ESG Defizite: Reporting, Ratings und Investments können besser werden

Traditionelle Investments und Defizite

(Un)ethische Finanzprofis: Trust in Finance: Values Matter von Renée Adams vom 3. August 2020: “a relatively more ethical value profile of finance professionals is associated with greater trust in finance. …. in periods of high trust in the finance industry, e.g. the pre-crisis period, finance professionals in the sample are less educated” (S. 17).

Die Schweiz ist kein Geldanlageparadies: Private Banking: So werden Millionäre zur Kasse gebeten vom 5. August 2020 auf mit Verweis auf „So zahlen Kunden für ein klassisches Mandat mit einem möglichst hohen Aktienanteil bei einem Anlagebetrag von einer Million Franken im Durchschnitt 1,37 Prozent an Gebühren“. „Steuern, Gebühren im Rahmen von Fremdwährungen, Börsen- und Produktgebühren kommen oft noch hinzu. Besonders ins Gewicht kann dies bei den häufigen Fondsmandaten fallen. Hier zahlen Kunden doppelt, warnt Moneyland. Zur Mandatsgebühr kommen noch die Fondsgebühren (TER) hinzu“. …“billiger sind die digitalen Robo-Advisor, die aber oftmals gänzlich auf die Beratung der Kunden verzichten. Dem Vergleich zufolge kosten solche Angebote im Schnitt rund 0,7 bis 0,75 Prozent der Anlagesumme pro Jahr – rund die Hälfte dessen, was klassische Mandate kosten“. Mein Kommentar: Während die Robo-Advisor Kosten in Deutschland nur geringfügig unter denen der Schweiz liegen, können selbst strenge Impact- und ESG-Mandate inklusiver aller Kosten von einigen Vermögensverwaltern wesentlich günstiger und mit viel niedrigeren Mindestinvestments angeboten werden (vgl.; Hinweis: Mit Diversifikator arbeite ich auch für andere Anbieter).

Optimal muss nicht gut sein: The Argument for Bonds in Strategic Asset Allocation von Aron Gottesman und Matthew Morey vom 24. Juli 2020: “Using 10-year time periods, we find that strategic allocations to various asset classes can vary widely depending upon the time period chosen. For example, over the period 1999-2008 (for moderate risk of 11 percent standard deviation) we find the optimal allocation is 99.09 percent to emerging market bonds. However, over the period 2010-2019 we find that this percentage to emerging market bonds falls off to only 13.70 percent. Similarly, we find the same sort of results with domestic equities, emerging equities and real estate” (S. 13). Mein Kommentar: Dieser Beitrag zeigt, wie unrealistisch “optimale“ Ergebnisse sein können bzw. wie stark Optimierungen von Methoden, Inputdaten und Restriktionen abhängen können.

Kann man von alten Megatrends lernen? Extreme Stock Market Performers, Part II: Do Technology Stocks Dominate? Von Hendrik Bessembinder vom 22. Juli 2020: “This study reports on decade-horizon outcomes for investors in U.S. common stocks since 1950. Despite the stellar performance of investments in firms such as Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft, Technology stocks as a group are more likely to appear on a list of the worst rather than best performers. Telecommunications, Healthcare/Pharmaceutical, and Energy firms are disproportionately represented among those with the best decade-horizon stock returns”… (Abstract).

Gesundheitsinvestments können sich sehr lohnen: Prioritizing health A prescription for prosperity vom McKinsey Global Institute vom 8. Juli 2020: “Using interventions that already exist today, the global disease burden could be reduced by about 40 percent over the next two decades. …. Health innovations in the visible pipeline could cut the disease burden by a further 6 to 10 percent. …. Better health could add $12 trillion to global GDP in 2040, an 8 percent boost that translates into 0.4 percent faster growth every year. … The economic return could be $2 to $4 for each $1 invested in better health” (S. VI).

