer Krankenhausbetreiber (11-2014)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 25: Biopharmatechnik (12-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 26: Erneuerbare Energie für Afrika (12-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 27: Laborservices aus Australien (12-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 28: Finnische Wellness (12-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 29: Transplantationsprodukte (12-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 30: Deutsche Medizintechnik (12-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 31: Finanzierung nachhaltiger Energieproduktion (12-2024)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 32: Innovative US-Diabetes-Technik (1-2025)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 33: Züge aus Frankreich (4-2025)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 34: Spezialmessgeräte aus den USA (4-2025)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 35: Spezialisierte US Medizintechnik (4-2025)

Regelbasierte Investments: Minimale Anpassungen (5-2025)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 36: Orthopädische Operationstechnik (5-2025)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 37: Solarenergie(speicher) aus Spanien (5-2025)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 38: Anti-Infektion aus Australien (5-2025)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 39: Healthcare-SaaS PBC (5-2025)

Disclaimer (in: SDG-Investmentbeispiel 40)

Dieser Beitrag ist von der Soehnholz ESG GmbH erstellt worden. Die Erstellerin übernimmt keine Gewähr für die Richtigkeit, Vollständigkeit und/oder Aktualität der zur Verfügung gestellten Inhalte. Die Informationen unterliegen deutschem Recht und richten sich ausschließlich an Investoren, die ihren Wohnsitz in Deutschland haben. Sie sind keine Finanzanalyse und nicht als Verkaufsangebot oder Aufforderung zur Abgabe eines Kauf- oder Zeichnungsangebots für Anteile der/s in dieser Unterlage dargestellten Aktie/Fonds zu verstehen und ersetzen nicht eine anleger- und anlagegerechte Beratung.

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Die Verkaufsunterlagen des Fonds werden bei der Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft (Monega Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH), der Verwahrstelle (Kreissparkasse Köln) und den Vertriebspartnern zur kostenlosen Ausgabe bereitgehalten. Die Verkaufsunterlagen sind zudem im Internet unter www.monega.de erhältlich. Die in dieser Unterlage zur Verfügung gestellten Inhalte dienen lediglich der allgemeinen Information und stellen keine Beratung oder sonstige Empfehlung dar. Die Kapitalanlage ist stets mit Risiken verbunden und kann zum Verlust des eingesetzten Kapitals führen. Vor einer etwaigen Anlageentscheidung sollten Sie eingehend prüfen, ob die Anlage für Ihre individuelle Situation und Ihre persönlichen Ziele geeignet ist.

Diese Unterlage enthält ggf. Informationen, die aus öffentlichen Quellen stammen, die die Erstellerin für verlässlich hält. Die dargestellten Inhalte, insbesondere die Darstellung von Strategien sowie deren Chancen und Risiken, können sich im Zeitverlauf ändern. Einschätzungen und Bewertungen reflektieren die Meinung der Erstellerin zum Zeitpunkt der Erstellung und können sich jederzeit ändern. Es ist nicht beabsichtigt, diese Unterlage laufend oder überhaupt zu aktualisieren. Sie stellt nur eine unverbindliche Momentaufnahme dar. Die Unterlage ist ausschließlich zur Information und zum persönlichen Gebrauch bestimmt. Jegliche nicht autorisierte Vervielfältigung und Weiterverbreitung ist untersagt.

Biodiversity research: Blogpost 501

Biodiversity research: 13x new research on chemical emissions, biodiversity basics, biodiversity returns, bio-regulatory risks, ESG history, ESG rating divergence, net-zero conviction, German impact, transition logic, brown engagement, good committees, willingness to answer, and AI overkill (# shows the number of SSRN full paper downloads as of May 15th,2025)

Social and ecological research

Chemical emissions: Lessons in Chemistry Climate Action Giants by Planet Tracker as of May 8^th, 2025: “The chemical industry … accounts for up to 6% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, … Specifically, this report benchmarks the climate transition performance of eight of the world’s top chemical companies: BASF, Bayer, Dow, Incitec Pivot, Air Liquide, LyondellBasell, SABIC, and Toray Industries. It evaluates them across emissions performance, value chain engagement, governance and remuneration, capital allocation, and policy advocacy … to provide financial institutions with a clear picture of these companies’ transition readiness and their potential climate-related risks and opportunities” (p. 39).

