Wrong ESG compensation illustration from Pixabay by Ray Alexander
10x new research on new toxics, climate target ambitions, financial analysts and climate topics, new ESG regulation effect on investments, ESG compensation governance deficits, ESG compensation outcome deficits, costly custom indices, unattractive private capital investments, gender-typical investment problems, and AI for retirement planning
ESG research
New toxics: Novel Entities – A financial time bomb by Planet Tracker as of Oct. 1st, 2024: “There are hundreds of thousands of novel entities – toxic substances created by humans and released into the environment that may be disruptive to the planet – travelling through the global economy. … most novel entities have not undergone safety assessments or information on those are protected or not shared. … Evaluating novel entities after they have been created and released is not acceptable. … Novel entities are often viewed by investors and lenders as technological progress adding to revenue and earnings potential. Novel entities are a source of significant litigation risk. Novel entities produced decades ago can still cause significant financial downside to companies today and in the future” (p. 5).
Intrinsic climate success: Raising the bar: What determines the ambition level of corporate climate targets? by Clara Privato, Matthew P. Johnson, and Timo Busch as of Sept. 9th, 2024: “Since the launch of the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi), we have witnessed a steady increase in the number of companies committing to climate targets for large-scale reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. … a two-stage qualitative study is conducted with a sample of 22 companies from five countries. … Within companies with highly ambitious climate targets, the findings indicate that certain factors are highly present, including leadership engagement, continual management support, employee involvement, participation in climate initiatives, and stakeholder collaboration. Conversely, none of these key factors are highly present in companies with less ambitious climate targets. Rather, these companies strongly identify the initiating factors of market-related pressures and non-market stakeholder influence as being the driving forces behind their target setting“ (abstract).
Climate analysts? Climate Value and Values Discovery by Zacharias Sautner, Laurence van Lent, Grigory Vilkov, and Ruishen Zhang as of July 24th, 2024 (#953): “Analyzing more than 310,000 earnings calls spanning two decades … the interest of analysts in “green topics ” is situational, reflecting market demands rather than persistent individual traits. Trading volume around earnings announcements is positively associated with the degree of climate discussions on earnings calls. … we find correlations between an analyst’s profile in earnings calls and career trajectories, with climate-centric analysts, particularly those focusing on value, experiencing better job opportunities. Climate analysts use voice, not exit, to ask (brown) firms to change“ (p. 25/26).
Regulation-driven divestments: Triggering a Divestment Wave? How ESMA’s Guidelines on ESG Fund Names Affect Fund Portfolios and Stocks by Stefan Jacob, Pauline Vitzthum, and Marco Wilkens as of Sept. 12th, 2024 (#58): “This paper examines the impact of the European Securities and Markets Authority’s (ESMA) Guidelines on funds’ names using ESG-related terms. These guidelines define clear exclusion criteria for sustainability-named funds. We examine the extent to which funds will be required to exclude non-compliant stocks, resulting in substantial divestments, particularly from firms with fossil fuel involvements. The enforcement of these guidelines is expected to significantly decarbonize the portfolios of sustainability-named funds, while at the same time triggering unprecedented selling pressure on certain stocks“ (abstract).