Profis sind schlechte Fondsselekteure: Choosing Investment Managers von Amit Goyal, Sunil Wahal und Deniz Yavuz vom 16. Juli 2020: “We study how pension plans, endowments, foundations, and sovereign wealth funds choose public equity and fixed income investment managers. Our focus is on the counterfactual: who these plan sponsors could have chosen compared to whom they actually chose. We find two aspects of the choice to be critically important: prior performance and personal connections between individuals employed by these institutions. A cautious reading of the overall evidence suggests that there are no positive excess returns to selection based on either prior performance or connections. But there are a variety of tests in which post-hiring excess returns, both with and without connections, are negative” (S. 32).

Faktoranalysen können sehr unterschiedlich erstellt werden: Performance Attribution – History and Progress von Carl Bacon vom CFA Institute Research Foundation vom 23. Dezember 2019: “The evolution of attribution analysis is clear, easy to trace, and illustrated in Figure 9, which maps, not necessarily in chronological order, the major developments in attribution analysis discussed in this review” (S. 33; vgl.

Diversifikation und Alternative Investments

Sammlerobjekte haben keine besonders attraktiven Renditen: Rich Men’s Hobby or Question of Personality: Who Considers Collectibles as Alternative Investment? von Jens Kleine und Thomas Peschke vom 24. Juli 2020: “From a purely rational perspective, it does not seem too promising to invest in collectibles for at least three reasons. Firstly, collectibles are speculative assets that provide no income. Furthermore, their financial performance is on average dominated by that of traditional asset classes.1 Secondly, a potential diversification effect with respect to traditional asset classes has to be treated with caution (see e.g. Burton and Jacobsen, 1999). Collectibles as an asset class may not necessarily protect against massive price declines during crisis periods and, if so, tend to be rather illiquid. Also, they are subject to fashions and fads that in turn strongly affect their long term value and liquidity. Lastly, collectibles are subject to specific costs and risks (such as e.g. maintenance, storage, theft, counterfeiting or physical destruction), which apply to a much lesser extent to traditional investments (see e.g. McInish and Srivastava, 1982). Nevertheless, the market for collectibles not only endures but has grown recently2” (S. 1). …  Collectors “possess sufficient means and an open personality that allows them to try new ways of experience coupled with external non-financial utility gains. At the same time they appear tougher and more self-reliant than others in the way they do business” (S. 11).

Valide Kritik an Diversifikation mit alternativen Investments: Endowment Performance von Richard Ennis vom 24. Juli 2020: “Notwithstanding the existence of a handful of arguably skillful endowment fund managers in the realm of alternative investments, the vast majority of endowment funds incur costs that overwhelm the limited opportunity to exploit mispricing. The alt-heavy approach to investing has failed to provide a diversification benefit and has significantly underperformed simpler approaches employing stocks and bonds alone. Absent a change in strategy, the great majority of endowments, large and small, are likely to underperform by a significant margin in the years ahead. Managers confident of their ability to identify truly profitable alternative investments consistently should concentrate those investments to a much greater extent, just as they should do with traditional active portfolios. Absent such confidence, they should shift assets to passive investments” (S. 17).

Sind Alternatives schlecht für die Rendite? Three Eras of Endowment Performance Between 1974 and 2019 von Richard Ennis vom 12. August 2020: „Three distinct eras define endowment fund performance since 1974. The first was when they held predominantly stocks and bonds. The second era witnessed spectacular performance from alternative investments. The final era, post-GFC, was one in which alternative investments became a source of deadweight diversification” (S. 1; GFC = Global Financial Crisis). … “The average number of managers for endowments with assets over $1 billion in 2019 was 108, substantially more than the average of 18 in 1994, when the Golden Age began. With so many managers nowadays, certainly there are a lot of offsetting active bets (deadweight) in the mix. … Given prevailing diversification patterns, endowments’ investment expenditures of 1-2% of asset-value simply overwhelm the opportunity to exploit mispricing.” (S. 9).

ESG Defizite: Corporate Social Responsability (CSR) und ESG Ratings

Heftige Reportingkritik an der Ölindustrie: Exposing a ticking time bomb – How fossil fuel industry fraud is setting us up for a financial implosion – and what whistleblowers can do about it von John Kostyak et al. vom National Whistleblower Center vom Juli 2020: “We find that a vast array of deceptions about climate risk are underway in the fossil fuel industry. These deceptions generally fall into three categories: • Overstating the value of reserves • Understating environmental liabilities • Understating physical risks to infrastructure”. … “Deception about the financial risks of climate change is pervasive across the fossil fuel industry” (S. 6).