Biodiversity lecture: A Course on Biodiversity by Thierry Roncalli from Amundi as of May 14^th, 2025 (#293) covering definition, ecosystem functions and services, threats and risks, measurement, governance and regulation and investment approaches and exercises.

ESG investment research (in: Biodiversity research)

Biodiversity returns: It’s all about cash, but what about biodiversity? Cutting through the biodiversity measurement jungle to account for biodiversity in corporate activities by Saverio Olivito and Patricia Ruffing-Straube as of May 7^th, 2025 (#31): “… Our results show that … firm-specific industry-dependency on biodiversity and ecosystem services is strongly associated with financial performance …“ (abstract).

Bio-regulatory risk: Do Equity Markets Reflect Biodiversity Regulatory Risk? by Ricardo Peña, Shikhar Singla, and Zirui Wang as of May 12^th, 2025 (#32): “We combine endangered species data with establishment locations to identify firm exposure to Areas of Unprotected Biodiversity Importance (AUBI)— areas likely to be targeted by future conservation policy. Between 2020 and 2023, firms in nature- and location dependent sectors earned 5.53% lower annual returns per standard deviation increase in AUBI exposure. Returns for high-exposure firms in these sectors were negative following Biden’s 2021 “30 by 30” executive order and positive after the 2024 election“ (abstract).

ESG history: A Study of ESG by Min Ruan and Haoxu Zhang as of May 7^th, 2025 (#35): “Despite its widespread adoption, existing literature on ESG often lacks a cohesive historical perspective. This study draws on historical events and major shifts to review its origins and evolution and analyse its strengths and weaknesses. By delving into its historical roots and connecting a series of seemingly unrelated facts and statistics under the framework of ESG, we further identify key drivers and co-benefits beyond sustainable finance and provide practical implications for improvements in the adoption process. Overall, the findings underscore the necessity of viewing ESG as a long-term institutional commitment for sustainable development rather a buzzword, highlighting its ongoing significance in a rapidly changing world“ (abstract).

Rating divergence: ESG Rating Uncertainty: Causes, Consequences and Potential Remedies by Ali Bayat, Ruini Qu, and Zohreh Rahmani as of May 7^th, 2025 (#30): “… This paper synthesizes the fragmented literature on ESG rating disagreement to assess how much ratings differ, what drives the variation, and what consequences follow. The paper also reviews potential responses that include efforts to achieve convergence, strategies that reduce the impact of disagreement, and the use of outcome-based alternatives to ESG ratings. The paper introduces a four-dimensional framework that categorizes the sources of disagreement into the content of what is measured, firm-specific factors, rater-specific attributes, and the methods used to produce the scores …“ (abstract). My comment: Divergence is understandable because of the complexity. Divergence is no excuse not to use ESG data.

Net-Zero conviction: Does Greenhouse Gas Disclosure Trigger a Net-Zero Fallacy for Retail Investors? by Christian Friedrich, Marco Meier, and Christian Peters as of May 7^th, 2025 (#10): “… our experiment shows that retail investors make less efficient investments when a fund discloses net-zero emissions as a salient sustainability achievement than when a fund discloses net-positive emissions, thereby documenting a phenomenon we label as “net-zero fallacy.” Our experiment further provides evidence that retail investors substitute more complex, multifactorial decisions by narrowly focusing on the salient sustainability achievement. Thereby, achieving net zero causes retail investors to ignore alternative mechanisms for more efficient emission reductions“ (abstract).