Wrong ESG compensation (1): ESG Overperformance? Assessing the Use of ESG Targets in Executive Compensation Plans by Adam B. Badawi and Robert Bartlett as of Sept. 10th, 2024 (#366): “The practice of linking executive compensation to ESG performance has recently become more prevalent in US public companies. In this paper, we document the extent of this practice within S&P 500 firms during the 2023 proxy season … We find that 315 of these firms (63.0%) include an ESG component in their executives’ compensation and that the vast majority of these incentives are part of the annual incentive plan (AIA) … While executives miss all of their financial targets 22% of the time in our sample, we show that this outcome is exceptionally rare for ESG-based compensation. Only 6 of 247 (2%) firms that disclose an ESG performance incentive report missing all of the ESG targets. We ask whether the ESG overperformance that we observe is associated with exceptional ESG outcomes or, instead, is related to governance deficiencies. Our findings that meeting ESG-based targets is not associated with improvements in ESG scores and that the presence of ESG-linked compensation is associated with more opposition in say-on-pay votes provides support for the weak governance theory over the exceptional performance theory“ (abstract). My comment With my shareholder engagement I ask companies to publish the pay ratio between their CEO and the average employee. Thus, all stakeholders can monitor if ESG compensation increases this already typically critically high metric (which I fear), also see Wrong ESG bonus math? Content-Post #188 and Kontraproduktive ESG-Ziele für Führungskräfte? | CAPinside
Wrong ESG compensation (2)? Paychecks with a Purpose: Evaluating the Effectiveness of CEO Equity and Cash Compensation for the Triple Bottom Line by Dennis Bams, Frederique Bouwman, and Bart Frijns as of Oct. 2nd, 2024 (#4): “We find that CEOs are more inclined to opt for a CSR strategy emphasizing Environmental Outcomes when they receive a larger proportion of their compensation in cash. … additional tests show that intentions have no predictive power for outcomes. … While the proportion of option compensation is beneficial for a CSR strategy that focuses on outcomes, the proportion of stock compensation motivates a focus on intentions. … In conclusion, our study shows that the prevailing approach of compensation packages focusing on equity compensation does not promote the triple bottom line principle.
Other investment research (in: Wrong ESG compensation)
Index illusion: Index Disruption: The Promise and Pitfalls of Self-Indexed ETFs by Bige Kahraman, Sida Li, and Anthony Limburg as of Sept. 27th, 2024 (#42): “The market for index providers is a concentrated market where the five largest providers serve approximately 95 percent of the market. … An increasing number of ETF issuers are creating proprietary indices in-house to avoid paying fees to third party index providers. In this paper, we … find that self-index funds offer higher, not lower, fees to their customers. To explain this, we suggest two hypotheses, one based on product differentiation and the other one based on conflicts of interest. Our results support the latter“ (p. 22). My comment: There are many (sustainability policy) reasons for custom portfolios but these portfolios should not be more expensive (see e.g. my direct SDG indexing options)
Private capital alpha illusion: The Private Capital Alpha by Gregory Brown, Andrei S. Goncalves, and Wendy Hu as of Sept. 25th, 2024 (#368): “We combine a large sample of 5,028 U.S. buyout, venture capital, and real estate funds from 1987 to 2022 to estimate the alphas of private capital asset classes under realistic simulations that account for the illiquidity and underdiversification in private markets as well as the portfolio allocation of typical limited partners. We find that buyout as an asset class has provided a positive and statistically significant alpha during our sample period. In contrast, over our sample period, the venture capital alpha was positive but statistically unreliable and the real estate alpha was, if anything, negative“ (p. 31). My comment: Most investors use gatekeepers of funds of funds to invest in private capital and after those costs even buyout alpha may be negligible”.
Lower-risk women: How Gender Differences and Behavioral Traits matter in Financial Decision-Making? Insights from Experimental and Survey Data by Giuseppe Attanasi, Simona Cicognani, Paola Paiardini, and Maria Luigia Signore as of Feb. 3rd, 2024 (#112): “… Our research suggests that gender alone does not exclusively determine diverse behavioral and investment choices. Instead, it is the context in which these choices are elicited that plays a crucial role. …(but) female investors consistently demonstrated a lower likelihood of engaging in investment activities across the financial domains of risk and ambiguity. … a tendency to invest less in risky financial assets limits the potential for accumulating greater wealth over time “ (p. 30).
Financial AI? Can ChatGPT Plan Your Retirement?: Generative AI and Financial Advice by Andrew W. Lo and Jillian Ross as of Sept. 4th, 2024 (#896): “… We focus on three challenges facing most LLM applications: domain-specific expertise and the ability to tailor that expertise to a user’s unique situation, trustworthiness and adherence to the user’s moral and ethical standards, and conformity to regulatory guidelines and oversight. … we focus on the narrow context of financial advice … Our goal is not to provide solutions to these challenges … but to propose a framework and road map for solving them as part of a larger research agenda for improving generative AI in any application” (abstract).
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