Lieferketten sollten nicht überoptimiert werden: Could climate become the weak link in your supply chain? McKinsey Global Institute case study vom Juni 220: “Supply chains and the infrastructure that supports them are designed for a stable climate. As hazards evolve, it will be necessary to increase investment in adaptation, possibly at the expense of efficiency” (S. 26).

Deutsche Großunternehmen sollten besser reporten: Nachhaltigkeitsberichte deutscher Grossunternehmen – 4. Untersuchung der Berichterstattung nach den GRI-Standards von Manfred zur Nieden, Max Braun und Anil Gürtürk von Transparency International Deutschland vom Juli 2020: „Die Richtlinien der Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) haben sich international weitgehend als Standard für die Nachhaltigkeitsberichterstattung durchgesetzt. …  Die Berichterstattung zur Korruptionsbekämpfung in deutschen Unternehmen mit den höchsten Berichtsqualität ist seit 2016 unverändert auf niedrigem Niveau. Bei dem Standard 205 – Korruptionsbekämpfung wird weniger als die Hälfte der durch die GRI-Standards geforderten Informationen angegeben. Die Auslassungen werden in 70 Prozent der Fälle nicht begründet. … Es mangelt an kritischem Blick der externen Prüfer – mehr Verbindlichkeit und Transparenz sind nötig“ (S. 3).

Eine proaktive Klimapolitik ist nötig: Climate-related financial policy in a world of radical uncertainty: Towards a precautionary approach Hugues Chenet, Josh Ryan-Collins and Frank van Lerven vom UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose vom 9. Februar 2020: Climate related financial risks (CRFR) “are characterised by radical uncertainty, meaning conventional backwards-looking probabilistic financial risk modelling is not fit for purpose in dealing with them. While scenario analysis and stress testing to some extent recognise the uncertainty problem, they remain based upon assumptions that are subject to significant uncertainty and do not sufficiently justify action in the short term, despite widespread recognition of the risks posed by inaction”. A Precautionary Financial Policy (PFP) approach helps justify preventative actions now to mitigate the potentially catastrophic financial and economic damages created by climate change, and shape financial markets in a clear direction towards a preferred net-zero carbon future”. …. “This paper is an exploration and attempt to lay out a new policy framework for dealing with CRFR rather than a turn-key solution for financial regulation in the face of such risks” (S. 24).

Aber muss das Rad wirklich neu erfunden bzw. reguliert werden? Umweltbezogene und menschenrechtliche Sorgfaltspflichten als Ansatz zur Stärkung einer nachhaltigen Unternehmensführung von Cara-Sophie Scherf, Nele Kampffmeyer, Peter Gailhofer, David Krebs, Constantin Hartmann, Remo Klinger im Auftrag des Umweltbundesamtes vom Juli 2020: „Im Kontext globaler Wertschöpfungsketten kommt es immer wieder zu gravierenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Umweltschädigungen. Von global tätigen Unternehmen wird zunehmend erwartet, dass sie die Verantwortung für die (globalen) Auswirkungen ihrer Geschäftstätigkeit und Geschäftsbeziehungen übernehmen. … Immer häufiger wird dabei der Ansatz der Sorgfaltspflichten zugrunde gelegt. Das Konzept sieht vor, dass Unternehmen geeignete Verfahren etablieren, um ihre möglichen und tatsächlichen negativen Auswirkungen zu ermitteln und entsprechende (Gegen-)Maßnahmen ergreifen, um diese Auswirkungen zu vermeiden, zu beenden oder auch wiedergutzumachen, sofern bereits Schäden eingetreten sind. … Vor diesem Hintergrund formuliert der vorliegende Bericht Empfehlungen zur Umsetzung insbesondere umweltbezogener Sorgfaltspflichten durch Unternehmen“ (S. 17). „Im Ergebnis wird empfohlen, ein neues Stammgesetz zu schaffen, das die menschenrechtliche und umweltbezogene Sorgfaltspflicht integriert, rechtsgebiet- und branchenübergreifend regelt“ (S. 19). Mein Kommentar: Ich habe keine Hinweise zu ESG Ratings bzw. Ratingagenturen gefunden, dabei beurteilen die schon jahrelang sehr viele der hier relevanten Aspekte. Unternehmen berichten bereits viele Informationen an diese Agenturen. Ist eine zusätzliche (deutsche) Regulierung in dieser Form wirklich nötig?