SDG investment research

German impact: Network Analysis of ESG and SDG across Legal Origins by Kausik Chaudhuri, Han Jin, Ting Xie and Yongcheol Shin as of May 7^th, 2025 (#10): “… we investigate the network causal relationship from ESG to SDG. … In particular, spill-out effects from German legal origin dominate while its spill-ins are almost negligible, which renders it to be the most influential ESG/SDG shock transmitter in the system. … the positive impacts of ESG on SDG diffuse mostly from German legal origin to English and French legal origins” (p. 22).

Transition logic: Productive Climate Finance by Dominik Boos and Julia Meyer as of May 7^th, 2025 (#4) “We extend the standard financial market model of sustainable finance by incorporating a production economy with heterogeneous firms (abstract) … First, normative and ethical dilemmas arise for values-based investors: is it justifiable to remain invested in a company with unsustainable practices, whose business model conflicts with the values of the financing party? What is an appropriate time frame for companies to start and complete their transformation? Second, current measurement approaches predominantly capture companies’ static sustainability performance, while identifying forward-looking sustainability indicators remains a challenge. … transition ambitions should play a greater role in classifying companies and investments as sustainable …” (p. 24)

Brown engagement: Impact Investing with Shareholder Engagement by Jean-Francois Chassagneux, Roxana Dumitrescu, and Olivier David Zerbib as of May 7^th, 2025 (#12): “… we propose a continuous-time equilibrium model in which heterogeneous investors exert costly shareholder engagement to decrease a representative firm’s greenhouse-gas emissions. … our framework shows that shareholder engagement induces investors to overweight high-emitting firms, accepting lower expected returns, to secure deeper emissions cuts. More precisely, we establish three main results: (i) stronger pro-environmental preferences or lower engagement costs amplify capital al locations and engagement toward brown firms; (ii) such engagement mechanically reduces brown firms’ equilibrium expected returns; and (iii) firms respond with a two-fold mitigation: they are incentivized to cut their gross emissions and subsequently are compelled to cut them further due to shareholder engagement” (p. 20). My comment: I try to invest in the 30 most sustainable companies and engage with all of them, see Shareholder engagement: 21 science based theses and an action plan

Good committees: Sustainability committee and eco-innovation: A global perspective by Asad Mashwani and Rizwan Mushtaq as of May 7^th, 2025 (#7): “This study investigates the influence of sustainability committees on corporate environmental innovation (hereafter eco-innovation) … We find that the existence of sustainability committee and climate governance mechanisms positively influences corporate eco innovation. Our results indicate that the sustainability committee along with sustainability reporting and corporate emission performance improves eco-innovation. Moreover, our results suggest that eco-innovation is associated with the firm’s overall environmental and ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) performance” (abstract).

Other investment research (in: Biodiversity research)

Willingness to Answer: Willingness To Pay: An Interrogation by Cass R. Sunstein as of Feb. 26^th, 2025 (#70): “Both free markets and government regulators tend to use willingness to pay (WTP) as the measure of value of goods that people do not own, and willingness to accept (WTA) as the measure of value of goods that people do own. … WTP and WTA might be infected by a lack of information, by behavioral biases, and by hedonic forecasting errors … There are questions about how to proceed when WTA is much higher than WTP for the same goods; the WTP-WTA disparity has yet to be fully understood. These questions are especially challenging when valuing environmental amenities, animal welfare, and social media”.

AI overkill: AI in Finance and Information Overload by Attila Balogh, Antoine Didisheim, Luciano A. Somoza, and Hanqing Tia as of May 2^nd, 2025 (#142): „This paper documents information overload in Large Language Models applied to financial analysis. Using earnings forecasts from corporate calls and market reaction predictions from news, we show that predictive accuracy follows an inverted U-shaped pattern, where excessive context degrades performance. Larger LLMs mitigate this effect, increasing the optimal context length” (abstract).

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Werbung (in: Biodiversity research)

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 39: Healthcare-SaaS PBC

SDG-Investmentbeispiel 39: Veeva

Das SDG-Investmentbeispiel 39 aus dem von mir beratenen Fonds (vgl. My fund) ist Veeva aus den USA. Veeva ist nach eigenen Aussagen ein weltweit führender Anbieter von Cloud-basierten Softwarelösungen für die Life-Sciences-Branche.