Gute Ergänzung von ESG Ratings (1): Impact-weighted financial accounts: The Missing Piece for an Impact Economy von George Serafeim, Robert Zochowski und Jen Downing von der Harvard Business School von 2019: “Impact-weighted accounts are line items on a financial statement, such as an income statement or a balance sheet, which are added to supplement the statement of financial health and performance by reflecting a company’s positive and negative impacts on employees, customers, the environment and the broader society” (S. 5). … “However, as in the case of many ESG managers, most companies are measuring inputs and activities rather than impacts” (S. 6).

Gute Ergänzung von ESG Ratings (2): Corporate Environmental Impact: Measurement, Data and Information von David Freiberg, DG Park George Serafeim und Robert Zochowski vom 22. Juli 2020: “We find the median environmental impact as a percentage of an organization’s sales (operating income) is close to 2% (20%) and above 10% (100%) in 11 out of 67 industries, suggesting a significant level of ‘hidden liabilities’ and potential for value erosion if environmental impacts are priced. …. We find that close to 60% (53%) of the variation in environmental impact scaled by sales (operating income) is driven by industry membership, while approximately 30% (36%) can be attributed to firm specific factors, with the remaining variation driven by country and more granular industry classifications. …. we find that our estimates of environmental intensity contain information different from that in environmental ratings especially when comparing firms within industries. …. when environmental ratings are included in the model, the monetized environmental estimates have a more meaningful economic and statistical association than any of the ratings, suggesting greater explanatory value and greater statistical significance. In fairness to the ratings providers, they are not necessarily measuring impact. Rather, they intend to integrate multiple signals of how well a company is managing environment-related risks and opportunities. … Results from our analysis show that firms with higher environmental intensity have lower stock returns, higher volatility, and higher systematic risk. …. Furthermore, we find that environmental ratings do not demonstrate a significant relationship with these financial characteristics besides volatility ….  surprisingly, we find that environmental intensity is not reflected in some industries with visibly large environmental impacts such as those in the Utilities sector” (S. 35/36).

Portfolio-Klimaanalyse ist schwierig: Portfolio alignment to a 2°C trajectory: science or art? Von Julie Raynaudb, Peter Tankovc und Stéphane Voisin vom 3. August 2020: A portfolio climate “assessment informs investors about the climate performance of their portfolios, but is subject to a range of uncertainties and ad hoc assumptions, related, in particular, to: – The measurement of the climate performance of assets and portfolio; – The estimation of their future climate performance, when a forward-looking assessment is used; – Multiple uncertainties embedded in the benchmark macroeconomic scenarios, including the technological uncertainty, the uncertainty related to non-CO2 emissions, model uncertainty and natural climate variability; – Assumptions needed to disaggregate the macro pathways to micro benchmarks; – Assumptions regarding the calculation of temperature alignment; – When an ITR is used, calculation of the temperature metric itself. Due to this deep uncertainty and differences in underlying assumptions, alignment assessment methodologies used by different providers are not comparable among themselves” (S. 14).

Wasserrisiken und -chancen: Troubled waters Water stress risks to portfolios von Andre Bertolotti und Yuxi Suo vom Blackrock investment Institute vom Juli 2020: Roughly 60% of the global REIT properties we were able to geolocate will experience high water stress by 2030, we find, driven by increased urbanization and the effects of climate change. This is more than double the number today. Water-related issues are not yet a material cash-flow driver for REITs, in our view, and the risks can be mitigated. Yet they may become more material over time due to knock-on effects such as regulatory shifts”. …. “Water stress has wide-ranging implications across asset classes. We show how the agriculture, electric power and food and beverage industries may be most at risk. The creditworthiness of some countries, states and municipalities facing water shortages could also come under threat as they face additional costs to fortify their water infrastructure. This comes on top of other growing physical climate risks such as exposure to flooding and other extreme weather events. • Companies resilient to water stress and other climate-related risks may fetch a premium in the transition to a more sustainable world, we believe” (S. 3; vgl.

ESG-Aufklärung ist nötig: Ethical investors left confused by industry labels amid “greenwashing” concerns, Which? Reveals von Which vom 1. August 2020: “A new Which? survey found very few people could pick the correct definition of ethical investing – as defined by fund managers – despite 37 per cent of respondents answering that they held these types of funds. Just 10 per cent of investors were able to accurately define it, meaning they were only marginally more successful than non-investors (6%)” (vgl.

ESG Defizite: ESG Investments und Performance

Mögliche Outperformance mit ESG: Going Green Means Being in the Black von Ralf Conen, Stefan Hartmann und Markus Rudolf vom 4. August 2020: “Penalties on particularly low corporate social performance do not unconditionally imply rewards for particularly good corporate social performance and vice versa. This finding holds for market neutral as well as risk factor adjusted portfolios. This is also why the significance of some long-short portfolios is watered down compared to the long only case” (S. 38). …. “The effect of ESG on portfolio performance is asymmetric and does not appear to be constant over time. We have also shown that markets reward short and long-term performance along ESG dimensions, namely consistency, differently. Lastly, the effect of ESG on portfolio performance is not globally integrated, but differs across regions in regards to its direction, magnitude and statistical significance. Orientating towards high (or in some markets low) ESG stocks thus enables money managers to potentially beat the market. While their outperformance is in some cases explained by an implicit tilt towards other risk factors, high ESG tilts, when factor neutralized, offer chances for economically and statistically significant alpha. Easy to implement screening strategies form a straightforward, yet diversified entry tool to monetize the underlying factor” (S. 42; vgl.

ESG war in der Coronakrise kein wichtiges Selektionskriterium: Where do Institutional Investors Seek Shelter when Disaster Strikes? Evidence from COVID-19 von Simon Glossner, Pedro Matos, Stefano Ramelli und Alexander Wagner vom 27. Juli 2020: “institutions valued financial resiliency (high cash, low leverage) to insure against the indeterminate duration of the cash flow shortfall” (S. 22). …. ‘‘soft’’ characteristics such as those captured by ESG scores do not appear to have generated extra interest from institutional investors”. …”retail investors — at least the ones we capture with the Robinhood trading proxy — increased their interest in more financially-fragile firms, hence revealing significantly more risk-tolerance than their institutional counterparts in times of crisis” (S. 23).

In Bezug auf ESG müssen Banken noch viel tun: Diese ESG-Strategien kommen in der Vermögensverwaltung zum Einsatz von Norbert Wulf vom 5. August 2020 im Mein Kommentar: Banken bieten ESG-Strategien meist noch nicht lange an und es gibt immer noch hohe Einstiegshürden und sehr wenig Auswahl bzw. die Strategien erfüllen keine strengen Nachhaltigkeitsanforderungen. Es geht aber auch anders, vgl. Solche Strategien biete ich auch anderen Vermögensverwaltern an.

ESG kann erheblich ausgebaut werden und führt zu mehr Wettbewerb: Verantwortliche Investments: Qualitative Anforderungen an die professionelle Umsetzung von ESG-Integration im Asset Management von Matthias Stapelfeldt und Helge Wulsdorf für das Forum Nachhaltige Geldanlagen vom Juli 2020: „ESG-Berichterstattung über verantwortliche Investments noch wenig ausgeprägt ist … Ein systematisches mit dem Analyseprozess verbundenes ESG-Engagement ist bislang nicht für verantwortliche Investmentfonds etabliert“ (S. 23). … „Die regulierungsbedingte Einbeziehung von ESG-Aspekten in verantwortliche Investmentprodukte sowie die vorgeschriebene Integration in die Beratungsprozesse werden zu grundsätzlichen Änderungen in der Produktpolitik bei den Anbietern führen. Die bisherigen „normalen“ Produkte müssen sich in der Anlageberatung nachhaltigkeitsbezogenen Fragen der Kunden stellen – auch wenn sie nicht nachhaltig sind. Es wird Performance- aber auch ESG-Vergleiche zwischen ähnlich beschaffenen verantwortlichen und nachhaltigen Produkten geben, so dass eine neue Art von Wettbewerb für verantwortliche Produkte entsteht. Dies führt zu mehr Transparenz und Qualität in den Investmentprozessen“ (S. 24; vgl.