Veeva arbeitet als gemeinnützige Gesellschaft (Public Benefit Corporation). Dazu schreibt Veeva: „Als PBC sind wir als gewinnorientiertes Unternehmen tätig, verfolgen aber auch einen gemeinnützigen Zweck, der … lautet wie folgt: „Die Bereitstellung von Produkten und Dienstleistungen, die dazu beitragen sollen, die von uns bedienten Branchen produktiver zu machen und hochwertige Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten in den Gemeinden zu schaffen, in denen wir tätig sind.

Ebenso wichtig ist, dass unsere Direktoren als PBC die gesetzliche Verpflichtung haben, die Interessen der Aktionäre mit den Interessen der Kunden, Mitarbeiter und anderer wichtiger Interessengruppen in Einklang zu bringen“ (Übersetzt mit der kostenlosen Version von DeepL.com).

Die Umsätze von Veeva resultieren zu über 80% aus Abonnents („Subscriptions“) und zu knapp 20% aus Services. Über 50% des Geschäftes werden in den USA gemacht, ungefähr ein Viertel in Europa und der Rest vor allem in Asien.

Sehr gute SDG-Vereinbarkeit und akzeptable ESG-Risiken (in: SDG-Investmentbeispiel 39)

Auch Veeva erfüllt meinen wichtigsten Nachhaltigkeitsanspruch, nämlich Produkte oder Services anzubieten, die möglichst kompatibel mit den Nachhaltigen Entwicklungszielen der Vereinten Nationen (SDG) sind (vgl. Maximale Portfolio-Nachhaltigkeit: Was geht?). Laut Clarity.ai sind 100% des Veeva-Umsatzes mit den SDG vereinbar.

Zum Vergleich: Der Amundi MSCI World Health Care ETF erreicht brutto nur 16% und netto 12% SDG-Umsatzvereinbarkeit, nachdem SDG-schädliche Umsätze abgezogen wurden. Der von mir beratene Fonds hat aktuell insgesamt 99% netto-SDG-Umsatzvereinbarkeit.

Negative SDG-Aspekte bzw. unerwünschte Aktivitäten oder nennenswerte Kontroversen sind von Veeva nicht bekannt.

Der aggregierte Best-in-Universe Score beträgt 64 und liegt damit unter den 73 des Fondsdurchschnitts. Das gilt auch für den E-Score von 56 (72), den S-Score von 62 (70) den G-Score von 71 (79). Allerdings liegen alle Scores oberhalb der mindestens erforderlichen 50.

Veeva berichte bereits GHG Scope 3 Emissionen und CEO Pay Ratios. Deshalb fokussiert meine erste Anfrage auf die Themen ESG-Befragungen von Kunden und Mitarbeitern und Nachhaltigkeitsbewertungen von Lieferanten (vgl. 241203_Nachhaltigkeitsinvestmentpolitik_der_Soehnholz_Asset_Management_GmbH.pdf).

Investmentstart in und Engagementstart mit Veeva war Ende April 2025. Das Unternehmen hat sehr schnell auf meine Anfrage reagiert und meine nachgereichten konkreten Anregungen grundsätzlich sehr positiv aufgenommen.

Gutes Nachhaltigkeitsfazit

Die Unternehmen in meinem Portfolio gehören sowohl in Bezug auf Ausschlüsse als auch ESG- und SDG-Kriterien bereits zu den besten weltweit. Alternative Investments scheiden nach diesen Kriterien etwas schlechter ab und es ist sehr unwahrscheinlich, dass deren Engagementreaktion noch besser als die von Veeva wäre. Grundsätzlich verkaufe ich allein wegen einer nicht völlig befriedigenden Reaktion auf meine Engagements keine Aktien. Divestments erfolgen in der Regel nur dann, wenn meine Mindestanforderungen an Ausschlüsse, ESG-Risiken bzw. SDG-Umsätze nicht mehr erfüllt werden.