Blackrock, Allianz und Deutsche Bank machen viel Kohle: Fool’s Gold – The financial institutions risking our renewable energy future with coal von Europe Beyond Coal vom 15. Juli 2020: “The report takes a close look at eight European financial institutions with the most significant ties to eight significant coal utilities in Europe that are responsible for half of all EU coal based CO₂ emissions …. Most of the assessed utilities show signs of a coal exit but not in the timelines required by science or with problematic design for the transition of their energy portfolios. … This research finds that the most coal-exposed investor associated with these utilities, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, has invested €1.5 billion in shares and bonds. Other highly important investors include Crédit Agricole, Allianz’s through third party assets, and Deutsche Bank. In total, the investment by the four largest investors equalled €5.0 billion. On the creditor side, UniCredit was the largest bank, providing €2.8 billion in loans and underwriting services, followed by BNP Paribas, Barclays and Société Générale since the IPCC 1.5 °C report was released in October 2018. In total, the crediting has amounted up to €7.9 billion” (S. 4). ….”BlackRock’s investments in the eight European coal power utilities total €7.0 billion” (S. 5).

Public Relations statt nachhaltigem Bankverhalten: “Trust Us, We’re Equator Banks” The presence or absence of grievance mechanisms and stakeholder engagement processes under the Equator Principles von BankTrack vom 11. August 2020: “The Equator Principles – banks’ own rules for financing large infrastructure projects – require banks to ensure that high-risk projects they finance have stakeholder engagement processes and project-level grievance mechanisms in place. …. We found that evidence of a stakeholder engagement processes or a project-level complaints mechanisms was missing in 24 out of 37 projects analysed (65%). In 16 cases (43%), neither a stakeholder engagement process nor a project-level complaints mechanism could be found” (S. 1). Mein Kommentar: Für die von der KfW mitfinanzierten Projekte sieht es aber ganz gut aus.

ESG Defizite: SDG bzw. Impactinvestments

Kritik an der Europäischen Investmentbank (EIB): The EU Climate Bank – Greenwashing or a banking revolution? Von Counter Balance vom Juni 2020: “While the new EIB energy policy adopted in November 2019 is a key step forward, with the potential to strongly contribute to a just transition in Europe, it nevertheless contains three important exceptions that could undermine the realisation of its objectives: >> one. The policy allows the EIB to continue approving projects from the 4th list of the so-called ‘Projects of Common Interest’ until the end of 2021, which contains 32 new fossil gas projects. >> two. It enables the financing of new highly-polluting fossil gas infrastructure, on the basis of a vague promise that it will one day transport ‘cleaner’ gas. >> three. The current threshold (Emissions Performance Standard) set for power generation remains extremely high and risks allowing gas power plants to receive EIB loans” (S. 7). …. 1 / THE FALSE PROMISE OF GREEN GAS …. The potential for truly sustainable renewable gas production in the EU is however only a fraction of what industry claims and will never be enough to substitute current fossil gas use. 2 / THE MYTH OF GREEN AVIATION Similarly, the myth of “green aviation” risks enabling further public investments in the aviation industry on the basis that it will be possible to make flying sustainable in the future. … 3 / THE RISKS OF BANKING ON NATURE The trend towards green finance, carbon and biodiversity offsetting and nature-based solutions also bears significant risks. Offsetting mechanisms present several unsolvable issues which makes them particularly unfit for truly protecting nature. They also tend to perpetuate injustices, with cases of land grabbing, community displacements and human rights abuses. 4 / CLIMATE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS? So-called “green” projects undertaken under development objectives can also have highly detrimental social impacts. … 5 / INFRASTRUCTURE MEGA-CORRIDORS: A DEVELOPMENT MODEL AT ODDS WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENT. The EIB support to infrastructure mega-corridors stands at odds with its climate commitments (S. 8). Mein Kommentar: Immer noch besser als staatliche Investments. Ich nutze Anleihen multinationaler Entwicklungsbanken statt Staatsanleihen, vgl.

SDG Reporting muss erheblich ausgebaut werden: Carrots and sticks – Sustainability Reporting Policy: Global trends in disclosure as the ESG agenda goes mainstream von der Global Reporting Initiative und der Universität Stellenbosch vom 31. Juli 2020: ”Our analysis for this edition includes over 600 reporting provisions … The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have gained prominence, yet explicit reference to SDGs in disclosure requirements remains limited” (S. 4).

Eine etwas andere doppelte Impactrendite: Conditional cash transfers to alleviate poverty also reduced deforestation in Indonesia von Paul Ferraro und Rhita Simorangkir in Science Advances vom 12. Juni 2020: “Solutions to poverty and ecosystem degradation are often framed as conicting. We ask whether Indonesia’s national anti-poverty program, which transfers cash to hundreds of thousands of poor households, reduced deforestation as a side benefit. Although the program has no direct link to conservation, we estimate that it reduced tree cover loss in villages by 30% (95% confidence interval, 10 to 50%). About half of the avoided losses were in primary forests, and reductions were larger when participation density was higher. The economic value the avoided carbon emissions alone compares favorably to program implementation costs. The program’s environmental impact appears to be mediated through channels widely available in developing nations: consumption smoothing, whereby cash substitutes for deforestation as a form of insurance, and consumption substitution, whereby market-purchased goods substitute for deforestation-sourced goods. The results imply that antipoverty programs targeted at the very poor can help achieve global environmental goals under certain conditions” (abstract).

Wenig ESG Defizite: Wealthtech

­US Robo SRI Outperformance aber nur wenig mehr SRI: The Robo Report™ Second Quarter 2020 von Backend Benchmarking vom 10. August 2020: “While Vanguard and Schwab continue to be leaders in terms of AUM, Betterment and Wealthfront have added customers and assets at a strong pace. We now estimate that robo advisors collectively manage $631 billion in assets. In 2019, we estimate the top five robo advice providers grew their AUM by 38%, on average. The industry, marked by closures and acquisitions, saw one of its three major independent providers, Personal Capital, acquired by retirement plan administrator Empower” (S. 3). “Most incumbent firms have already acquired, or developed in-house, automated offerings making competition difficult for new independents” (S. 29). …“Some firms are implementing a three-tiered approach with digital-only robo advice for the smallest and most cost-conscious individuals, hybrid-advice for those that prefer the ability to work with a live advisor or have more complex financial planning needs, and a traditional advice offering” (S. 30). Und in Bezug auf neue Entwicklungen: “Self-Driving Money is a step towards the integration of day-to-day spending and savings with long-term investing and goal planning” (S. 30). “When looking at the next wave of investing and trading technologies, direct indexing is a feature in which we expect to see continued innovation and product developments” (S. 32). “Portfolio Sustainability Scores in SRI-themed accounts were not significantly higher than their non-SRI counterparts” … (S. 22). …”The good news is that in the year-to-date, 1-year, and 2-year periods covered by our analysis, the majority of the equity portions of the SRI portfolios outperformed their non-SRI counterparts” (S. 24; vgl. für Deutschland

In den USA kann mit Modellportfolios Geld verdienen: The Model Portfolio Landscape in 5 Charts von Jason Kephart von Morningstar vom 6. August 2020: “Third-party model portfolios are on the rise–more than 400 have been launched since 2018”. … “models are offered as a blueprint for asset allocation and fund selection. This gives advisors discretion over underlying fund selection, rebalancing frequency, and potential tactical asset-allocation tilts …”. Blackrock hat mit 51 die meisten Modellportfolios (Durchschnittskosten 0,33% p.a.), Vanguard 44 (0,06%), Goldman Sachs 38 (0,3%) und Fidelity 31 (0,34%). Andere Anbieter sind u.a. SEI (0,69%), Charles Schwab (0,06%), Russell (0,71%), Invesco (0,26%), Natixis (0,68%), AQR (0,79%), State Street (0,13%) und Franklin Templeton (0,45%). Modellportfolios kosten im Schnitt knapp 0,4% pro Jahr (vgl.

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