Dabei bin ich davon überzeugt, dass Investments und Divestments durchaus reale Auswirkungen auf Unternehmen haben können (vgl. Wirkungen der nachhaltigen Kapitalanlage von Rolf Häßler von NKI Research vom März 2025). Das gilt vor allem, wenn transparent über diese berichtet wird, so wie ich das hier mache (Weiterführend: Zu Divestments siehe Impact divestment: Illiquidity hurts und zu „Additionalität“ von börsennotierten Investments siehe Who Clears the Market When Passive Investors Trade? von Marco Sammon und John J. Shim vom 15.April 2024).

Portfoliodiversifikationsbeitrag OK (in: SDG-Investmentbeispiel 39)

Der US-Anteil der Investments liegt auch nach der Investition in Veeva Aktien nur knapp über 45 % und damit weit unterhalb von globalen Marktindizes.

Veeva fokussiert zwar auf die Gesundheitsbranche, ist aber wohl eher ein IT-Unternehmen als ein Gesundheitsunternehmen. Durch die Übernahme des Gesundheits-IT Unternehmens Nexus (vgl. SDG-Investmentbeispiel 19: Deutsche Gesundheits-Software), das Mitte April aus dem Fonds ausgeschieden ist, ist nur noch Pro Medicus (vgl. SDG-Investmentbeispiel 23 Pro Medicus) aus Australien auf den (Gesundheits-)IT-Bereich fokussiert. Keines der Unternehmen im Portfolio steht in nennenswerter direkter Konkurrenz zu Veeva.

Auch bei einer Klassifikation als Gesundheitsunternehmen wird mit der Investition in Veeva die selbst gesetzte Grenze von maximal 20 von 30 Aktien aus diesem Segment nicht überschritten.

Mit einer Kapitalisierung von über 35 Milliarden US-Dollar gehört Veeva zu den größten Unternehmen des Fonds. Allerdings liegt die durchschnittliche Kapitalisierung des Fonds weiter unterhalb von 5 Milliarden Euro und damit im Zielbereich.

Weitere Informationen zum Fonds

Disclaimer (in: SDG-Investmentbeispiel 39)

Greenwashing risks: Researchpost 225

Greenwashing risks: 7x new research on ESG performance, disaster and green flow effects, missing and/or negative impact, and Multilateral Development Bank Bonds (#shows the number of SSRN full paper downloads as of May 8th, 2025).

ESG performance: The Importance of Being Prime: A Financial Fact for Serious Companies by Rudy Kwack, and Kosmas Papadopoulos from ISS Corporate as of April 30^th, 2025: “Companies with strong sustainability performance (designated as “Prime”) demonstrate superior financial outcomes, including higher profitability, better overall financial quality, and reduced stock price volatility, when compared to those with weaker sustainability performance. … Leading sustainability performers also benefit from consistently lower costs of capital compared to the broader universe of companies …” (p. 2). My comment: Even with similar performance investors should prefer sustainable investments because of positive or less-negative external effects

Disaster effects: Climate Boards: Do Natural Disaster Experiences Make Directors More Prosocial? by Sehoon Kim, Bernadette A. Minton, and Rohan Williamson as of May 5th, 2025 (#132): “… we identify Directors with Abnormal Disaster Experiences (DADEs). … firms with more DADEs on their boards exhibit lower scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emission intensities and are more likely to implement climate-related policies … These effects are driven by influential DADEs serving on governance, audit, or ESG committees, but absent among DADEs on finance, compensation, or risk committees, supporting a preference-based rather than risk-based mechanism. Independent directors, rather than the influence of CEOs, play a central role. The effects are stronger when disaster experiences are accumulated over longer histories and in large or high-emission firms. … firms with more DADEs do not exhibit worse financial or operational performance …! My comment: Sustainable investment may benefit from more severe disasters, but hopefully even without more disasters.

Green flow effects: The Cost of Sustainable Investing: Global Green Fund Flows and Asset Prices by Hao Jiang and Lin Sun as of May 6th, 2025 (#6): “Using the EU Sustainable Finance Action Plan as a natural experiment, we find that flows into “dark green” funds surge after the publication of the June 2020 Taxonomy Regulation, before tapering around the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation in March 2021. The prices of stocks with stronger green fund buying pressures in June 2020 increase further by more than 6% and subsequently reverse, comoving with fund flows. … analyses of green fund flows and asset prices in global stock markets … provide causal evidence on large but transitory impacts of green investing on green asset prices” (abstract).

Greenwashing risks: Unveiling the dark side of sustainability: Are banks’ ESG misrepresentations truly worthwhile? by Rosa Cocozza, Domenico Curcio, Serena Gallo, and Davide Vioto as of April 30^th, 2025 (#13): “… analyzing a sample of US and European listed banks over the years 2015–2022, … we use a measure of greenwashing that considers the consistency of what banks disclose with what they actually do to address ESG-related issues. We find that engaging in greenwashing practices contributes to undermining financial stability, with a rise in systemic risk which is exacerbated for less efficient and larger banks. Market seems to acknowledge a superior informative value to banks’ actual ESG performance, giving less importance to what they disclose. Finally, a better performance in each of the environmental, social and governance dimensions reduces systemic risk, but only a bank’s commitment in addressing environment related issues seems to moderate the contribution of greenwashing to financial system fragility“ (abstract).

Missing impact: Norms Make Investors Socially Responsible by Mennatallah Balbaa, Bin Dong, Alexander Vostroknutov, Peiran Jiao, and Mareike Worch as of Feb. 18th, 2025 (#84): “… our findings indicate a deviation from profit maximization among participants when the investment choice is framed with social responsibility. … The tendency to increase investment amounts in the low-performing sustainable stock as an effect of norm perceptions was observed across all treatment groups (p. 32) … the currently perceived social norms do not differ strongly between sustainable investments with and without impact. This highlights a significant risk of greenwashing, as it enables companies or fund managers to prioritize the superficial appearance of sustainability over the delivery of tangible, measurable environmental or social outcomes. Thus, it is essential for policymakers to encourage social norms targeted at actual impact by raising societal awareness of the importance of genuine sustainability efforts” (p. 35). My comment (in: Greenwashing risks): We all should focus much more on the impact of investments, see e.g. Maximale Portfolio-Nachhaltigkeit: Was geht?

Negative impact? Who Loses in Win‑Win Investing? A Mixed Methods Study of Impact Risk by Lauren Kaufmann and Helet Botha as of April 29^th, 2025 (#8): “Impact risk refers to the likelihood that impact will be different than expected … through a yearlong data collection effort including interviews with 124 impact investors, we are the first, to our knowledge, to document the consideration of impact risk by practitioners. … through a vignette-based experiment with an online sample (N = 435) .. We find that win–win views of business … can lead to inadequate consideration of impact risk …“ (abstract).

MDBs or Govvies? Multilateral Development Bank Bonds by Thea Kolasa, Steven Ongena, and Christopher Humphrey as of Nov. 26th, 2025 (#144): “Multilateral development banks (MDBs) play a key role in development finance. MDBs raise capital by issuing a substantial quantity of bonds, both in terms of face value and volume. We are the first to analyze the bond issuance behavior and yield spread determinants of MDBs. Our findings highlight the increase in bond issues over time, driven by new MDB establishments and an increase in bonds issued per MDB. We also observe a shift from long-term to short-term bonds post-global financial crisis …“ (abstract). “… our findings suggest that MDBs demonstrate resilience to average levels of shareholder conflict and geopolitical risk. However, in cases of abnormal conflict between the two main shareholders, MDBs tend to issue bonds at higher costs of debt. Our analysis is based on 19 different MDBs“ (p. 26). My comment: Since many years I used MDBB instead of government bonds for “responsible” investment portfolios